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Abstract
This thesis addresses a number of questions on the optimal taxation of firms, with
particular emphasis on the challenges to taxation in developing economies. Chapter
1 exploits bunching of firms at a tax kink to identify the effect of a tax rate change
on investment. Building on the standard bunching framework, I estimate the fre-
quency distribution of firms around the kink, and the share of bunching firms with
excess investment. I apply this approach to administrative tax returns for firms in
the United Kingdom and find that excess investment explains up to 20% of bunch-
ing. Chapter 2 examines the trade-off between production efficiency and revenue
efficiency in taxation under imperfect enforcement. We exploit quasi-experimental
variation created by a minimum tax scheme, a production inefficient policy used in
many developing countries, which consists of taxing firms on turnover as their profit
rate falls below a certain threshold. Using administrative tax records of corpora-
tions in Pakistan, we find large bunching around the profit rate kink createded by the
minimum tax scheme and estimate that the turnover tax reduces evasion by up to
60-70% of corporate income. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of interventions by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on countries’ likelihood of adopting the value-
added tax (VAT). I discuss how the IMF has promoted VAT adoption by making
lending conditional on adoption, providing administrative and technical assistance,
and reducing the political costs of adoption. Applying a Cox proportional hazard
model to a cross-country panel for the period 1975-2000, I find that countries that
are under a lending agreement with the IMF are three times as likely to adopt the
VAT than are countries not under a lending agreement.
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Introduction
This thesis addresses a number of questions on the optimal taxation of firms, with
particular emphasis on the challenges to taxation in developing economies. A key
motivation for this study is the fact that developing economies raise less tax revenue
as a share of GDP than developed economies (17.6% vs. 25%) and are much more
reliant on corporate taxation as a source of revenue (42.3% vs. 17.85% of tax revenue,
Gordon & Li 2009). I study how investment responds to corporate taxation, discuss
the trade-off between production and revenue efficiency in taxation under imperfect
enforcement, and examine the determinants of the adoption of the value-added tax
(VAT), a consumption tax levied at firm level. The first two chapters exploit quasi-
experimental variation from kinks in the corporate tax schedule and use corporate
tax return data for the universe of firms in the United Kingdom (UK) and Pakistan.
The third chapter estimates a Cox hazard model on cross-country data. Overall,
this work contributes to a growing literature on public finance and development
reviewed in Besley & Persson (2013).
Chapter 1 exploits bunching of firms at a tax kink as quasi-experimental
variation to identify the effect of a tax rate change on investment, and explore how
this effect interacts with variation in capital depreciation rates. The idea is that
firms with a taxable income slightly above the kink have an incentive to reduce
their income to bunch at the kink, and increasing investment is one possible strat-
egy for that. This means that bunching of firms should be accompanied by a spike
in investment at the kink. Building on the standard bunching framework, I estimate
the frequency distribution of firms around the kink, and the share of bunchers with
excess investments at the extensive and intensive margin. I apply this approach to
administrative tax return data for the universe of UK firms from 2001-2007, and
show that investment by small firms significantly responds to a tax rate change. I
find large and significant spikes in the share of capital investors and median capital
costs at the 10k kink. The spikes are larger in 2002-2005 when the kink is larger, and
for quickly depreciating capital items, which yield larger tax reductions. I estimate
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that extensive margin investments explain 7.7-19.2% of bunching and intensive mar-
gin investments explain 4.3-16.8% of bunching. Evidence from subsample analysis
supports the interpretation of the observed behaviour as real investment rather than
evasion or avoidance.
Chapter 2 analyzes the design of tax systems under imperfect enforcement.
A common policy in developing countries is to impose minimum tax schemes whereby
firms are taxed either on profits or on turnover, depending on which tax liability is
larger. This production inefficient tax policy has been motivated by the idea that
the broader turnover tax base is harder to evade. Minimum tax schemes give rise to
a kink point in firms’ choice sets as the tax rate and tax base jump discontinuously
when one tax liability surpasses the other. Using administrative tax records on
corporations in Pakistan, we find large bunching around the minimum tax kink. We
show that the combined tax rate and tax base change at the kink provides small real
incentives for bunching, making the policy ideal for eliciting evasion. We develop
an empirical approach allowing us to put (tight) bounds on the evasion response to
switches between profit and turnover taxation, and find that turnover taxes reduce
evasion by up to 60-70% of corporate income. Our analysis sheds new light on the
use of production-inefficient tax tools in countries with limited tax capacity and can
easily be replicated in other contexts as the quasi-experimental variation needed is
ubiquitous.
Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of interventions by the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) on the likelihood of countries to adopt the VAT. I discuss how
the IMF has promoted VAT adoption by making lending conditional on adoption,
providing administrative and technical assistance, and reducing the political costs
of adoption. I use the Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the impact of
IMF lending on VAT adoption in a panel of 125 countries from 1975-2000. I find
that countries that are under a lending agreement with the IMF are three times as
likely to adopt the VAT than are countries not under a lending agreement. I show
that this effect is not driven by omitted variables such as debt crises and provide
suggestive evidence against reverse causality. I also find that political factors play a
less prominent role in VAT adoption than theory predicts. Political instability does
not affect VAT adoption and autocracy reduces the likelihood of adoption only in
the absence of IMF lending.
Chapter 1
The Investment Effect of Taxation: Evidence from a
Corporate Tax Kink
1.1 Introduction
The impact of tax policy on corporate investment continues to be debated among
economists and policymakers. As the corporate income tax is not a tax on pure prof-
its,1 theory predicts that the tax rate and depreciation allowance schedule should
affect firms’ investment decisions. A reduction in the tax rate would increase the
after-tax return to investment, while an increase in capital depreciation rates would
reduce the cost of investment. As investment is much more volatile than other
macroeconomic variables and has important multiplier effects on the economy, poli-
cymakers have frequently tried to stimulate investment through tax incentives. The
1981 introduction of the investment tax credit by Reagan, the 2002 US bonus de-
preciation policy,2 and the zero starting rate for firms with a taxable income below
£10,0003 in the UK, in place during 2002-2005, are just a few examples of such
stimulus policies.
While the use of investment tax incentives abounds, it is empirically difficult
to demonstrate a positive causal effect of tax policy on investment. The line of
causality between investment and tax policy runs both ways, as tax reforms are
often motivated by sluggish investment, and a host of other macroeconomic variables
affects both tax policy and investment. The literature so far has shown that the Hall-
1For the multiple reasons why the corporate income tax is not a tax on pure profits, see Auerbach
et al. (2010) and Hassett & Hubbard (2002).
2Temporary increase in capital depreciation rates.
3Henceforth 10k for simplicity.
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Jorgenson user cost of capital has a large impact on investment4, but this estimate
confounds the effects of different tax policy parameters, namely the tax rate and
capital depreciation allowance. Work attempting to disentangle these effects by
examining specific tax parameter changes, such as the bonus depreciation policy
found only weak evidence for tax incentive effects (e.g. Cohen & Cummins 2006,
House & Shapiro 2008).
This paper exploits bunching of firms at a kink point, a taxable income
threshold at which the marginal tax rate changes discontinuously, as quasi-experimental
variation. This allows me to identify the effect of a tax rate change on investment,
and to explore how this effect interacts with variation in capital depreciation rates.
The idea is that firms with a taxable income slightly above the kink have an incentive
to reduce their income to bunch at the kink, and increasing investment is one pos-
sible strategy for that. Investment translates into capital depreciation allowances,
which are deducted from taxable income and can measure up to 100% of the under-
lying expenditure in the year of purchase, depending on the capital type. If firms
move to the kink by increasing investment, bunching should be accompanied by a
spike in investment at the kink. My estimation builds on the bunching approach
of estimating the elasticity of taxable income (ETI), as developed by Saez (2010)
and applied to corporations by Bach (2012) and Devereux et al. (2013). In addition
to the frequency distribution of firms, I estimate the size of the investment spike,
i.e. the number of firms with higher than predicted investment levels around the
kink. I consider the size of the investment spike at both the extensive margin (share
of capital investors) and the intensive margin (median capital costs for investors).
This allows me to derive the number of investment bunchers, bunchers that moved
to the kink inter alia by investing.
I apply this approach to study the investment effect of taxation in the
UK, a setting which presents two methodological advantages. First, the UK tax
schedule provides a compelling source of variation for my study, featuring a large
and salient kink at 10k of taxable income during 2001-2005. The size of the tax rate
jump at this kink varies over time from 12.5 to 23.75 percentage points, creating
stronger incentives to bunch at the kink in years with a larger tax rate jump. In
addition, variation in capital depreciation rates across capital types creates variation
in the suitability of different capital investments as instruments for bunching, with
investments yielding larger allowances in the year of purchase more suitable for
bunching. Combining these two types of variation allows me to distinguish bunching-
induced variation in investment around the 10k kink from any other changes in
investment that occur around the kink. The second advantage of the UK setting is
the availability of administrative tax return data, which covers the universe of UK
4See Hassett & Hubbard (2002) for a review.
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firms for 2001-2007, and contains precise measures of investment-induced taxable
income reductions (capital depreciation allowances).
My empirical findings show that investment by small firms significantly re-
sponds to a tax rate change. First, I find large and statistically significant spikes in
the share of capital investors and median capital costs at the 10k kink. Consistent
with the idea of bunching through investment, the spikes are larger in 2002-2005
when the kink is larger, and also larger for quickly depreciating capital items, which
yield larger tax reductions. Second, I quantify the contribution of this investment
behaviour to bunching, and find that extensive margin investments explain 7.7-
19.2% of bunching and intensive margin investments explain 4.3-16.8% of bunching.
Third, I provide evidence supporting the interpretation of the observed behaviour as
real investment rather than evasion (over-reporting) or avoidance (transfer pricing,
income shifting). The bunching response to the kink is stronger in subsamples char-
acterized by high investment propensity (growing firms, manufacturing and retail
sector firms, high cost-margin firms), and weaker in subsamples characterized by
high ease of evasion (firms with below median turnover and number of employees).
The scope to engage in avoidance schemes like cost manipulation through transfer
pricing or shifting income to international tax havens is extremely limited for firms
with a taxable income around 10k, as less than 3% of them are members of a group
or register any overseas income.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, my paper
relates to the large literature estimating Hall-Jorgenson style user cost of capital
models. This literature either relies on tax reforms as instruments for user cost of
capital changes in a generalized methods of moments estimation (Cummins et al.
1994; Cummins et al. 1996), or compares forecast errors in investment and the user
cost of capital (Auerbach & Hassett 1991). My work echoes this literature’s findings
of a significant effect of tax policy on investment, but presents two methodological
advantages. Contrary to previous studies, which confound the effect of different tax
policy parameters, my quasi-experimental design allows me to isolate the effect of
a tax rate change, and to explore its interaction with capital allowance rates. In
addition, my study uses administrative tax return data, which is more accurately
measured than the accounting data used in previous studies, is available for a larger
sample of firms, and provides direct measures of capital depreciation allowances
claimed.
Second, my work is related to the more recent literature examining the effect
of the bonus depreciation policy, using difference-in-difference-type strategies (Co-
hen & Cummins 2006) or a structural approach (House & Shapiro 2008; Auerbach
et al. 2008). Contrary to this literature, which remains divided on the stimulat-
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ing effect of the policy, I provide clear evidence for a positive effect of a tax rate
decrease, and show that capital depreciation rates matter for the composition of
capital investment.
Third, this paper builds on the use of bunching at kink points to estimate
the ETI, an approach developed by Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven &
Waseem (2013), and applied to firms by Bach (2012), Devereux et al. (2013) and Best
et al. (2013). I show how estimating the distribution of taxable income components
such as investment provides information on the underlying drivers of bunching. This
empirical approach is not confined to estimating investment responses only, but can
also be used more generally to decompose the response to taxation in contexts with
kinked tax schedules.
Finally, my paper contributes to research on the decomposition of taxable
income changes, providing the first empirical evidence of real responses by firms.
Gordon & Slemrod (2000), Saez (2004) and Devereux et al. (2013) find evidence
that changes in corporate profit margins in the UK and US are partly due to tax-
rate induced income shifting from the corporate to the personal tax base. Almunia
& Lopez-Rodriguez (2012) and Seim (2012) argue that responses of Spanish firms to
an enforcement notch, and of Swedish personal taxpayers to a wealth tax kink are
entirely driven by reporting effects. Similarly, Best et al. (2013) show that bunching
at the minimum tax kink in Pakistan must be largely driven by evasion. This
paper is the first to provide well-identified evidence of a real investment response to
taxation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 develops the empirical strat-
egy. Section 1.3 introduces the context and data. Section 1.4 presents the empirical
results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Strategy
This section presents a novel empirical strategy for investigating firms’ response to
taxation. Section 1.2.1 reviews how bunching at kink points is used to estimate the
ETI. Section 1.2.2 shows that examining the distribution of investment around tax
kinks helps to identify the response of investment to a tax rate change.
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1.2.1 Estimating Bunching
As proposed by Saez (2010), I use bunching in the distribution of taxable income
around a kink point in the tax schedule to estimate the ETI. Panel A of Figure
1.I illustrates this idea. With a constant marginal tax rate τ1 and no kink, taxable
income pi follows a smooth frequency distribution (red dashed line). Now consider
the introduction of a higher marginal tax rate τ2 for profits above some threshold pi?
(marked by a black solid line). Assume that firms have a convex cost function (or
a concave production function) and maximize after-tax profits. With the new tax
regime, all firms with pi > pi? reoptimize and move to a lower profit level. Firms in
some interval [pi?, pi? + ∆pi?] will no longer find it profitable to produce pi > pi? and
thus move to the kink (black solid line). The new distribution of profits (blue solid
line) has a spike at pi? and a lower frequency for pi > pi?.
As the excess mass at the kink must equal the (shaded) area below the
distribution from which bunchers move to the kink, the excess mass indicates the
income change ∆pi? of the marginal buncher. To see how this translates into an
estimate of the ETI, abstract from income effects by assuming that the jump in the
marginal tax rate is small, and consider that the compensated elasticity of taxable
income pi with respect the tax rate τ is
 = dpi
?
pi?
(1− τ)
dτ
. (1.1)
Assuming furthermore that the frequency distribution f(pi) is uniform around the
kink, the number of bunchers is
B = dpi?f(pi?). (1.2)
Transforming B into an estimate of the excess mass b through b(τ1, τ2) = B/f(pi?),
we can thus approximate5  as
 ' b(τ1, τ2)
pi? · log 1−τ11−τ2
. (1.3)
To implement the estimation empirically, I follow the strategy developed
by Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven & Waseem (2013), as illustrated in Panel B of
Figure 1.I. The figure shows the empirical frequency (blue curly line) which, due to
optimization frictions, does not feature a precise spike but rather diffuse bunching
around the kink. I estimate a counterfactual frequency (red solid line) by fitting a
5Saez (2010) shows that this approximation also applies to the general case in which the tax rate
change at the kink is not small, if one assumes a quasi-linear utility (production) function, so
that the compensated and uncompensated elastities are the same.
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Figure 1.I: Estimating Bunching
A: Theory
Frequency
pi
pi? pi? + ∆pi?
Frequency with kink (τ = τ2 > τ1 if pi ≥ pi?)
Frequency without kink (τ = τ1∀pi)
Bunchers
Marginal Buncher
B: Empirical Implementation
Frequency
pi
pi? pi? + ∆pi?
Empirical frequency f
Estimated frequency fˆ
Bunchers (excess mass b)
Marginal Buncher
Excluded range
Notes: The figure illustrates the theoretical underpinning (Panel A) and empirical imple-
mentation (Panel B) of the bunching strategy to estimate the elasticity of taxable income.
As Panel A shows, when there is no kink and all firms pay marginal tax rate τ = τ1,
independently of their taxable income, the frequency distribution of firms is smooth (red
dotted line). Now consider that a kink is introduced at income level pi? (marked by a black
vertical line), so that firms pay tax rate τ2 > τ1 for all units of income pi > pi?. Assuming
that firms have a convex cost function, firms with income in some interval [pi?, pi? + ∆pi?]
move to the kink. Firms at higher income levels also re-optimize and decrease their in-
come, but do not move all the way to the kink. The new frequency distribution (blue
solid line) features a spike at the kink and a lower frequency above the kink. The size of
the excess mass at the kink is equal to the interval (shaded area) from which firms move
to the kink, and thus indicates the income change ∆pi? of the marginal buncher. Panel
B shows the empirical frequency distribution (blue curly line) when there is a kink at τ?.
In practice, optimization frictions prevent firms from moving straight to the kink, so that
bunching takes the form of a diffuse excess mass around the kink, rather than a spike. The
empirical implementation consists in fitting a counterfactual frequency fˆ (red solid line)
as flexible polynomial to the observed frequency f , excluding the range around the kink in
which bunching takes place (marked by black dashed lines). The details of the estimation
are shown in equation (1.4). Estimating the excess mass b between the empirical and
the estimated frequency in the excluded range allows us to approximate the elasticity of
taxable income as  = b/ [pi? · log(1− τ1, 1− τ2)].
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q-order polynomial to the frequency counts fj of firms with a taxble income in bin
pij, excluding an interval [piL, piU ] around the kink point (marked by black dashed
lines):
fj =
q∑
l=0
βl(pij)l +
piU∑
k=piL
γk · 1[pij = k] +
∑
r∈R
[ρr + µr · pij] · 1[pij
r
∈ N ] + vj. (1.4)
The γk coefficients allow for different frequencies in the excluded range. As the
empirical frequency displays strong round number bunching at low income levels, I
control for round number bunching at multiples of R = {5k, 10k}, and allow these
round number effects to change linearly with income. The last term in the equation,
vj, is the error. I account for the fact that bunchers move to the kink from the right
by implementing an integration constraint, shifting the counterfactual distribution
to the right of the kink upwards, until the area under the counterfactual integrates
to the area under the empirical distribution. My empirical specification follows
Devereux et al. (2013) in that it relies on taxable income bins of £100, a fifth-order
polynomial, and an excluded range of [8k; 12k].6
The number of bunchers is calculated as the difference between the observed
frequency and the predicted frequency fˆk of equation (1.4), ignoring the contribution
of the γk coefficients for the excluded range:
B =
piU∑
k=piL
(fk − fˆk). (1.5)
This can be translated into the excess mass b and the elasticity , by scaling B by
the average predicted frequency in the Nk excluded bins:
b =
∑piU
k=piL(fk − fˆk)∑piU
k=piL fˆk/Nk
. (1.6)
All standard errors are derived from a bootstrap procedure, which samples from the
estimated residuals with replacement.
1.2.2 Estimating Investment Bunching
This section supplements the bunching framework with an analysis of investment
changes, to quantify their contribution to bunching. Investment in capital items
is measured by capital depreciation allowances, which capture the extent to which
6See Devereux et al. (2013) for robustness checks with different specifications. All estimations
rely on a [3k, 40k] estimation range, but the figures in section 1.4 zoom in on the [3k, 30k] range
around the kink.
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investment reduces taxable income. If firms reduce their taxable income by increas-
ing investment, bunching should be accompanied by an investment spike around
the kink. The size of the observed spike, combined with the underlying distribution
of investment, is used to estimate the number of investment bunchers, firms which
moved to the kink by increasing their level of investment. The approach is applied to
extensive and intensive margin changes in investment in sections 1.2.2.1 and 1.2.2.2
respectively.
1.2.2.1 Extensive Investment Bunching
To detect extensive investment bunching, I investigate whether firms that would not
otherwise invest make capital investments to move to the kink. I plot the share sj
of investors, i.e. firms in income bin pij that report capital depreciation allowance
cg > 0 for some capital item g. This plot is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1.II
(blue curly line). In the absence of the kink, the share of investors evolves smoothly
as a function of taxable income. Once a kink is introduced, firms intending to bunch
start investing in new capital items, move to the kink, and the share of investors
spikes at the kink.
To estimate the counterfactual share of investors (red solid line), I fit a q-
order polynomial to the share of investors sj in income bin pij, excluding bins in an
interval [piL, piU ] around the kink:
sj = δE01 · 1[pij < pi?] + δE02 · 1[pij > pi?] +
q∑
l=1
δEl (pij)l +
piU∑
k=piL
θEk · 1[pij = k] + uEj . (1.7)
The superscript E denotes the extensive margin, uj is the error term. The empirical
specification (bin size, order of polynomial, excluded range) is as in section 1.2.1.
The only distinction is that this specification allows for different constants above and
below the kink. Indeed, in the UK tax system, firms with a gross income below the
10k kink face a 0% tax rate in 2002-2005 and thus have no incentive to claim capital
depreciation allowances. The observed share of firms claiming capital allowances is
lower below the kink and discontinuously jumps up at the kink.7
The number of extensive investment bunchers is estimated as the excess
number of investors in the bunching range:
ME =
piU∑
k=piL
(sk − sˆk) · fk, (1.8)
7Round number investment spikes are controlled for by the control procedure presented in section
1.4.2.
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Figure 1.II: Estimating Investment Bunching
A: Extensive Margin
Share of investors
pi
pi?
Share of investors s
Estimated counterfactual sˆ
Investment bunchers
= (s− sˆ) · frequency
Excluded range
B: Intensive Margin
Median cost
pi
pi?
Median cost C
Estimated counterfactual Cˆ
Investment bunchers
= Firms with c ≥ Cˆ
−1/2 · frequency
Excluded range
Notes: The figure illustrates the empirical estimation of investment bunching, for extensive
and intensive margin investment changes. Panel A considers the extensive margin. It plots
the share of investors s (firms claiming positive capital depreciation allowances, blue curly
line) evolves smoothly as a function of taxable income outside of the excluded range
(marked by black dashed lines) but features a spike at the kink pi? (marked by a black
solid line). Due to optimization frictions, this spike is located not only at the kink, but
also covers income levels just below and above the kink, within the excluded range. The
fact that s is lower to the left of the excluded range is due to a particularity of the
UK tax system and is shown here to facilitate an understanding of the empirical results.
During 2002-2005, firms below the kink face a 0% tax rate, and thus have no incentive
to claim capital allowances for their investments, unless their gross income would place
them above the kink. The empirical strategy consists of estimating the counterfactual
share of investors sˆ (red solid line) by fitting a flexible polynomial to the observed share s,
excluding a range around the kink, as shown in equation (1.7). The number of extensive
investment bunchers is estimated as suggested in equation (1.8), as the excess number of
investors, i.e. the difference between the observed and counterfactual share of investors in
the excluded range. Panel B is similar to Panel A, but considers the intensive margin of
investment changes. It shows the observed median cost C (capital depreciation allowance)
for the sample of investors (blue curly line) and the counterfactual median cost Cˆ (red
solid line), estimated according to equation (1.11). See section (1.2.2.2) for a discussion of
why I consider the median cost to examine intensive investment bunching. The number
of intensive investment bunchers is estimated as the excess number of firms with above
median capital costs in the excluded range, as show in equation (1.12).
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where the counterfactual share of investors is the predicted value from equation
(1.7), ignoring the θˆEk coefficients for the excluded range,
sˆj = δˆE01 · 1[pij < pi?] + δˆE02 · 1[pij > pi?] +
q∑
l=1
δˆEl (pij)l. (1.9)
The contribution of extensive investment changes to bunching, and thus to the ETI,
is defined as the share of extensive investment bunchers in the total number of
bunchers:
ContE = M
E
B
. (1.10)
1.2.2.2 Intensive Investment Bunching
To detect intensive investment bunching, I investigate whether firms move to the
kink by increasing the size of their investment. I consider only investors and base my
analysis on the median cost (capital depreciation allowance) Cj of firms in income
bin pij. This choices warrents some explanation. First, I examine the median rather
than the mean cost, as the latter is much more noisy and influenced by outliers.
Second, I consider only investors, as the share of non-investors is above 90% for
most capital items. Examining intensive investments in the full sample would thus
require using not the median but different (endogenously chosen) percentiles for
different capital items.8
As illustrated in Panel B of Figure 1.II, the median cost (blue curly line)
evolves smoothly as a function of taxable income in the absence of a kink. Once the
kink is introduced, firms intending to bunch increase their investment levels, move
to the kink, and the median cost spikes at the kink. Analogously to the previous
section, I fit a q-degree polynomial to estimate the counterfactual median cost (red
solid line), excluding the bins around the kink:
Cj =
q∑
l=0
δIl (pij)l +
piU∑
k=piL
θIk · 1[pij = k] + uIj . (1.11)
The superscript I denotes the intensive margin. The number of intensive invest-
ment bunchers is estimated as the excess number of firms with a cost above the
counterfactual median:
M I =
piU∑
k=piL
∑
i∈j
1[pij = k] · 1[cij ≥ Cˆj]− 12
piU∑
k=piL
fk, (1.12)
where cij is the cost of firm i in income bin j, and the counterfactual median is the
8The median, for instance, is constant at 0 for all capital items except short-life machinery, but
the 10th percentile is uninformative for short-life machinery, in which almost all firms invest.
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predicted value from equation (1.11), ignoring the θˆIk coefficients for the excluded
range,
Cˆj =
q∑
l=0
δˆIl (pij)l. (1.13)
The contribution of intensive investment bunching is then defined as the share of
intensive investment bunchers in the total number of bunchers:
ContI = M
I
B
. (1.14)
It should be noted that the group of investors obviously confounds firms that
invest regardless of the kink and the extensive investment bunchers that invest to
move to the kink. The presence of extensive investment bunchers, which most likely
have below-median cost levels, would bias the median cost downward for investors
in the excluded range. I therefore consider the intensive margin estimates a lower
bound on the investment bunching contribution.
1.3 Context and Data
The UK corporate tax system provides a unique context for applying the new em-
pirical strategy to study the investment response to taxation. Section 1.3.1 presents
the tax system and discusses the sources of identifying variation it provides. Section
1.3.2 presents the administrative tax return data used in this study.
1.3.1 UK Corporate Tax System
The corporate income tax in the UK is contributed by approximately 1.5 million
registered corporations each fiscal year (1 April in year t until 31 March in t+1).9 In
2011, the corporate income tax in the UK raised £43,763 million, i.e. 10% of total
tax revenue and 4% of GDP.10 Although corporate tax collections are important,
the gap between predicted and actual collected tax liabilities is large. The UK
tax authority Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) estimates that in 2009
(the most recent tax gap estimates), 9.6% of true corporate tax liabilities remained
unpaid (HMRC (2012)).
The UK corporate income tax offers two compelling sources of variation to
study the response of investment to tax policy changes. The first source of variation
9Author’s estimates.
10See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/receipts/receipts-stats.pdf.
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Table 1.I: UK Corporate Tax Schedule
Taxable income 2000-2001 2002-2005 2006 2007 2008-2010
0-10k 10 0 19 20 21
10k-50k 22.5 23.75 19 20 21
50k-300k 20 19 19 20 21
300k-1,500k 32.5 32.75 32.75 32.5 29.75
>1,500k 30 30 30 30 28
Notes: The table shows how the marginal corporate tax rate (in percent) has varied across
tax brackets (rows) and across fiscal years (columns). The tax is applied to taxable corpo-
rate profits, defined as turnover from different income sources, net of recurrent investments,
capital depreciation allowances for different of capital items, deductions (e.g. corporate
venture scheme relief) and losses carried forward from previous years. For more informa-
tion on the tax base, see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/agents/ct/. For more information on
the tax rate schedule, see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/ct-receipts/table-a6.pdf.
is the tax rate jump (kink) between the first and second brackets in the corporate
tax schedule. As Table 1.I shows, the UK corporate tax schedule features five tax
brackets, with two large convex kinks, at 10k and 300k of taxable income, and
two smaller concave kinks. The kink at 10k is particularly suitable for studying the
investment response to taxation. First, in 2002-2005, the 10k kink is larger than any
other kink, thus generating strong incentives for bunching.11 Second, the size of the
kink changes over time. In 2001, the kink implies a 12.5 percentage points tax rate
change. For 2002-2005, a 0% starting rate is introduced for all firms with a taxable
income below 10k, which increases the size of the tax rate jump to 23.75 percentage
points and makes the kink more salient. Finally, in 2006, the kink is abolished and
the first three tax brackets are merged at a marginal tax rate of 19%.
The second source of variation is the difference in depreciation allowance
rates across different capital items, which leads to a differential suitability of capital
items for investment bunching. To see why depreciation allowance rates are rele-
vant, consider that the corporate tax base is comprised of turnover net of recurrent
investments (salaries, purchases of tradable goods), capital depreciation allowances,
deductions (e.g. community investment schemes) and losses carried forward.12 An
11In the presence of optimization frictions, bunching is relatively stronger at larger kinks, as shown
in Chetty et al (2011).
12Losses thus affect taxable income but are realized in prior periods and cannot be manipulated
ex-post to reduce taxable income. Deduction can be used to change taxable income and move
to the kink, but my empirical analysis find no evidence of this. Spikes in median deductions or
the share of firms claiming deductions at the kink appear only in some subsamples and time
periods, and the excess number of firms claiming deductions in the excluded range (deduction
bunchers) is not significantly different from 0 when selection effects are controlled for. For more
information on how the tax base is derived, see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/agents/ct/.
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Table 1.II: UK Capital Depreciation Schedule
Short-life Cars Long-life Industrial
Machinery Machinery Buildings
First Year Allowance 40% 25%/100% 40% 24%
Writing Down Allowance 25% 25% 6% 4%
Notes: The table shows how the capital depreciation schedule varies across capital items,
for fiscal years 2001-2007. All capital purchases give rise a to a First Year Allowance
(FYA) in the year of purchase, and a Writing Down Allowance (WDA) in the years fol-
lowing the year of purchase. All items are depreciated according to a reducing balance
allowance, except for industrial buildings, which are depreciated on a straight line basis.
A reducing balance allowance is applied every year to the remaining balance of unclaimed
expenditure. Once the balance of unclaimed expenditure is less than £1000, it can be
depreciated immediately, under the small pool allowance rule. A straight line allowance
means that the same amount of allowance for an expenditure is claimed every year until
the total expenditure has been claimed. For more information on capital allowance rates,
see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/ct-receipts/table-a5.pdf. For more information on
capital allowance rules, see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/pimmanual/pim3005.htm
and http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/capital-allowances/getstarted.htm.
increase in recurrent investments translates one-for-one into a reduction of the tax
base. To what extent an increase in capital investments translates into a reduction
of the tax base depends on the capital depreciation schedule, summarized in Table
1.II. For each capital item purchased, firms deduct a First Year Allowance (FYA) in
the year of purchase, and a Writing Down Allowance (WDA) in all following years.
The WDA is applied on a reducing balance basis (straight line basis for buildings),
until the cost that remains to be claimed is less than £1000, at which time it is
written off.
When considering the use of capital investments for bunching, firms take
into account both the FYA and the total depreciation speed of the capital item. The
weight given to each of these two determinants depends on the firms’ production
function and discount factor. Independently of the weights, purchases of short-life
machinery (e.g. computers) are most suitable for bunching, as they yield the highest
FYA (40%) and highest depreciation speed. As for the other capital items, their
ranking in terms of suitability for bunching is ambiguous. For firms valuing the FYA
over depreciation speed, purchases of long-life machinery (e.g. electrical systems),
which yield a 40% FYA, are most suitable for bunching. For firms valuing depreci-
ation speed over the FYA, investments in cars are most suitable for bunching.
A number of exceptions to these rules are worth mentioning. Investments
by small and medium firms in short-life machinery received a 50% FYA in 2004,
2006 and 2007. Furthermore, investments by small firms13 in information and com-
13Small firms are distinct from SMEs (cf. footnote 18) and satisfy at least two of the following
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munication technologies (considered short-life machinery) received a 100% FYA in
2000-2003. In addition, a 100% FYA has been in place for specifically designed
energy efficient short-life machinery since 1 April 2001 and for low carbon emission
cars since 1 April 2002. These exceptions make investments in short-life machin-
ery and cars even more suitable for bunching purposes, compared to investments in
other capital assets.
1.3.2 Data
This study is based on the HMRC CT600 panel including the universe of UK cor-
porate tax returns filed for the years 2001-2007.14 The dataset provides information
on taxable income under different headings (foreign, trading, capital etc.), capital
allowances, deductions, losses, tax liability and after-tax deductions. The accuracy
of the data is extremely high, given its administrative nature and the fact that
all returns are electronically checked for consistency. The dataset contains approxi-
mately 1.5 million obervations per year. An average of 800,000 firms per year have a
taxable income between 3k and 40k, the interval relevant for the investment bunch-
ing estimations. Only firms that do not report turnover (10.7% of the sample) are
dropped.
The investment variables of interest are recurrent investment and capital
allowances for short-life machinery, cars, long-life machinery and buildings. Re-
current investment is constructed as the difference between trading turnover and
trading income. To measure capital investments, I use the capital allowance vari-
able rather than the underlying expenditure, as the former precisely captures the
investment-induced taxable income reduction.15 The data does not distinguish be-
tween the 100% and 40%/50% FYA capital types within the short-life machinery
and cars categories. Furthermore, although capital allowances are intended to cover
capital purchases for business use only, it cannot be excluded that some (especially
small) firms also claim allowances for personal use items (e.g. laptops).
To examine which types of firms are most likely to engange in investment
bunching behavior, I combine the CT600 panel with FAME accounting data, which
requirements: turnover of not more than £2.8 (5.6) million, balance sheet total of not more
than £1.4 (2.8) million, number of employees of not more than 50 for FYs ending before (after)
30 January 2004. See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/camanual/CA23170.htm.
14As the 10k kink disappeared in 2006, and capital depreciation rules changed significantly in
2008, the study does not exploit data for post-2007.
15Unfortunately, the expenditure data does not provide information on the timing of capital pur-
chases. Such information would help support the hypothesis of bunching through investment,
if bunchers are found to implement a disproportionate share of investment at the end of the
accounting period, when they can predict that their gross profit is close to, but above, the kink.
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is available for approximately 90% of the CT600 observations. This data is compiled
by Bureau van Dijk, based on annual accounts submitted by all tax-registered firms
to UK Companies House. Among other things, this data contains information on
the company’s debt levels and 5-digit SIC industry codes. I aggregate the latter to
sectors at the 2-digit level, to achieve subsamples big enough (at least 10% of the
full sample) for frequency plots around the 10k kink. I then merge the panel with
sector-level data on the share of sales to the final consumer and the median number
of employees per firm. These data are compiled by the Office for National Statistics
in the Supply and Use Tables and the SME Statistics.16
1.4 Empirical Results
This section builds on the finding of a large behavioral response to the 10k kink,
as established by Devereux et al. (2013) and shown in Figure 1.III. The excess
bunching mass of 12.3 translates into a large elasticity of 0.45 with a standard error
of 0.016.17 An examination of the investment level of firms around the kink sheds
light on the anatomy of this behavioral response. Section 1.4.1 presents evidence that
firms move to the kink by increasing investment. Section 1.4.2, provides estimates
of the contribution of this behavior to bunching. Section 1.4.3 discusses evidence
supporting the interpretation of the observed behavior as real investment rather
than avoidance or evasion through over-reporting.
1.4.1 Evidence of Bunching Through Investment
If firms use investments to reduce their taxable income and move to the 10k kink,
this should be reflected in a higher share of investors and a higher median capital cost
around the kink. Variation in the kink size across time allows us to distinguish the
bunching-induced investment changes from any other difference in investment levels
between firms around the 10k kink and firms at higher or lower income levels.
16To avoid selection of subsamples on outcomes, I searched for the earliest available data. However,
the median number of employees per firm is only available starting from 2007. The share of
sales to the final consumer is for 2000.
17In fact, bunching is strongly asymmetric, suggesting that firms misperceive the kink as a notch,
i.e. a jump in the average tax rate. A notch generates a strictly dominated area above the tax
bracket cutoff, and should thus be accompanied by bunching below the cutoff and a missing
mass above the cutoff (see Kleven & Waseem (2013) for evidence from Pakistan). In the UK
data, however, there is no missing mass above the cutoff, and the estimates of bunching and
investment bunching with an asymmetric excluded range at 10k are almost identical to the
results presented here and thus omitted. The asymmetry of bunching does not appear in the
figures shown in Devereux et al. (2013), which plot the distribution of taxable income in £1000
bins and rely on the subsample of firms with one-year accounting periods.
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Figure 1.III: Bunching at 10k
Excess mass b = 12.3 (.4)
Elasticity e = .454 (.016)
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Notes: The figure presents the empirical frequency (blue dotted line) and the estimated
counterfactual (red solid line) of firms around the 10k kink, for fiscal years 2002-2005.
During this period, the marginal tax rate is 0% for incomes below 10k and 23.75% for
incomes above 10k. The counterfactual is estimated from equation (1.4), by fitting a
flexible polynomial to the observed frequency, excluding a range around the kink. The
kink is marked by a vertial solid line; the exluded range is marked by vertical dashed lines.
The bin size (£100) and degree of polynomial (5) are chosen to optimize the fit, as in
Devereux et al. (2013). The estimation allows for round number effects at multiples of
10k up to 20k, and at multiples of 5k, interacted with taxable income. Excess mass b is
the excess frequency in the excluded range around the kink, in proportion to the average
counterfactual frequency in the excluded range, as estimated following equation (1.6). The
elasticity of taxable income  is estimated using equation (1.3). Bootstrapped standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Source: HMRC.
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Consider first recurrent investments, the largest investment item (on average
97.1% of a firm’s costs), and the only one for which an increase translates one-to-
one into a reduction in taxable income. Panel A of Figure 1.IV plots the median
recurrent cost by taxable income, for 2001, 2002-2005 and 2006-2007. The plots also
show the counterfactual median cost, estimated according to equation (1.13), and
the size of the spike at 10k. Note that I consider median costs rather than the share
of investors, as the latter is not applicable for recurrent investments, for which all
firms register a positive amount (unless one of the underlying variables is missing).
The spike size is the difference between the observed and estimated median cost in
the 10k bin, scaled by the estimated cost. This proxy of investment bunching is
distinct from the number of investment bunchers, estimated in section 1.4.2, which
focuses on the excess number of investors across the entire excluded range, rather
than only at the kink.
As Figure 1.IV shows, there is already a statistically significant spike in
recurrent investments at 10k in 2001, when the kink at 10k is present but small.
The spike size more than doubles in 2002, when the introduction of the 0-% starting
rate increases the size of the tax rate jump and the salience of the kink. In addition
to the sharp spike at 10k, the 2002-2005 figure also shows higher cost levels for firms
with a taxable income ∈ [8k, 10k], the income interval below the kink which registers
a significant excess mass of firms, as shown in Figure 1.III.18 Finally, the spike size
is reduced to a tenth of its previous size in 2006-2007, when the kink disappears.
The spike is still statistically significant, however, which could be explained by
misperceptions or adjustment costs that prevent bunchers from lowering their cost
immediately after the kink is abolished. Also note that overall investments decrease
over time.
The time pattern for investments in short-life machinery (Panel B), the
most quickly depreciating capital item, is very similar to the pattern for recurrent
investments. In 2001, the median capital cost, at 10k, is about twice as high as
the estimated counterfactual. The spike increases to quadruple the estimated cost
in 2002-2005, and falls back to a level only 30% higher than the estimated cost
in 2006-2007. Note that, during 2002-2005, the median cost for most income bins
below the kink is 0. This is because firms with a taxable income below 10k pay
no tax, and thus have no incentive to claim capital allowances, unless their income
gross of capital allowances places them above 10k.19
18See the previous footnote for a discussion of the asymmetric nature of bunching
19Just as in the frequency plot in Figure 1.III, the cost plots for 2002-2005 display a spike at 5k,
although there is no kink at this point. This spike is present even when dropping firms with a
taxable income of exactly 5k, suggesting that the excess mass at 5k is at least partly driven by
firms that misperceived 5k as a kink and intentially increased their cost to move there.
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Figure 1.IV: Investment Spikes Across Time
A: Recurrent Investment
2001 (Small Kink) 2002-2005 (Large Kink) 2006-2007 (Placebo)
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B: Short-life Machinery
2001 (Small Kink) 2002-2005 (Large Kink) 2006-2007 (Placebo)
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Notes: The figure shows plots of the median cost (blue dotted line) by taxable income bins (bin size £100) and the estimated counterfactual median cost (red solid line).
Panel A shows median recurrent costs and Panel B shows median costs (capital allowance claims) for short-life machinery, for the years 2001, 2002-2005 and 2006-2007
respectively. In 2001, the 10k kink represented a jump in the marginal tax rate from 10% to 22.5%. In 2002-2005, the jump was from 0% to 23.75%. In 2006-07, there
was no kink and the marginal tax rate was 19% for all firms with a taxable income below 50k. The counterfactual median cost is estimated from equation (1.11), by
fitting a 5th-order polynomial to the observed median cost, excluding a range around around the kink. For short-life machinery in 2002-2005, the specification allows
for different constants above and below the kink. The kink is marked by a vertial solid line (vertical dotted line in 2006-2007, when there is no kink); the excluded range
is marked by vertical dashed lines. The spike size is the difference between the observed and counterfactual median cost in the income bin centered at 10k, minus a
randomly drawn estimated residual, and scaled by the counterfactual median cost at the kink. Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses. Source: HMRC.
32
Figure 1.V: Investment Spikes Across Capital Items
A: Extensive Margin
Short-life Machinery Cars Long-life Machinery Buildings
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B: Intensive Margin
Short-life Machinery Cars Long-life Machinery Buildings
Spike size = 1.19 (.06)
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
c
o
s
t
0 10 20 30
Taxable income (in £1000)
Spike size = .03 (.02)
2
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
c
o
s
t
0 10 20 30
Taxable income (in £1000)
Spike size = .61 (.3)
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
c
o
s
t
0 10 20 30
Taxable income (in £1000)
Spike size = -.11 (.42)
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
c
o
s
t
0 10 20 30
Taxable income (in £1000)
Notes: The figure examines investment changes around the 10k kink at the extensive margin (Panel A) and the intensive margin (Panel B). Panel A plots
the share of investors (firms with positive capital allowance claims) and Panel B plots the median cost (capital allowance claims for investors, blue dotted
line), by taxable income (bin size £100). The plots also show an estimated counterfactual (red solid line). For Panel A, the counterfactual median cost is
estimated from equation (1.7), by fitting a 5th-order polynomial to the observed median cost, excluding a range around the kink. The estimation allows
for different constants for income bins above and below 10k. The counterfactual for Panel B is estimated in a similar way, using equation (1.11). All
figures are for 2002-2005, when the kink represents a tax rate jump from 0% to 23.75%. The kink is marked by a vertial solid line; the excluded range is
marked by vertical dashed lines. The spike size is the difference between the observed and counterfactual share of investors (median cost) in the income
bin at 10k, minus a randomly drawn estimated residual, and scaled by the counterfactual share of investors (median cost) at the kink. Bootstrapped
standard errors are shown in parentheses. Source: HMRC.
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As a second way of distinguishing bunching-induced investment spikes from
other changes in investment levels around the kink, I exploit variation in the rate
of capital depreciation across different capital types. If firms invest in order to
bunch, they should primarily invest in quickly depreciating capital items like short-
life machinery and cars. Figure 1.V provides evidence for differential investment
spikes across capital items, distinguishing between the extensive and the intensive
margin (Panels A and B respectively). For short-life machinery, both the share of
investors as well as the median cost for investors display a large and statistically
significant spike at the kink. For cars, there is a significant spike at the extensive
margin only. Intensive margin investment bunching is inhibited by the cap on capital
allowance for cars at £3000 per year, which means that the median cost is almost
constant at £3000. For long-life machinery and buildings, both the share of investing
firms as well as the median cost for investors are much more noisy and the pattern
of statistical significance of investment spikes is inconsistent. Although the intensive
margin spike for long-life machinery and the extensive margin spike for buildings
are statistically significant, they are smaller than other spikes at random levels
of taxable income. This might suggest that the empirical methodology used in
these distributions is not robust enough to accurately determine their statistical
significance. Overall, the pattern of significance of investment spikes over time and
across capital types supports the hypothesis that firms bunch by investing.
1.4.2 Estimating the Contribution of Investment Bunching
To estimate the contribution of investment bunching, I calculate the number of
investment bunchers, as defined in section 1.2.2, and their contribution Cont to the
total number of bunchers. Figures 1.VI and 1.VII show these estimations for short-
life machinery, at the extensive and intensive margins respectively. The results for
all other capital items are presented in Table 1.III. For recurrent investments, only
the intensive margin is applicable. For cars, long-life machinery and buildings, I
conduct the estimation for the extensive margin only. This is because the sample of
investors for these capital items is too small (less than 15% of the full sample) and
the median cost plots are too noisy to credibly estimate intensive margin investment
bunching. Note that all contribution estimates are for the period 2002-2005, when
the kink is most salient and represents a tax rate jump of 23.75 percentage points.
In the first place, consider the baseline results for extensive investment
bunching as shown in Panel A1 of Figure 1.VI. The estimation suggests that invest-
ment bunchers represent 19.2% of all bunchers. This result relies on the assumption
that the share of investors would evolve smoothly as a function of taxable income if
there were no kink, i.e. that the spike in investment at the kink is entirely due to
34
investment bunching behavior. To test this assumption, let sj,t denote the share of
investors in income bin j in year t and sj,t−2 the share of investors among the same
group of firms in year t−2.20 Unless bunchers stay at the kink for three consecutive
years, there is no reason to expect sj,t−2 to spike at the kink. The year t−2 is chosen
because it is close enough to serve as a reasonable control, but further in the past
than year t−1, in which the share of investors might be affected by auto-correlation
in bunching. Indeed, approximately one-third of all bunchers stay at the kink for
more than one year, but only one-sixth of them stay for more than two years. 21
The joint plot of sj,t and sj,t−2 in Panel A2 shows that the share of investors,
two years prior to bunching at the kink, also spikes at the kink. This suggests that
bunchers might be a selected sample among the firms above the kink. Mechanically,
firms with a high investment level (or low profit margin) will require a smaller
percentage change in investment to achieve a certain percentage change in profits,
to move to the kink. Another possible mechanism to explain the selection effect is
adjustment costs. Consider that only firms with sufficiently low adjustment costs
move to the kink (e.g. those with good tax advisors), and that this feature is
positively correlated with investment propensity. In this case, we would observe
an investment spike at the kink, even if bunchers did not change their investment
behavior to move to the kink.
Independently of the mechanism driving it, the selection effect should be
controlled for in the estimation. For Panel A2, I estimate the number of extensive
investment bunchers by subtracting from the previous estimate in equation (1.8)
the control difference between the observed and counterfactual share of investors in
t− 2:
MEC =
piU∑
k=piL
[(sj,t − sˆj,t)− (sj,t−2 − sˆj,t−2)] · fk,t. (1.15)
Subscript C marks all estimates that control for selection effects. The contribution
of extensive investment bunching is defined as
ContEC =
MEC
B
. (1.16)
Controlling for the selection effect makes the contribution estimate drop to 7.7%.
However, this estimate is possibly downward biased because some firms stay at the
kink for more than two consecutive years, so that sj,t−2 may be affected by investment
bunching in t−2. I therefore consider the baseline estimate an upper bound and the
control estimate a lower bound on the true contribution of investment bunching.
20The “full” sample thus considers all firms that report at least three consecutive observations.
21The share of investors in t + 1 is not a good counterfactual, since investments are measured
by capital depreciation allowances, so that investment bunchers in t will also be observed as
investors in t+ 1, when they continue to depreciate their capital purchase from year t.
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To verify the robustness of these results, I implement a second estimation for
the sample of one-time bunchers only (Panel B of Figure 1.VI). This allows me to use
as counterfactual the share of investors in t− 1, which should be unaffected by past
investment bunching behavior, because I eliminate firms with a taxable income in
[8k, 12k] for at least two consecutive years (approximately 13% of the sample). The
baseline estimation for this sample (Panel B1) suggests that investment-bunchers
represent 37% of all bunchers. This estimate drops to 24.9% only when the selection
effect is controlled for (Panel B2). Obviously, these results apply only to one-time
bunchers, which might rely on “crude” strategies like investment bunching to a
larger extent than more sophsticated repeat bunchers.22 However, the results for
this sample confirm that the investment bunching contribution remains significant
even when the selection effect is controlled for.
As Figure 1.VII shows, the estimates for the contribution of intensive invest-
ment bunching display a qualitatively similar variation across estimation strategies,
but are overall smaller (though statistically significant).23 In the full sample, inten-
sive investment bunchers represent between 16.8% (baseline estimation) and 4.3%
(control estimation) of the total number of bunchers. In the sample of one-time
bunchers, the estimates are again slightly higher, ranging from 20.3% (baseline) to
10.2% (control).
22Also notice that the estimates are potentially upward biased because sj,t−1 changes discontinu-
ously at 12k, the upper bound of the excluded range. This is because restricting the sample to
one-time bunchers means eliminating a disproportionately large number of observations in the
[8k, 12k] interval, compared to bins outside the bunching interval, and the remaining observa-
tions have a different investment level than the full sample.
23To see how I control for the selection effect in the intensive margin estimation, note that the
number of firms in the bunching range is different for period t and the control t−x, x ∈ {1, 2}.
Therefore, contrary to section 1.2.2.2, I estimate not the number of investment bunchers but
rather the share of investment bunchers among the firms in the bunching range, mIt and mIt−x:
mIt = 1/FC,t ·
{∑piU
k=piL
∑
i∈j 1[pij = k] · 1[cij,t ≥ Cˆj,t]− 12FC,t
}
, and accordingly formIt−x, with
FC,t =
∑piU
k=piL fk,t, the total number observations within the bunching range in year t, in the
relevant sample. The contribution of intensive investment bunching is defined as ContIC =
(mIt−mIt−x)·FC,t
BC,t
.
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Figure 1.VI: Extensive Investment Bunching
A: Full Sample
A1: Baseline A2: With Control
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B: One-time Bunchers
B1: Baseline B2: With Control
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Notes: The figure displays results for estimating the contribution of investment in short-
life machinery to bunching, focusing on extensive margin changes in investment. The data
are for 2002-2005, when the 10k kink represents a tax rate jump from 0% to 23.75%. The
kink is marked by a vertial solid line; the excluded range is marked by vertical dashed lines.
In the full sample (Panel A), I use the share of investors in t− 2 to control for selection in
the group of bunchers. Panel A1 plots the share of investors (firms with positive capital
allowance claims for short-life machinery) in year t by income bins in year t (blue dotted
line, bin size £100), and its estimated counterfactual (red solid line). The counterfactual is
estimated by fitting a flexible polynomial to the observed share, excluding a range around
the kink, as shown in equation (1.7). Panel A2 is identical to Panel A1, and also plots the
control share of investors in t− 2 by income bins in t (grey dotted line), and its estimated
counterfactual (grey solid line). The number of extensive margin investment bunchers
(excess investors) ME is the difference between the observed and counterfactual number
of investors in the excluded range for Panel A1 (equation (1.8)), and the difference between
the observed and the control counterfactual number of investors in the excluded range for
Panel A2 (equation (1.15)). The number of bunchers B is estimated as shown in Figure
1.III, by fitting a flexible polynomial to the observed frequency distribution of firms. B
is the difference between the observed and estimated frequency, in the excluded range,
as in equation (1.5). The contribution of extensive margin investment to bunching is
ContE = ME/B. Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses. In the sample
of one-time bunchers (Panel B), in which I eliminate all firms with a taxable income
∈ [8k, 12k] for two consecutive years, I use the share of investors in t− 1, by income bins
in t, to control for selection in the group of bunchers. Everything else is as in Panel A.
Source: HMRC.
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Figure 1.VII: Intensive Investment Bunching
A: Full Sample
A1: Baseline A2: With Control
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B: One-time Bunchers
B1: Baseline B2: With Control
MI = 10972(0)
B  = 54086(8990)
ContI = .203(.02)
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Notes: The figure displays results for estimating the contribution of investment in short-
life machinery to bunching, focusing on intensive margin changes in investment. The data
are for 2002-2005, when the 10k kink represents a tax rate jump from 0% to 23.75%.
The kink is marked by a vertial solid line; the excluded range is marked by vertical
dashed lines. In the full sample (Panel A), I use the median cost in t − 2 to control for
selection in the group of bunchers. Panel A1 plots the median cost for investors (firms
with positive capital allowance claims for short-life machinery) in year t, by income bins
in year t (blue dotted line, bin size £100), and its estimated counterfactual (red solid
line). The counterfactual is estimated by a fitting a flexible polynomial to the observed
median cost, excluding a range around the kink, as shown in equation (1.11). Panel A2
is identical to Panel A1, and also plots the control median cost in t − 2 by income bins
in t (grey dotted line), and its estimated counterfactual (grey solid line). The number of
intensive margin investment bunchers (excess investors)M I is excess number of firms with
a cost (capital allowance claim) above the counterfactual median in the excluded range for
Panel A1 (equation (1.12)), and the excess number of firms with a cost above the control
counterfactual median in the excluded range for Panel A2 (see footnote 21). The number
of bunchers B is estimated as shown in Figure 1.III, by fitting a flexible polynomial to
the observed frequency distribution of firms. B is the difference between the observed
and estimated frequency, in the excluded range, as in equation (1.5). The contribution
of intensive margin investment to bunching is ContI = M I/B. Bootstrapped standard
errors are shown in parentheses. In the sample of one-time bunchers (Panel B), in which
I eliminate all firms with a taxable income ∈ [8k, 12k] for two consecutive years, I use the
share of investors in t − 1 , by income bins in t, to control for selection in the group of
bunchers. Everything else is as in Panel A. Source: HMRC.
38
Table 1.III: Estimating Investment Bunching
Full Sample One-time Bunchers
Baseline With Control Baseline With Control
Investment item N Bunchers B Cont Cont N Bunchers B Cont Cont
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Recurrent Investments 2507423 120689 .238 .018 2182426 55127 .458 -.062
(2714) (.01) (.01) (11606) (.06) (.01)
Short-life machinery I 1479976 85461 .168 .043 1295667 54086 .203 .102
(1949) (.00) (.01) (8990) (.02) (.01)
Short-life machinery E 2558590 122343 .192 .077 2226960 62457 .37 .249
(2783) (.01) (.02) (10200) (.12) (.04)
Cars 2558590 122343 .046 -.002 2226960 62457 .08 -.009
(3023) (.0049) (.009) (7237) (.012) (.012)
Long-life machinery 2558590 122343 .01 .0026 2226624 63823 .013 .007
(2824) (.0021) (.003) (7965) (.005) (.004)
Buildings 2558590 122343 .013 .0001 2226624 63823 .019 -.001
(2695) (.0026) (.005) (14665) (.005) (.006)
Notes: The table presents the results of estimating the contribution of investment changes to bunching at the 10k kink, for different investment items (rows). The
estimations are for 2002-2005, when the 10k kink represents a tax rate jump from 0% to 23.75%. The results for recurrent investments and for short-life machinery (I)
are for intensive margin investment changes. All other results are for the extensive margin. Columns (1)-(4) present the results for the full sample of firms for which
at least three consecutive observations exist. The control strategy for this sample uses the share of investors/median cost in t − 2 to control for selection in the group
of bunchers. Columns (5)-(8) present the results for the sample of one-time bunchers, eliminating all firms with taxable income ∈ [8k, 12k] for two consecutive years.
The control strategy for this sample uses the share of investors/median cost in t− 1 to control for selection in the group of bunchers. Columns (1) and (5) present the
sample size, columns (2) and (6) present the number of bunchers B, and columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) present the contribution Cont of investment to bunching, with
and without controlling for selection effects. The number of bunchers B is estimated as shown in Figure 1.III, by fitting a flexible polynomial to the observed frequency
distribution of firms. B is the difference between the observed and estimated frequency, in an excluded range around the kink, as in equation (1.5). The estimation of
the contribution of investment bunching Cont is as shown in Figures 1.VI and 1.VII. I calculate the investment bunchers ME (M I) as the excess number of investors,
i.e. the difference between the observed and counterfactual share of investors (median cost) in the excluded range, according to equation (1.8) (equation (1.12)). For
the specification with control, I compare the observed share/median cost to the control counterfactual, according to equation (1.15) (footnote 21). The contribution is
estimated as Cont = M/B. Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses. Source: HMRC.
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Table 1.III shows the estimation results for all investment items. Most
contribution estimates are statistically significant only without the selection effect
control. The contribution estimates are largest for recurrent investments (45%)
and lowest for long-life machinery and buildings (below 2%). With the control,
however, all estimates lose significance in at least one of the samples. The control
estimates are significant for recurrent investments in the full sample, and for long-
life machinery in the sample of one-time bunchers. However, these estimates are
statistically significant only at the 10% level, and economically insignificant, as they
indicate an investment bunching contribution of below 2%.
Emphasizing the more conservative results for the full sample, I conclude
that investments in short-life machinery are an instrument for bunching for a moder-
ate fraction of up to 19.2% of bunchers, and that extensive investments play a larger
role than intensive investments. The results do not provide evidence for investment
bunching through items other than short-life machinery. It is possible, however,
that firms use large-scale changes in capital investments to approach the kink, and
fine-tune their bunching behavior with recurrent investments. The latter may be
too small to be picked up by the estimation strategy used.
1.4.3 Distinguishing Avoidance, Evasion and Investment
The empirical analysis has so far been agnostic about whether the observed invest-
ment spikes at the kink constitute avoidance (e.g. transfer pricing manipulation),
evasion (e.g. over-reporting), or real investment. While it is not possible to cleanly
decompose the investment spikes into these components, this section discusses pre-
liminary evidence suggesting that the spikes mainly represent a real investment
increase. The argument is threefold.
First, it is unlikely that the firms considered in this study engage in tax
avoidance strategies such as cost manipulation through transfer pricing or shifting
income to international tax havens. The firms in the sample are small and/or
relatively unprofitable. Only 0.12% of them register any overseas income, 0.20%
register double taxation relief and 6.1% are member of a group.24 This means that
the scope for engaging in tax avoidance schemes is very limited, as most of these
schemes rely on international business activity or group membership.
Second, an examination of the context suggests that evasion is unlikely
to explain a large part of bunching. Tax compliance in the UK is relatively high
compared to many other countries, and tax-registered corporations need to publish
24Author’s calculation.
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accounts and emit VAT receipts to their clients. This means that over-reporting
investment would require sophisticated disclosure strategies. Moreover, although the
audit probability for small firms is negligible, the cost of an audit is high, and may
include the cost of cooperating with auditors, potential penalties, and reputational
damage.
To test empirically for the presence of evasion, I examine bunching behavior
in subsamples of firms with high ease of evasion. If a large part of investment and
thus bunching is driven by evasion (over-reporting), we should expect firms with
better evasion opportunities to respond more strongly to the kink. Based on previous
findings in the tax evasion literature, I consider firm size, the need for financial
intermediation and the share of sales to the final consumer as key determinants of
the ease of evasion. Kleven et al. (2009) develop an agency model in which firms with
a large number of employees find it more difficult to sustain a collusion agreement on
evasion.25 Turnover is another measure of firm size and often used by tax inspectors
to determine the level of enforcement (accounting requirements, audit frequency),
as discussed in Almunia & Lopez-Rodriguez (2012). Gordon & Li (2009) provide a
model in which firms that rely on formal credit are more tax compliant, as financial
sector transactions are observable to the government.26 Finally, firms find it easier
to evade sales to the final consumer, which are not covered by the VAT paper trail,
rather than to evade sales to other (VAT compliant) firms.27
Panel A of Table 1.IV displays excess mass and elasticity estimates for
the following subsamples: firms with low (below median) turnover, low number of
employees, no debt (dummy)28, and high (above median) share of sales to the final
consumer, as compared to the full sample. Although theory predicts that firms in
these subsamples can evade taxes with relative ease, the bunching estimates for firms
with low turnover and number of employees are significantly lower than those for the
full sample. The estimates for firms without debt are not significantly different from
the full sample. This provides evidence against the hypothesis that most bunchers
move to the kink through over-reporting of costs.29 However, the fact that firms
with a high share of sales to the final consumer bunch significantly more than the
full sample suggests that part of the response to the kink might be driven by output
evasion, which this group of firms can practice with relative ease.
25Kumler et al. (2013) find evidence from Mexico that supports this theory.
26This argument is consistent with cross-country evidence by Bachas & Jensen (2013).
27 Pomeranz (2013) supports this argument with experimental evidence from Chile.
28Firms for which the FAME data does not report any long-term or short-term loans or debt are
coded as having no debt.
29The estimates for the contribution Cont of investment to bunching are more noisy due to the
smaller sample size and thus omitted. Qualitatively, however, the size of these estimates evolves
in similar ways as the excess mass estimates when comparing subsamples to the full sample.
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If avoidance and evasion are not the key drivers of bunching, the investment
spikes must constitute real investment. To support this argument, Panel B of Table
1.IV displays bunching estimates for subsamples of firms with different degrees of
investment propensity, as compared to the full sample. The evidence is consistent
with the hypothesis of bunching through investment. The smallest excess mass is
registered by the financial sector, which works with financial rather than physical
capital and thus has less opportunity for bunching through real investment. The
capital intensive manufacturing sector and the stock-intensive retail sector, on the
other hand, register a significantly higher excess mass at the kink than the full
sample does. The excess mass is also significantly higher for firms with a high (above
median) cost margin, high short-life machinery capital investments, high recurrent
investments and for growing firms (though the latter difference is significant only
at the 10% level). It should also be mentioned that there is no evidence for inter-
temporal shifting in investments, so that the investment spikes can be interpreted
as an overall increase in investment, rather than a reallocation of investment across
years.30
Although care was taken to avoid selection on outcomes (e.g. conditioning
subsamples on observables in t − 1), the results of this heterogeneity study obvi-
ously rely on correlations and cannot be interpreted as causal evidence. Besides,
even though heterogeneity across subsamples is consistent with bunching through
investment, it is not clear whether these investments are for business purposes or
personal use items. For instance, a plumbing business with a taxable income of 12k
may move to the kink by purchasing a computer, which could be used both for book-
keeping purposes and for leisure activities. This interpretation of bunching-induced
investments as private consumption is supported by the fact that bunching-induced
investments do not seem to stimulate growth. Investment bunchers (and bunchers
in general) do not grow faster in the years after they bunch, compared to firms below
or above the bunching range.31
1.5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a novel empirical strategy for examining the investment
effect of tax policy changes. I exploit bunching of firms at a tax kink to examine how
a tax rate change affects firms’ investment decisions, and how this effect interacts
30The t+ 1 share of investors (median cost), by taxable income bins in year t, does not exhibit a
downward spike, as would be expected if firms shift investments from year t+ 1 to t. Besides,
Devereux et al. (2013) also fail to find evidence of inter-temporal profit shifting.
31I test for this by plotting the growth rate in t + 1/2/3 by taxable income bins in year t. I find
that firms located at or around the kink do not register higher growth rates than firms above
or below the bunching range.
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Table 1.IV: Heterogeneity in Bunching
Panel A: Ease of Evasion Indicators
Sample Share b 
(1) (2) (3)
Full 1 12.3 .45
(.4) (.016)
Low turnover .50 8.3 .30
(.2) (.009)
Low number of employees .46 10.2 .38
(.4) (.013)
No debt .92 12.1 .45
(.4) (.014)
High share of sales to final consumer .45 14.5 .53
(.5) (.019)
Panel B: Investment Propensity Indicators
Sample Share b 
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing sector .12 14.4 .53
(.5) (.018)
Retail sector .12 14.4 .53
(.7) (.025)
Service sector .17 13.1 .48
(.5) (.019)
Financial sector .48 10.2 .38
(.4) (.014)
Growing .43 12.8 .48
(.5) (.018)
Low profit margin in t− 1 .50 16 .59
(.7) (.027)
High capital investments in t− 1 .47 17.7 .65
(.7) (.026)
High recurrent investments in t− 1 .44 15.7 .58
(.7) (.028)
Notes: The table shows estimates of the excess mass b at the 10k kink (column (2)) and the
elasticity of taxable income  (3), for different subsamples of firms. Column (1) shows the share of
the subsample within the sample of firms with a taxable income ∈ [3k, 40k]. The estimations are for
2002-2005, when the 10k kink represents a tax rate jump from 0% to 23.75%. “Low” and “high”
refers to firms below and above the sample median on the specified observable characteristics.
Firms for which the FAME data does not report any long-term or short-term loans or debt are
coded as having no debt (dummy). The sector categorization is based on 2-digit SIC industry
codes. Growing firms are those with an above-median growth rate in turnover between t− 1 and
t. Recurrent and capital investments (for short-life machinery) are scaled by turnover. The excess
mass b is the excess frequency in the excluded range around the kink, in proportion to the average
counterfactual frequency in the excluded range, as estimated following equation (1.6). The details
of this estimation are explained in the footnotes to Figure 1.III. The elasticity of taxable income
 is estimated using equation (1.3). The estimation of the contribution of investment bunching
Cont is calculated as shown in Panel B2 of Figure 1.VI, for the preferred specification (extensive
margin, control specification II). The contribution is Cont = MEc /B, where B is the number of
bunchers and MEC the number of investment bunchers, i.e. the difference between the observed
and control counterfactual share of investors in the excluded range, according to equation (1.15).
Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses. Source: HMRC.
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with variation in capital depreciation rates across capital types. Building on the
bunching approach proposed by Saez (2010), I estimate the frequency distribution
of firms around the kink, and the number of firms with excess investments at the
intensive and extensive margin. This allows me to calculate the share bunchers that
changed their investment levels to move to the kink. This empirical approach is
widely applicable to the study of the underlying drivers of taxable income responses
to kinked choice sets.
Using tax return data for UK corporations, I provide the first micro-evidence
that investment by small firms significantly responds to a tax rate change. Bunching
at the 10k kink is accompanied by spikes in the share of capital investors and the
median capital cost at the kink. These spikes are larger in 2002-2005 when the kink is
larger, and for quickly depreciating capital items, which yield larger tax reductions.
I estimate that extensive margin investments explain 7.7-19.2% of bunching and
intensive margin investments explain 4.3-16.8% of bunching. The fact that the
response to the kink is stronger among firms with a high investment propensity
and weaker among firms with a high ease of evasion supports the interpretation
of the investment spikes as real investment response rather than evasion through
over-reporting.
The findings imply that the introduction of the zero starting rate for UK
firms with a taxable income below 10k not only encouraged incorporation by firms
below the kink, as examined by Devereux & Liu (2013), but also investment by firms
just above the kink. This evidence of locally important investment effects suggests
that tax rate changes can be used to stimulate investment. The analysis also confirms
that capital depreciation rates matter for the composition of investment, as firms
only use investment in short-lived capital items in response to tax rate changes.
However, bunching through investment appears to be a small firms phenomenon.
The 300k kink in the UK tax schedule also features a significant bunching mass but
no investment spikes.
More work remains to be done to understand whether tax-induced invest-
ments are productive, or whether small firms exploit the low levels of tax enforce-
ment they face to claim capital allowances for the purchase of private consumption
goods. Work in this area would help shed light on the long-run growth effects of
tax-induced investments. I also aim to extend the empirical framework to derive an
estimate of the elasticity of investment with respect to the tax rate. Moreover, while
the proposed empirical approach takes a step towards decomposing taxable income
responses, it leaves a large part of the bunching mass at the kink unexplained. The
approach should be further developed to identify evasion and avoidance, and explain
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the share of bunching that is not driven by investment.32
32I aim to provide some evidence on evasion behavior in the future, by combining the tax return
data with administrative audit and penalty reports. HMRC is in the process of preparing these
data for disclosure.
Chapter 2
Production vs. Revenue Efficiency With Limited Tax
Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan
2.1 Introduction
A central result in public economics, the production efficiency theorem (Diamond
& Mirrlees 1971), states that tax systems should leave production undistorted even
in second-best environments. This result permits taxes on consumption, wages and
profits, but precludes taxes on intermediate inputs, turnover and trade. The theorem
has been hugely influential in the policy advice given to developing countries, but a
key concern with such advice is that the underlying theoretical assumptions are ill-
suited to settings with limited tax capacity. In particular, the theorem considers an
environment with perfect tax enforcement—zero tax evasion at zero administrative
costs—which is clearly at odds with the situation in developing countries. Once we
allow for tax evasion or informality, it may be desirable to deviate from production
efficiency if this leads to less evasion and therefore larger revenue efficiency. While
there is some theoretical work along these lines (e.g. Emran & Stiglitz 2005a; Gor-
don & Li 2009), there is virtually no empirical evidence on the trade-off between
production and revenue efficiency in the choice of tax instruments.
To address this question empirically, we need simultaneous variation in tax
instruments that vary with respect to their production efficiency properties (such as
switches between two instruments). This is more challenging than the usual search
for variation in tax rates for a given tax instrument, because we are interested in
comparing instruments that apply to different tax bases and often to very different
taxpayer populations. A few studies have taken a macro cross-country approach
focusing on trade vs domestic taxes (Baunsgaard & Keen 2010; Cage & Gadenne
45
46
2012). This paper proposes instead a micro approach that exploits a production
inefficient tax policy commonly observed in developing countries. This is the impo-
sition of minimum tax schemes according to which firms are taxed either on profits
or on turnover (with a lower rate applying to turnover), depending on which tax
liability is larger.1 This policy has been motivated by the idea that the broader
turnover base is harder to evade, an argument that seems intuitive but is so far
untested. Crucially, these minimum tax schemes give rise to kink points in firms’
choice sets: the tax rate and tax base jump discontinuously at a threshold for the
profit rate (profits as a share of turnover), but tax liability is continuous at the
threshold. We show that such kinks provide an ideal setting for estimating evasion
responses to switches between profit and turnover taxes using a bunching approach,
allowing us to evaluate the desirability of deviating from production efficiency to
achieve more revenue efficiency. Compared to existing bunching approaches (Saez
2010; Chetty et al. 2011; Kleven & Waseem 2013) a conceptual contribution is to
develop a method that exploits the simultaneous discontinuity in the tax rate and
the tax base.
The basic empirical idea is that excess bunching at the minimum tax kink
will be driven (mostly) by evasion or avoidance responses rather than by real produc-
tion responses. To see this, consider first a stylized comparison between a turnover
tax and a pure profit tax on an individual firm. Because turnover is a much broader
base than profits, minimum tax schemes are always associated with very small
turnover tax rates as compared to profit tax rates. For example, in our empiri-
cal application to Pakistan, the turnover tax rate is .5% while the profit tax rate is
35%. The low turnover tax rate implies that this tax introduces only a small dis-
tortion of real production at the intensive margin, while a profit tax levied on true
economic profits would be associated with a zero distortion of real production at the
intensive margin.2 Hence, the simultaneous changes in tax base and tax rate at the
1Such minimum tax schemes have been implemented in numerous developing countries, including
Argentina, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Laos, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Panama, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Taiwan, Tanzania,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia (see Ernst & Young 2013 for a description). Most of these
minimum tax schemes are based on turnover, but a few of them are based on alternative bases
such as total assets or broader taxable income measures in between profits and turnover.
2We provide two important clarifications to this small-distortion argument in the paper. First,
because of the broadness of the turnover base, a small tax rate on turnover may create a large
average tax rate on profits (tax liability as a share of profits) and therefore create significant
distortions at the extensive margin (such as informality, sector, and location choices). However,
since tax liability is continuous at the minimum tax kink, there will be no extensive responses
to the kink and our bunching estimates are not affected by such responses. Second, a small
turnover tax rate can create a large reduction in turnover when production technology is close
to constant returns to scale (in which case the turnover elasticity with respect to the turnover
tax rate becomes very large). However, with near-constant returns to scale changes in turnover
have almost no impact on profit rates, and so real production responses are not able to generate
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kink offset each other to produce a very small change in real incentives for the indi-
vidual firm. On the other hand, because the tax bases are completely different on
each side of the kink, there will be a large change in evasion incentives if those bases
are associated with different evasion opportunities. Hence, if we see large bunching
at the minimum tax kink, this is difficult to reconcile with real output responses
under reasonable elasticity parameters and provides prima facie evidence of an eva-
sion response to the switch between turnover and profit taxation. We show in the
paper that this basic argument is robust to a number of generalizations, including
real distortions of turnover taxes driven by cascading3 and distortionary profit taxes
levied on bases that deviate from pure economic rent.4 We develop a simple model
allowing us to put bounds on the evasion response using bunching at the minimum
tax kink under different assumptions about the real output elasticity. Due to the
weak real incentive, the bounds on the evasion response are extremely tight under
a very wide range of real output elasticities.
We use administrative data from the Federal Board of Revenue in Pak-
istan to analyze the responses by Pakistani firms to the minimum tax regime. The
data contains all corporate tax returns between 2006 and 2010, which are predom-
inantly filed electronically, contributing to the quality of the data in this context.
Our main empirical findings are the following. First, we observe large and sharp
bunching in reported profit rates around the threshold below which the turnover
tax applies. We exploit variation in the minimum tax kink over time and across
firms to confirm that the excess bunching is indeed a response to the tax system.
The variation includes a temporary elimination of the minimum tax scheme as well
as differences in the size and location of the kink for different populations of firms.
These findings provide compelling non-parametric evidence that firms respond to
the minimum tax incentives in the way that our theory predicts, and the presence
of weak real incentives around the kink suggests that evasion is an important part
of the story. To explore the role of evasion, we also show that firms with greater
evasion opportunity—either smaller firms or firms with less activities subject to a
paper trail—bunch more strongly at the minimum tax kink.
much bunching around the minimum tax kink even in this case.
3While a small turnover tax introduces only a small firm-level distortion of real production at the
intensive margin, there may still be significant economy-wide distortions because of cascading—
taxing the same item multiple times—through the production chain. As we explain later, these
general equilibrium cascading effects do not generate bunching at the minimum tax kink, which
is a great advantage for our ability to identify evasion.
4In general, actual corporate income taxes do not correspond to taxes on pure economic profits,
and so may be associated with significant real distortions (e.g. Hassett & Hubbard 2002;
Devereux & Sorensen 2006; Auerbach et al. 2010). By itself, this effect makes a profit tax more
distortionary compared to a turnover tax. We show that this creates real production incentives
around the minimum tax kink that move firms away from the kink, and therefore reinforces
our argument that bunching is not driven by real responses.
48
Second, we combine our non-parametric bunching evidence with a simple
conceptual framework in order to bound the evasion response to switches between
profit and turnover taxes under different assumptions on the real output elasticity.
We find that turnover taxes reduce evasion by up to 60-70% of corporate income
compared to profit taxes. The evasion estimates are very robust to the size of the
real output elasticity, because the smallness of real incentives around the kink im-
plies that real responses contribute very little to bunching even under very large
elasticities. Third, we use our empirical estimates as sufficient statistics in an anal-
ysis of the optimal choice of tax base and tax rate in an environment with limited
tax capacity. We find that welfare can be increased by moving away from a pure
profit tax towards a much broader base that is closer (but not identical) to turnover,
because the loss of production efficiency is more than compensated for by the in-
crease in tax compliance. It is in general not optimal to go all the way to a pure
turnover tax in our framework, but the administrative simplicity of a pure turnover
tax could further tip the balance in practice. Overall, our findings demonstrate that
governments with limited tax capacity face an important trade-off between produc-
tion efficiency and revenue efficiency that has first-order implications for the choice
of tax instruments.
Our paper contributes to several literatures. First, we contribute to an
emerging empirical literature on public finance and development using adminis-
trative microdata (Kleven & Waseem 2013; Pomeranz 2013; Kumler et al. 2013).
Second, a theoretical literature has studied the implications of limited tax capacity
for optimal taxation (Emran & Stiglitz 2005a; Keen 2008; Boadway & Sato 2009;
Gordon & Li 2009; Kleven et al. 2009; Besley & Persson 2011; Dharmapala et al.
2011). While most of these papers study movements between the formal and in-
formal sectors, our paper studies corporate tax evasion at the intensive margin and
derives simple expressions for optimal tax policy that depend on parameters which
we estimate.5
Third, a vast literature studies the determinants of tax evasion (see An-
dreoni et al. 1998 and Slemrod & Yitzhaki 2002 for surveys). This literature has
used macroeconomic indicators (money supply, aggregate electricity demand etc.),
survey data on consumption and income, or audit data to estimate the extent of tax
evasion (see Slemrod 2007, Fuest & Riedel 2009 and Slemrod & Weber 2012 for sur-
veys). However, with the exception of the rare occasions when randomised audits are
available (Slemrod et al. 2001; Kleven et al. 2011), methodological limitations mean
that the credibility and precision of these estimates are questionable. Our paper con-
tributes a novel methodology for the estimation of evasion using quasi-experimental
5Both the empirical and the theoretical literatures on public finance and development are surveyed
in Besley & Persson (2013).
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variation created by tax policy. The approach generates robust estimates of eva-
sion and can be easily replicated in other contexts as the tax variation needed is
ubiquitous, especially in the developing world. Fourth, our paper is related to the
literature on taxable income elasticities (Saez et al. 2012), and especially work that
emphasizes the endogeneity of taxable income elasticities to the broadness of the
tax base (Slemrod & Kopczuk 2002; Kopczuk 2005). Finally, we contribute to the
large stream of literature studying responses by corporations to the tax code (see
Auerbach 2002, Hassett & Hubbard 2002 and Auerbach et al. 2010 for surveys, and
Gruber & Rauh 2007, Bach 2012, Dwenger & Steiner 2012, Kawano & Slemrod 2012
and Devereux et al. 2013 for recent estimates of the elasticity of corporate taxable
income with respect to the effective marginal tax rate).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents our conceptual
framework, which is used in section 2.3 to develop an empirical methodology based
on minimum tax schemes. Section 2.4 describes the context and data and section
2.5 presents our results. Section 2.6 numerically analyzes optimal policy, and section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
This section develops a stylized model of the firm to analyze the optimal design of
a tax on the firm’s activities. Our analysis focuses on the firm’s responses to tax
rate and tax base changes in environments with or without tax evasion. When tax
enforcement is perfect, the optimal tax system leaves the firm’s production decision
undistorted by taxing profits. When tax enforcement is imperfect, it becomes opti-
mal to move towards a distortionary tax on turnover/output if this discourages tax
evasion by firms.6 The stylized model allows us to identify sufficient statistics that
capture this trade-off between production efficiency and revenue efficiency (compli-
ance) and guides our empirical strategy in the next section. Our framework abstracts
from general equilibrium effects of taxation, consistent with the empirical applica-
tion (using bunching) which is also not affected by potential general equilibrium
effects.
6Normalizing the output price to 1, turnover and output are of course identical and so we will in
general use the terms “output tax” and “turnover tax” to mean the same thing throughout the
paper.
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2.2.1 Firm Behavior and Tax Policy Without Evasion
A firm chooses how much output y to produce at a convex cost c (y). The firm
pays taxes T [y, c (y)] = τ [y − µc (y)], which depend on the tax rate τ and a tax
base parameter µ. The tax base parameter equals the share of costs that can be
deducted from a firm’s revenues when determining the tax base. The tax base thus
ranges from an output tax base to a pure profit tax base when increasing µ from 0
to 1. The firm’s after-tax profits equal
Π (y) = (1− τ) y − c (y) + τµc (y) . (2.1)
The profit-maximizing output level solves
c′ (y) = 1− τ 1− µ1− τµ ≡ 1− ω, (2.2)
where ω denotes the tax wedge between the social and private return to output. For
a pure profit tax base (µ = 1), the tax wedge disappears and the output choice is
efficient, regardless of the tax rate. For an output tax base (µ = 0), the tax wedge
equals the tax rate. The impact of the tax rate τ and the base parameter µ on the
firm’s output choice depends on the implied change in the tax wedge ω, with ∂ω
∂τ
≥ 0
and ∂ω
∂µ
≤ 0. The change from a high tax rate on a profit tax base to a lower tax rate
on a broader output tax base will only affect the firm’s output choice if it affects
the tax wedge ω.
The government sets tax parameters τ, µ to maximize welfare subject to
an exogenous revenue requirement R. In this stylized framework, this amounts
to maximizing after-tax profits (corresponding to aggregate consumption by firm
owners) subject to the revenue requirement. Hence, the welfare objective of the
government can be written as
W = Π (y) + λ {T [y, c (y)]−R} , (2.3)
where the firm’s output choice satisfies (2.2) and λ ≥ 1 denotes the (endogenous)
marginal cost of public funds. The welfare effect of changing the tax parameters τ, µ
can be decomposed into a mechanical welfare effect from transferring resources from
the firm to the government for a given output level and a behavioral welfare effect
due to the response in output. While the behavioral response in y affects welfare
through government revenue, it has only a second-order welfare effect through firm
profits (envelope result following from Π′ (y) = 0). From equations (2.1) and (2.3),
the mechanical welfare effect of the tax rate τ (normalized by the marginal cost of
funds λ) can be written as Mτ ≡ [y − µc (y)] × [λ− 1] /λ ≥ 0. The mechanical
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welfare effect of the tax base parameter µ (again normalized by λ) can be written as
Mµ ≡ −τc (y)× [λ− 1] /λ ≤ 0. Both mechanical effects equal 0 if the marginal cost
of public funds λ equals 1. The total welfare impact of τ and µ equal respectively
∂W
∂τ
/λ = Mτ + ω
∂y
∂τ
, (2.4)
∂W
∂µ
/λ = Mµ + ω
∂y
∂µ
. (2.5)
This allows us to establish a natural implication of the production efficiency theorem
in this stylized model. With a pure profit tax base, the government can raise taxes
without distorting the firm’s output. Hence, if possible, it is optimal to tax pure
profits.
Proposition 1 (Production Efficiency). With perfect tax enforcement, the opti-
mal tax base is given by the firm’s pure profit (i.e., µ = 1).
Proof. For µ = 1, the government can increase tax revenues by increasing the tax
rate without affecting the production choice. Hence, the marginal cost of public
funds λ = 1. The government sets τ = R/ [y − c (y)]. For any µ < 1, we can
increase µ by dµ and increase τ by dτ = τc(y)
y−µc(y)dµ so that the mechanical welfare
effects cancel out. Hence, the impact on welfare equals
dW = ∂W
∂τ
dτ + ∂W
∂µ
dµ
= λω ∂y
∂ω
∂ω
∂µ
[
∂ω/∂τ
∂ω/∂µ
τc (y)
y − µc (y) + 1
]
dµ.
The impact on welfare is positive if the wedge ω decreases in response to the change.
This is true if and only if
−∂ω/∂τ
∂ω/∂µ
≤ y − µc (y)
τc (y) .
Since − ∂ω/∂τ
∂ω/∂µ
= 1−µ
τ(1−τ) , the condition simplifies to the after-tax profits being positive,
(1− τ) (y − µc (y))− (1− µ) c (y) ≥ 0,
which is always satisfied for the firm’s output choice.
2.2.2 Firm Behavior and Tax Policy With Evasion
We now relax the assumption of perfect enforcement and analyze optimal tax policy
in the presence of tax evasion. In particular, we incorporate in our model the notion
that an output tax is harder to evade than a profit tax, the argument being that it
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is harder to evade a broader base and possibly also that the level of output is more
visible than the difference between output and input. We capture the relative ease
of evading profit taxes by allowing firms to declare costs cˆ 6= c (y) at a convex cost
of misreporting g (cˆ− c (y)) with g (0) = 0.7 The key implications are similar if we
also allow the output level y to be misreported, as long as it remains harder to evade
an output tax than a profit tax.
The firm again maximizes its after-tax profits, but these now depend on
both real output y (at real costs c (y)) and reported costs cˆ for tax purposes,
Π (y, cˆ) = Πˆ (y, cˆ)− g (cˆ− c (y)) = (1− τ) y − c (y) + τµcˆ− g (cˆ− c (y)) , (2.6)
where Πˆ (·) denotes the reported after-tax profits (i.e., exclusive of costs of evasion
g (·)). At the firm’s optimum,
c′ (y) = 1− ω, (2.7)
g′ (cˆ− c (y)) = τµ. (2.8)
The output level depends on the tax wedge ω in exactly the same way as before,
and is therefore not affected by the presence of evasion.8 The level of evasion is
increasing in the base parameter µ and is thus higher for a profit tax base than for
an output tax base. The level of evasion is also increasing in the tax rate τ . The
latter result relies on the assumption that the cost of evasion g (·) depends on the
difference between reported and true costs rather than on the difference between
reported and true tax liability (Allingham & Sandmo 1972; Yitzhaki 1974), but this
assumption is not key for the main analytical insights that we present below.
With evasion, the government’s tax revenue can be decomposed into the
revenue based on the true tax base and the foregone revenue due to misreporting
the base,
T [y, cˆ] = τ × [y − µcˆ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
reported base
= τ × {[y − µc (y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
true base
− µ [cˆ− c (y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
unreported base
}.
The government’s welfare objective can be written asW = Π (y, cˆ)+λ {T [y, cˆ]−R},
where we assume that the private cost of evasion g (·) is also a social cost by including
7The modelling of evasion (or avoidance) based on a convex and deterministic cost function
g (.) was first proposed by Slemrod (2001). This model is simpler to work with than a model
incorporating the probability of audit and choice under uncertaintly as in the classic formulation
of Allingham & Sandmo (1972).
8The independence of real production and evasion relies on the assumption of additively separable
evasion costs g (.) that depend only on the evasion level cˆ−c (y), independently of the real output
level y. This independence simplifies the analysis without changing the main substance of our
results.
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Π (·) = Πˆ (·)− g (·) in W .9 The (normalized) mechanical welfare effects of τ and µ
can be written as Mτ ≡ [y − µcˆ] × [λ− 1] /λ ≥ 0 and Mµ ≡ −τ cˆ × [λ− 1] /λ ≤ 0.
Hence, the total welfare effects of τ, µ equal
∂W
∂τ
/λ = Mτ + ω
∂y
∂τ
− τµ∂ (cˆ− c)
∂τ
, (2.9)
∂W
∂µ
/λ = Mµ + ω
∂y
∂µ
− τµ∂ (cˆ− c)
∂µ
. (2.10)
Both an increase in the tax rate (τ ↑) and an increase in the tax base (µ ↓) entail a
positive mechanical welfare effect, but a negative revenue effect through a decrease
in the firm’s real output. However, while an increase in the tax rate increases the
level of misreporting, an increase in the tax base decreases the level of misreporting.
We may state the following key proposition:
Proposition 2 (Production Inefficiency). With imperfect tax enforcement, the
optimal tax base is interior, i.e., µ ∈ (0, 1). The optimal tax system satisfies
τ
1− τ ·
∂ω
∂τ
(µ) = G(µ) · εcˆ−c
εy
, (2.11)
where εcˆ−c ≡ ∂(cˆ−c)∂τµ τµcˆ−c ≥ 0 is the elasticity of evasion with respect to τµ, εy ≡
∂y
∂(1−ω)
1−ω
y
≥ 0 is the elasticity of real output with respect to 1 − ω, and G(µ) ≡
[cˆ− c (y)] /Πˆ (y, cˆ) ≥ 0 is evasion as a share of reported profits. The evasion rate
G(µ) satisfies G(0) = 0 and is monotonically increasing in µ, while ∂ω
∂τ
(µ) =
1−µ
(1−τµ)2 ≥ 0 satisfies ∂ω∂τ (0) = 1, ∂ω∂τ (1) = 0 and is monotonically decreasing in
µ whenever τ ∈
[
0, 12−µ
]
.
Proof. For µ = 1, an increase in the tax base has a second-order negative impact
on production efficiency, but a first-order positive impact on evasion reduction, i.e.,
∂W
∂µ
/λ = Mµ − τ ∂(cˆ−c)∂µ < 0. Notice that this result holds for λ = 1 as well, in which
case Mµ = 0.
For µ = 0, a decrease in the tax base has a second-order negative impact on
evasion reduction, but a first-order positive impact on production efficiency. Notice
that ∂W
∂µ
/λ = Mµ + τ ∂y∂µ > 0 if Mµ is sufficiently small. However, since the impact
on evasion is of second order, we can use the same argument as before to argue that
9The assumption that the private and social costs of evasion are the same is important for
efficiency and optimal tax results (Slemrod 1995; Slemrod & Yitzhaki 2002; Chetty 2009). Ex-
amples of social evasion costs include productivity losses from operating in cash, not keeping
accurate accounting books, and otherwise changing the production process to eliminate ver-
ifiable evidence. Including the evasion cost as a social cost is the natural starting point for
developing countries where the revenue loss from evasion is a first-order social concern. In
fact, the big-picture question on the trade-off between production and revenue efficiency that
motivates this paper would be a moot point if evasion were socially costless.
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a tax-neutral increase in µ and τ , for a given y, will increase y and thus increase
welfare, starting from µ = 0.
To characterize the relation between the tax rate τ and the tax base µ,
consider again an increase dµ in µ and dτ = τ cˆ
y−µcˆdµ such that the mechanical
welfare effects cancel out. The welfare effect through the change in y is like in the
proof of Proposition 1. Hence,
dW/λ = ω ∂y
∂ω
[
∂ω
∂τ
τ cˆ
y − µcˆ +
∂ω
∂µ
]
dµ− τµ∂ (cˆ− c)
∂τµ
[
∂τµ
∂τ
τ cˆ
y − µcˆ +
∂τµ
∂µ
]
dµ
= ω ∂y
∂ω
∂ω
∂τ
[
τ cˆ
y − µcˆ +
∂ω/∂µ
∂ω/∂τ
]
dµ− τµ∂ (cˆ− c)
∂τµ
[
µ
τ cˆ
y − µcˆ + τ
]
dµ
Rewriting this in terms of elasticities, we find
dW/λ =
{
τ
1− τ
∂ω
∂τ
Πˆ (y, cˆ) εy − [cˆ− c] εcˆ−c
}
τy
y − µcˆdµ.
Notice that dW/λ = 0 is required for the initial level of τ and µ to be optimal, and
so the expression in the proposition follows.
Hence, in the presence of profit evasion, it is always optimal to introduce
at least some production inefficiency by setting µ < 1. To understand the optimal
tax rule (2.11), note that the left-hand side τ1−τ · ∂ω(µ)∂τ reflects the effective marginal
tax wedge on real production. This production wedge is equal to τ1−τ when µ = 0,
equal to zero when µ = 1, and typically monotonically decreasing between those two
extremes.10 At the social optimum, the production wedge must be equal to the ratio
between the evasion and output elasticities εcˆ−c/εy scaled by the evasion rate G (µ).
This rate is equal to zero when µ = 0 and is monotonically increasing in µ. The
formula highlights the trade-off between production efficiency (captured by the real
output elasticity) and revenue efficiency (captured by the evasion elasticity) when
setting the tax base µ. If the evasion elasticity is small relative to the real output
elasticity (εcˆ−c/εy ≈ 0), the production efficiency concern will be strong relative to
the revenue efficiency concern, and so it will be socially optimal to move close to
a pure profit tax by setting µ ≈ 1 (such that τ1−τ · ∂ω(µ)∂τ ≈ 0). Conversely, if the
evasion elasticity is large relative to the real output elasticity, the revenue efficiency
concern will be relatively strong and this makes it optimal to move towards the
output tax by lowering µ, thereby simultaneously decreasing the evasion rate G(µ)
10The cross-derivative ∂2ω∂τ∂ω may switch signs such that the production wedge may be locally
increasing in µ for τ < 1/(2 − µ). Hence, this can only occur when the tax rate is at least 50
percent.
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and increasing the production wedge until formula (2.11) is satisfied.11 The former
case is arguably the one that applies to a developed country context, whereas the
latter case captures a developing country context. Our stylized framework thus
highlights the starkly different policy recommendations in settings with strong vs.
weak tax capacity. Finally, note that the optimal tax formula (2.11) also identifies
sufficient statistics for determining the optimal tax base and rate in our stylized
framework, which we will study empirically.12
2.3 Empirical Methodology Using Minimum Tax Schemes
Using our conceptual framework, this section develops an empirical methodology
that exploits a type of minimum tax scheme common to many developing countries,
including Pakistan which we consider in the empirical application below. Under
this type of minimum tax scheme, if the profit tax liability of a firm falls below a
certain threshold, the firm is taxed on an alternative, much broader tax base than
profits. The alternative tax base is typically output/turnover (e.g., in Pakistan),
and we focus on this case to be consistent with our empirical application. We show
that such minimum tax schemes give rise to (non-standard) kink points in firms’
choice sets, and that they produce differential quasi-experimental variation in the
incentives for real production and compliance.
2.3.1 Minimum Tax Kink and Bunching (Without Evasion)
We first consider the baseline model without evasion. Firms report turnover y and
costs c (y) and pay the maximum of a profit tax (µ = 1, τpi) and an output tax
(µ = 0, τy) where τy < τpi. That is,
T [y, c (y)] = max {τpi [y − c (y)] , τyy} . (2.12)
11The optimal tax rate τ changes endogenously as µ changes to satisfy the revenue constraint.
12Our decomposition into real output and evasion elasticities is not in contradiction with the
sufficiency of taxable income elasticities for welfare analysis (Feldstein 1995, 1999). It is possible
to rewrite equation (2.11) in terms of the elasticities of taxable profits with respect to the tax
rate τ and the tax base µ, respectively. If taxable profits are more responsive to an increase
in the tax rate than to an increase in the tax base, this implies a relatively low efficiency
cost associated with the tax base increase and therefore a low optimal µ. The presence of
evasion, however, suggests an explanation for why these taxable profit responses may diverge
as evasion is expected to respond in opposite directions to an increase in the tax rate (τ ↑) and
an increase in the tax base (µ ↓). Our empirical methodology builds on this decomposition into
real responses and evasion.
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Firms thus switch between the profit tax and the output tax when
τpi [y − c (y)] = τyy ⇔ p ≡ y − c (y)
y
= τy
τpi
. (2.13)
This implies a fixed cutoff τy/τpi for the profit rate p (profits as a share of turnover):
if the profit rate is higher than this cutoff, firms pay the profit tax; otherwise they
pay the output tax. As the profit rate crosses the cutoff, the tax rate and tax base
change discontinuously, but the tax liability (2.12) is continuous. Hence, this is a
kink (a discontinuous change in marginal tax incentives) as opposed to a notch (a
discontinuous change in total tax liability), but a conceptually different type of kink
to those explored in previous work (Saez et al. 2012; Chetty et al. 2011) due to the
joint change in tax rate and tax base.13 In the model without evasion, firms choose
only real output based on the marginal return 1− ω, which changes from 1 (profit
tax) to 1− τy (output tax) at the kink.
Figure 2.I illustrates how the minimum tax kink at τy/τpi creates bunching
in the distribution of profit rates. The figure is based on the general model with
both real responses and evasion responses, but we begin by abstracting from eva-
sion responses. The dashed line represents the distribution of profit rates before the
introduction of a minimum tax (i.e., under a profit tax). Assuming a smooth distri-
bution of firm productivities (through heterogeneity in cost functions), this baseline
distribution of profit rates is smooth and we denote it by f0 (p). The introduction
of a minimum tax (i.e., an output tax for p ≤ τy/τpi) reduces the marginal return
to output from 1 to 1− τy for firms initially below the cutoff. Those firms respond
by reducing their output levels, which leads to an increase in their profit rates un-
der decreasing returns to scale (such that marginal costs c′ (y) larger than average
costs c (y) /y). This creates a right-shift in the profit rate distribution below the
cutoff (with no change above the cutoff) and produces excess bunching exactly at
the cutoff. Allowing for optimization error (as in all bunching studies), there will
be bunching around the cutoff rather than a mass point precisely at the cutoff, as
illustrated in Figure 2.I. Finally, it is important to note that real output reductions
below the kink produces excess bunching only under decreasing returns to scale. In
the case of constant (increasing) returns to scale, the model without evasion predicts
zero bunching (hole) at the minimum tax kink.14
Bunchers at the kink point τy/τpi come from a continuous segment [τy/τpi −∆p, τy/τpi]
of the baseline distribution f0 (p) absent the kink, where ∆p denotes the profit rate
13See Kleven & Waseem (2013) for further discussion of the conceptual distinction between kinks
and notches.
14The possibility of non-decreasing returns to scale therefore only strengthens our main conclusion
below that, once we allow for both real and evasion responses, bunching at minimum tax kinks
tends to be driven mainly by evasion.
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Figure 2.I: Empirical Methodology
bunching at
minimum tax kink
Density
Profit Rate (y-c)/y
‹
 y/ 
c’(y) = 1-y
g’(c-c) = 0
‹
c’(y) = 1
g’(c-c) = 
‹
y , (c-c) 
‹
Notes: The figure illustrates the implications of the introduction of a minimum tax on
the observed density distribution of reported profit rates pˆ = (y − cˆ) /y. The grey dashed
line shows the smooth distribution of profit rates that would be observed in the absence
of the minimum tax, while the green, solid line shows the distribution of profit rates that
is observed in the presence of the minimum tax. As discussed in section 2.2.2, under the
profit tax, firms’ optimality conditions are given by c′ (y) = 1 and g′ (cˆ− c) = τpi. Firms
whose optimal reported profit rate under the profit tax is smaller than τy/τpi will adjust
their production and reporting decisions in response to the introduction of the minimum
tax to satisfy c′ (y) = 1 − τy and g′ (cˆ− c) = 0, causing them to decrease both output
y and cost evasion cˆ − c. Both responses move their reported profit rate up towards the
kink. Firms whose profit rate was close to the kink before introduction of the minimum
tax pile up at the kink, which gives rise to an observed excess mass around the kink when
accounting for optimization errors.
58
response by the marginal bunching firm. Assuming that the kink is small, the total
amount of bunching is given by B = ∆p · f0
(
τy
τpi
)
. Hence, based on estimates of
excess bunching B and a counterfactual density at the kink f0
(
τy
τpi
)
, it is possible
to infer the profit rate change ∆p induced by the kink. In the model without eva-
sion, this profit rate response is directly proportional to the real output elasticity.
Assuming again that the minimum tax kink is small,15 total differentiation yields
∆p =
[
c
y
− c′ (y)
]
dy
y
' τ
2
y
τpi
εy, (2.14)
where we use that c′ (y) = 1 and c
y
= 1 − p ' 1 − τy
τpi
in the vicinity of the cutoff.
The output elasticity is defined as εy ≡ dy/yd(1−ω)/(1−ω) and we use that d(1−ω)1−ω = −τy
when crossing the kink.
Based on equation (2.14), we note that large bunching (large ∆p) will trans-
late into an extremely large output elasticity. This follows from the observation that
τ 2y /τpi will in general be a tiny number, because output tax rates are always small due
to the fact that output/turnover is a very broad base (for example, τy is at most 1%
in the case of Pakistan). The intuition for this result is that the combined changes
in tax base µ and tax rate τ offset each other to create a very small change in the
real return to output 1− ω, which makes the minimum tax kink a very small inter-
vention in a model without evasion. Hence, the presence of large bunching around
minimum tax kinks (which is what we find empirically) cannot be reconciled with
believable real output elasticities in a model without tax evasion and therefore rep-
resents prima facie evidence of evasion.16 The next section characterizes bunching
responses in the model with evasion.
2.3.2 Minimum Tax Kink and Bunching (With Evasion)
We now turn to the model with evasion. Firms switch from profit to output taxation
when the reported profit rate pˆ = (y − cˆ) /y falls below the cutoff τy/τpi. This kink
point is associated with a differential change in the incentives for real output and
compliance. The marginal return to real output 1−ω changes from 1 to 1−τy when
switching from profit to output taxation as before, whereas the marginal return to
15The small-kink assumption is common in bunching studies and has the advantage of avoiding
parametric specifications of the cost functions c (.) , g (.).
16In theory, the real output elasticity could be very large if the production technology is close to
constant returns to scale (the elasticity goes to infinity as we converge to constant returns to
scale). However, as explained above near-constant returns to scale implies near-constant profit
rates even under large output responses and therefore no output-driven bunching. In other
words, real output elasticities are large precisely in situations where output-driven bunching
at the minimum tax kink must be small, and so the observation of large bunching cannot be
credibly explained by real responses under near-constant returns to scale.
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tax evasion τµ changes from τpi to 0. Hence, for firms whose reported profit rate falls
below the cutoff τy/τpi absent the minimum tax, the introduction of the minimum
tax reduces real output (loss of production efficiency) and increases compliance (gain
in revenue efficiency). Assuming decreasing returns to scale, both effects increase
the reported profit rate below the cutoff and thus produce bunching from below as
shown in Figure 2.I.
Using the decomposition dcˆ = d (cˆ− c) + dc and totally differentiating, we
now obtain
∆pˆ =
[
cˆ
y
− c′ (y)
]
dy
y
− d (cˆ− c)
y
' τ
2
y
τpi
εy − d (cˆ− c)
y
, (2.15)
where we again use c′ (y) = 1 and cˆ
y
= 1 − pˆ ' 1 − τy
τpi
. The bunching response
∆pˆ thus depends on both the real output response and the evasion response, but in
very different ways. The real output response will be small under any potentially
believable output elasticity (due to the scale factor τ 2y /τpi as described above), and so
a large bunching response ∆pˆ must imply a large evasion response to the output tax.
While we cannot separately estimate real output and evasion responses using only
one minimum tax kink, equation (2.15) allows for a bounding exercise on the evasion
response under different assumptions about εy. Because of the smallness of the factor
τ 2y /τpi, the estimated evasion response will be insensitive to εy. Furthermore, if in
addition to the presence of a minimum tax scheme, there is random variation in the
output tax rate τy applying to this scheme (giving us more than one observation of
∆pˆ for the same values of the output elasticity εy and the evasion response d (cˆ− c)
under the randomness assumption), it would be possible to separately estimate the
real and evasion responses.17 Random variation in the profit tax rate τpi is not as
useful for separately estimating output and evasion responses, because the profit tax
rate directly affects the evasion reponse d (cˆ− c) to the minimum tax kink (and so
does not give us additional observations of ∆pˆ for the same values of d (cˆ− c)).18
2.3.3 Robustness
The kink implied by the minimum tax scheme changes the incentives for production
and evasion differentially. The analysis above shows that when combining a pure
profit tax with a small turnover tax, the change in real incentives at the kink is mi-
nor, implying that substantial bunching provides evidence for evasion. This section
17We do have time variation in τy in our empirical application, but such variation is not plausibly
random and so we focus on the bounding approach to separately estimate evasion responses.
18We do have variation in τpi in our empirical application that is arguably exogenous. Even if this
does not allow us to separately estimate output and evasion responses, it is still very useful for
providing an additional identification check on our bunching strategy.
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shows that the key insight—that bunching at the minimum tax kink reflects mostly
evasion—is robust to a number of generalizations.
Distortionary Profit Tax
The assumption that the profit tax corresponds to a tax on pure economic rent is
very strong and stands in sharp contrast to the large body of literature analyzing
the effective marginal tax distortion created by corporate income taxation and its
real impact on corporations (see Hassett & Hubbard 2002). However, relaxing this
simplifying assumption only strengthens our conclusion that observed bunching must
be driven overwhelmingly by evasion responses. Other things equal, the introduction
of real distortions in the profit tax regime implies that when firms move from profit
to turnover taxation real incentives will deteriorate by less or potentially improve.
This additional effect by itself implies that the minimum tax scheme improves real
incentives below the kink, so that firms respond by increasing their output. An
increase in output reduces a firm’s true profit rate (∆p ≤ 0) under non-increasing
returns to scale and thus moves it away from the kink. Rewriting equation (2.15)
as follows
∆pˆ = ∆p− d
(
cˆ− c
y
)
, (2.16)
we see clearly that also in the case of a distortionary profit tax (implying ∆p ≤ 0
other things equal) real responses cannot be responsible for bunching at the min-
imum tax kink (corresponding to ∆pˆ > 0). Hence, our argument does not rely
on the small change in the production incentives around the kink, but only on the
production incentives not being much smaller for the turnover tax (with a small τy)
than for the profit tax such that ∆p is small or negative. We conclude that if the
effective marginal tax rate under the profit tax were positive (rather than zero), our
estimate of the evasion response based on the decomposition in (2.15) would provide
a lower bound.
Distortionary Turnover Tax: Cascading and Extensive Responses
As we argued above, a low turnover tax rate generates only small distortions to firm-
level production incentives at the intensive margin. Importantly, this does not imply
that the overall distortionary effect of turnover taxes is small. First, even a small
turnover tax could cause significant production inefficiencies because of cascading
through the production chain. Cascading effects of multiple-stage production can
imply effective distortions far higher than statutory tax rates (Keen 2013). Crucially,
though, such general equilibrium distortions affect the distribution of firms on both
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sides of the minimum tax kink and therefore cannot generate bunching at the kink.
The absence of cascading effects in our bunching estimates is a great advantage for
our ability to identify evasion responses to tax base switches, but cascading would
still form a potentially important part of an overall welfare evaluation of minimum
tax schemes.
Second, due to the breadth of the base, even a small turnover tax can create
a large average tax rate on profits for firms with low (actual) profit rates, which could
cause firms to respond along the extensive margin. Crucially for our analysis, since
tax liability is continuous around the minimum tax kink, the switch between profit
and turnover taxation does not create extensive responses in the vicinity of the kink;
extensive responses to the turnover tax will only be potentially important further
away from the kink. Conceptually, excess bunching is a measure of the intensive
response and is therefore not affected by potential extensive responses, but such
effects would again be relevant for a broader policy evaluation.19
Output Evasion
The model can be extended to include output evasion whereby firms report output
yˆ which may differ from their true output y and face a convex cost of doing so. In
this case, firms’ profits are given by
Π = y − c (y)− τ (yˆ − µcˆ)− g (cˆ− c (y) , y − yˆ)
and the analog of equation (2.15) becomes
∆pˆ =
[
cˆ
yˆ
− c′ (y)
]
dy
yˆ
− d (cˆ− c)
yˆ
− cˆ
yˆ
d (y − yˆ)
yˆ
' τ
2
y
τpi
εy
y
yˆ
− d (cˆ− c)
yˆ
−
(
1− τy
τpi
)
d(y − yˆ)
yˆ
(2.17)
decomposing the bunching response ∆pˆ into a real response in the first term and
the two evasion responses. Given the lower tax rate (τy  τpi), the incentives to
underreport output are arguably smaller under the output tax than under the profit
tax, which would further increase the bunching response. The key point to note is
that this expression preserves the feature that the real output response in the first
term will be small as it is scaled by τ 2y /τpi and so large bunching responses must
19In particular, since profit rates vary across sectors due to differences in technology, a uniform
turnover tax rate (as in our empirical application to Pakistan) creates differential average tax
rates on profits across different sectors and therefore distorts the sectoral allocation of labour
and capital. Such effects may call for sector-specific turnover tax rates depending on, for
example, the average profit rate in each sector.
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reflect some combination of output and cost evasion responses. While we have done
our welfare analysis in the presence of cost evasion only, the insights do not depend
on the particular form evasion takes, as long as evasion is easier under a profit
tax than under the output tax. Moreover, if it were true that the minimum tax
makes it easier to misreport output, then firms would reduce their reported output
more under the turnover tax, moving them away from the kink, so the presence of
bunching also directly supports the notion that evasion is easier under a profit tax
regime.20
Pricing Power
The model can also be extended to incorporate pricing power by firms. In this case,
firm profits are given by
Π = (1− τ) ρ (y) y − c (y) + τµcˆ− g (cˆ− c (y))
where ρ (y) is the price the firm receives, which depends negatively on output y. In
this model, the analog of equation (2.15) is
∆pˆ =
[
cˆ
y
(1− σ)− c′ (y)
]
dy
ρ (y) y −
d (cˆ− c)
ρ (y) y
' (1− σ) τ
2
y
τpi
εy − d (cˆ− c)
ρ (y) y (2.18)
where σ ≡ −∂ρ(y)
∂y
y
ρ(y) > 0 is the price elasticity the firm faces and the second equality
follows by using cˆ/ρ (y) y = 1−τy/τpi and c′ (y) = ρ(y) (1− σ) at the kink. Firms now
reduce their prices when increasing output. Hence, the more elastic the demand, the
less true profits will change in response to real incentives. The term multiplying the
output elasticity is smaller than when we assume firms have no pricing power and so
we conclude that the presence of pricing power only strengthens our interpretation
of observed bunching and makes our estimate of the evasion response based on the
decomposition in (2.15) a lower bound.
20Here we have assumed that it is not possible for firms to misreport their output for the minimum
tax without simultaneously misreporting their output for the profit tax. In the Pakistani context
this is reasonable as firms report output once and this is used to calculate both the profit tax
and the minimum tax liabilities.
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2.4 Context and data
2.4.1 Corporate Taxation: Minimum Tax Regime
The corporate income tax is an important source of revenue in Pakistan and cur-
rently raises 2.5% of GDP, which comprises about 25% of all federal tax revenues.
The tax is contributed by more than 20,000 corporations filing their tax returns
every year. The scale of non-compliance is expected to be large in Pakistan, but
credible evidence on the amount of corporate tax evasion has been lacking due to
problems with data and methodology. The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) re-
ports an estimate of the corporate evasion rate equal to 45%, but does not provide
information on the estimation.21 A study by the World Bank (2009) estimates the
evasion rate to be as high as 218% of actual corporate income tax payments, drawing
on an input-output model for a selected group of sectors. It is because of the con-
cern about corporate non-compliance that policy makers in Pakistan have devised
a tax scheme, which ensures that every operational corporation pays a minimum
amount of tax every year. The minimum tax scheme, which has been in place since
1991, combines a tax rate τpi on annual corporate profits (turnover minus deductible
costs) with a smaller tax rate τy on annual corporate turnover, requiring each firm
to assess both tax liabilities and pay whichever is higher.22
As explained above, the minimum tax scheme implies that a firm’s tax base
depends on whether its profit rate (corporate profits as a share of turnover) is above
or below a threshold equal to the tax rate ratio τy/τpi. This profit rate threshold
represents a kink point where the tax base and tax rate change discretely. The
kink point varies across different groups of firms and across time. First, Pakistan
offers a reduced profit tax rate for recently incorporated firms. All companies which
register after June 2005, have no more than 250 employees, have annual sales below
Rs. 250 million, and paid-up capital below Rs. 25 million are eligible for a lower
profit tax rate. Second, both the profit tax rate and the turnover tax rate undergo
changes during the time period we study. Table 2.I catalogs these variations across
firms and over time, which we exploit in our empirical analysis. Importantly, the
definitions of the tax bases to which these rates are applied remain the same for the
21See FBR (2012-2013).
22When the turnover tax is binding, firms are allowed to carry forward the tax paid in excess
of the profit tax liability and adjust it against next year’s profit tax liability, provided that
the resulting net liability does not fall below the turnover tax liability for that year. Such
adjustment, if not exhausted, can be carried forward for a period of up to five years (three
years in 2008 and 2009). In the data, we observe that only 1.3% of firms claim such carry
forward, indicating either that firms are unaware of this option or that their profit tax liability
net of carry forward drop below output tax liability, in which case carry forward cannot be
claimed. In any case, the potential for carry forward attenuates the size of the minimum tax
kink and works against the (strong) bunching that we find.
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Table 2.I: Pakistan Corporate Tax Schedule
Year Tax Rates (%)Profit (high) Profit (low) Turnover
2006 35 20 0.5
2007 35 20 0.5
2008 35 20 0
2009 35 20 0.5
2010 35 25 1
Notes: The table presents Pakistan’s corporate income tax schedule for fiscal years 2006
to 2010. Fiscal year t runs from July 1 of year t to June 30 of year t + 1. Tax rates are
given in percentages. The low tax rate applies to firms which registered after June 2005,
have no more than 250 employees, have annual sales of not more than Rs. 250 million, and
paid-up capital of not more than Rs. 25 million. Our empirial analysis takes into account
that the thresholds for some of these requirements change over time. All firms that do
not meet these criteria are liable for the high tax rate. Firms calculate their net profit
and turnover tax liablity (the tax code allows for specific deductions under each type of
tax) and pay whichever liability is higher. Firms are allowed to carry forward the tax
paid in excess of the profit tax liability and can adjust it against next year’s liability to
the extent that the net liability does not fall below the output tax liability for that year.
Such adjustment, if not exhausted, can be carried forward for a further period of up to
five years (three years in 2008 and 2009). In the data, we observe that only 1.3% of firms
claim such carry forward, which indicates that firms are either unaware of this option or
observe their profit tax liability net of carry forward drop below output tax liability, in
which case carry forward cannot be claimed. We also exclude banks and financial firms,
which face a standard tax rate of 38% in 2006 and 154 firms in sectors that were selectively
given a lower turnover tax rate in 2010.
entire period under consideration. In the years we study, around 50 percent of the
taxpayers are liable for turnover taxation as their reported profit rates put them
below the minimum tax kink.
2.4.2 Data
Our study uses administrative data from FBR, covering the universe of corporate
income tax returns for the years 2006-2010.23 Since July 2007, electronic filing
has been mandatory for all companies, and over 90% of the returns used in our
study were filed electronically. Electronic filing ensures that the data has much
less measurement error than what is typically the case for developing countries. As
far as we know, this is the first study to exploit corporate tax return data for a
developing country. The filed returns are automatically subject to a basic validation
check that uncovers any internal inconsistencies like reconciling tax liability with
reported profit. Besides this validation check, the tax returns are considered final
unless selected for audit.
Two aspects of the data are worth keeping in mind. First, our dataset
contains almost all active corporations. As corporations also act as withholding
23In Pakistan, tax year t runs from July 1 of year t to June 30 of year t+ 1.
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agents, deducting tax at source on their sales and purchases, it is almost impossible
for an operational corporation not to file a tax return. FBR takes the view that
registered corporations which do not file tax returns are non-operational. Second,
besides the corporations in our data, the population of firms in Pakistan include
both unincorporated firms subject to personal income taxation and informal firms
operating outside the tax net. In general, corporate and personal income taxes may
lead to shifting between the corporate and non-corporate sectors as well as between
the formal and informal sectors (Waseem 2013). We do not study these (interesting)
effects here; our bunching estimates capture intensive-margin responses conditional
on being a corporate tax filer, and are therefore not affected by incorporation or
informality responses.
We limit our analysis to firms that report both profit and turnover, and
either the incorporation date or the profit tax liability, which are required for al-
locating firms to the high and low profit rate groups.24 We also subject the data
to a number of checks for internal consistency detailed in table A.III of the web
appendix. Our final dataset contains 24,290 firm-year observations.
2.5 Empirical Results
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis, examing how firms re-
spond to the minimum tax policy. We first present evidence that there is sharp
bunching at the minimum tax kink as predicted by our analysis in section 2.3, and
that it is caused by the presence of the kink. We then analyze heterogeneity in
bunching across different subsamples, showing that it is consistent with the pre-
dictions of the previous literature on tax evasion, and finally we use the observed
bunching to estimate the magnitude of evasion responses.
2.5.1 Bunching at Minimum Tax Kinks
As shown in section 2.3, the type of minimum tax scheme observed in Pakistan
should lead to excess bunching by firms around a threshold profit rate (profits as a
share of turnover) equal to the ratio of the two tax rates, τy/τpi. Figure 2.II shows
evidence that firms do indeed bunch around this minimum tax kink. The figure
shows bunching evidence for different groups of firms (panels A and B) and different
years (panels C and D), exploiting the variation in the kink across these samples.
24Table A.IV in the web appendix compares the firms we lose to those we are able to use based
on firm characteristics reported in the tax returns.
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We plot the empirical density distribution of the reported profit rate (profits as
percentage of turnover) in bins of approximately 0.2 percentage points.25 Panel A
shows the density for high-rate firms (facing a profit tax rate of 35%) in the years
2006, 2007 and 2009 pooled together, since for those firms and years the minimum
tax kink is at a profit rate threshold of τy
τpi
= 0.5%35% = 1.43% (demarcated by a solid
vertical line in the figure). The density exhibits large and sharp bunching around the
kink point. Since there is no reason for firms to cluster around a profit rate of 1.43%
other than the presence of the minimum tax scheme, this represents compelling
evidence of a behavioral response to the scheme. Notice also that there is a modest
amount of “natural” excess mass around the zero-profit point (much smaller than
at the kink point) as many firms generate very little income.26
Panels B-D provide identification checks ensuring that excess bunching at
the minimum tax kink is indeed a response to the tax system (as opposed to a
spurious property of the profit rate distribution) by exploiting variation in the min-
imum tax kink across firms and over time. Panel B compares high-rate firms to
low-rate firms during the years 2006, 2007 and 2009, when the latter group of firms
face a reduced profit tax rate of 20% and therefore a minimum tax kink located at
τy
τpi
= 0.5%20% = 2.5%. Besides the different location of the kink, our model implies that
the size of the kink is smaller for low-rate firms than for high-rate firms in terms of
evasion incentives (as the change in the evasion incentive µ · τ at the kink equals
the profit tax rate τpi) but not real incentives (as the change in the real incentive
1−ω at the kink equals the turnover tax rate τy). Hence, we expect to see both that
low-rate firms bunch in a different place and that the amount of bunching is smaller
(if evasion is important), and this is precisely what panel B shows. Even though
bunching is smaller for low-rate firms, it is still very clear and sharp. Outside the
bunching areas around the two kinks, the low-rate and high-rate distributions are
very close and exhibit the same (small) excess mass around zero.27
Panels C and D of Figure 2.II exploit time variation in the kink, focusing
on the sample of high-rate firms. Panel C shows that excess bunching at 1.43%
completely disappears in 2008 when the minimum tax regime (i.e., turnover tax
25The exact bin width is chosen to ensure that kink points are always located at bin centres. This
requires us to slightly vary the bin width between panels A-C and panel D as the distance
between the two kinks in panel D is different due to the higher turnover tax rate.
26A small number of firms in the data report precisely zero profits, which represents a form of
“round-number bunching” as analyzed in detail by Kleven & Waseem (2013). To eliminate this
effect driven by the salience of zero, the empirical distributions in Figure 2.II exclude obser-
vations with pi = 0, so the excess mass around zero is not driven by round-number bunching.
Figure A.I in the web appendix reproduced panel A of figure 2.II, using the raw data before the
consistency checks and without dropping firms with pi = 0. Our results are robust to including
firms reporting pi = 0.
27The low-rate distribution is more noisy than the high-rate distribution because the former rep-
resents a much smaller fraction (about 16%) of the population of firms.
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Figure 2.II: Bunching Evidence
A: High-rate Firms, B: High-rate vs Low-rate Firms,
2006/07/09 2006/07/09
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Notes: The figure shows the empirical density distribution of the profit rate (reported
profit as percentage of turnover), for different groups of firms and time periods. Firms
calculate their profit tax liability (taxed at rate τpi) and turnover tax liablity (taxed at
rate τy) and pay whichever liability is higher. This minimum tax regime introduces a kink
at a profit rate equal to the tax rate ratio τy/τpi; firms move from the profit tax scheme
for profit rates above the kink to the turnover tax scheme for profit rates below the kink.
For high-rate firms in 2006/07/09 (panel A), τpi = 0.35 and τy = 0.005, placing the kink
at a profit rate of 1.43%. For low-rate firms in 2006/07/09 (panel B), τpi = 0.25 and
τy = 0.005, placing the kink at a profit rate of 2.5%. For high rate firms in 2008 (panel
C), the minimum tax scheme is abolished and all firms’ profits are taxed at rateτpi = 0.35,
so that there is no kink. For high-rates firms in 2010 (panel D), τpi = 0.35 and τy = 0.01,
placing the kink at a profit rate of 2.86%. Kink points are marked by vertical solid lines,
and the colour of the kink line matches the colour of the corresponding density. The zero
profit point is marked by a vertical dotted line. The bin size is 0.214 (0.204 for 2010),
chosen so that all kink points are bin centres.
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below a profit rate of 1.43%) is removed. The 2008 density instead exhibits a larger
mass of firms with profit rates between 0 and 1.43%. The distributions in panel C
are consistent with our theoretical prediction that the introduction of an output tax
below a profit rate threshold creates bunching coming from below. Finally, panel D
shows that bunching moves from 1.43% to 2.86% in 2010, when the doubling of the
output tax rate shifts the kink. This change is accompanied by an overall decrease in
the mass of firms with profit rates between 0 and 2, again illustrating that bunchers
move to the kink from below.
Taken together, the panels of Figure 2.II provide compelling evidence that
firms respond to the incentives created by the minimum tax scheme. The substantial
amount of bunching observed around kink points (which are associated with weak
real incentives as explained above) suggests that evasion responses are quantitatively
important.
2.5.2 Heterogeneity in Evasion Opportunities
Since our theoretical framework predicts that bunching responses will be driven
primarily by evasion, we expect that firms for which evasion is easier will display
greater bunching. To explore this, we split the data using indicators of evasion
opportunities identified by the previous tax evasion literature and compare bunching
in those subsamples. First, Kleven et al. (2009) develop an agency model in which
firms with a large number of employees find it more difficult to sustain collusion on
evasion, and Kumler et al. (2013) find evidence that supports this theory in Mexico,
so we split the sample by firm size as proxied for by the wage bill and turnover.28
Second, Gordon & Li (2009) provide a model where firms that rely on formal credit
are more tax compliant (as this creates a paper trail that governments can observe),
an argument that is consistent with the cross-country evidence in Bachas & Jensen
(2013), so interest payments as a proportion of turnover is our second indicator of
evasion opportunities. Third, firms selling to final consumers have more opportunity
to evade than firms selling to other firms (due to the absence of a verifiable paper trail
on the former), consistent with the experimental evidence for Chile by Pomeranz
(2013), so we split the sample into retailers and non-retailers.
We focus on the group of high-rate firms, which represents most of the data
and therefore gives us more power to detect heterogeneity. Panels A and B of Figure
2.III plot the density of the profit rate around the kink at 1.43%, splitting the sample
by median salary payments (scaled by turnover) and median turnover, respectively.
As predicted by the theory, we find that small firms respond more strongly to the
28Unfortunately, the number of employees is not available in the data.
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kink. In both panels, the small-firm distribution exhibits a larger spike at the kink
than the large-firm distribution. Panel C shows bunching for firms with more or less
need for financial intermediation, as proxied for by reported interest payments as a
fraction of turnover. While the difference in excess bunching is less pronounced than
in the previous panels, the density for firms with below median interest payments
does exhibit a larger spike at the kink, again in accordance with the theory. Finally,
panel D examines bunching by sector, dividing the firms into “retailers” (firms that
sell at least partly to final consumers) and “non-retailers” (firms that sell exclusively
to other firms). In line with the theory, there is again a larger spike at the kink
in the retailer subsample. We therefore conclude that the patterns of bunching
heterogeneity across firms are consistent with evasion being the main mechanism,
using the indicators of evasion opportunity identified by the existing literature.
2.5.3 Estimating Evasion Responses Using Bunching
This section presents estimates of excess bunching and uses our model to translate
them into estimates of evasion responses. Following Chetty et al. (2011), we estimate
a counterfactual density—what the distribution would have looked like absent the
kink—by fitting a flexible polynomial to the observed density, excluding observations
in a range around the kink that is (visibly) affected by bunching. Denoting by dj the
fraction of the data in profit rate bin j and by pj the (midpoint) profit rate in bin
j, the counterfactual density is obtained from a regression of the following form
dj =
q∑
i=0
βi(pj)i +
pU∑
i=pL
γi · 1[pj = i] + νj, (2.19)
where q is the order of the polynomial and [pL, pU ] is the excluded range. The
counterfactual density is estimated as the predicted values from (2.19) omitting the
contribution of the dummies in the excluded range, i.e. dˆj =
∑q
i=0 βˆi(pj)i, and
excess bunching is then estimated as the area between the observed and counter-
factual densities in the excluded range, Bˆ = ∑pUj=pL (dj − dˆj). Standard errors are
bootstrapped by sampling from the estimated errors with replacement.
Figure 2.IV compares the empirical density distributions to estimated coun-
terfactual distributions (smooth solid lines) for the four samples examined in Figure
2.II: high-rate firms in 2006/07/09 in panel A, low-rate firms in 2006/07/09 in panel
B, high-rate firms in 2008 (placebo) in panel C, and high-rate firms in 2010 in panel
D. In each panel, the solid vertical line represents the kink point while the dashed
vertical lines demarcate the excluded range around the kink used in the estimation
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Figure 2.III: Heterogeneity in Bunching
A: Salary Payments B: Turnover
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Notes: The figure shows the empirical density distribution of the profit rate (reported
profit as percentage of turnover), for different subsamples within the high-rate firms group
in 2006/07/09. The tax rate schedule is explained in the notes to figure 2.II. For high-rates
firms in 2006/07/09, the minimum tax regime places the kink at a profit rate of 1.43%
(firms with a profit rate above this threshold fall under the profit tax scheme, while firms
with a profit rate below fall under the turnover tax scheme). In panels A-C, the high-
rate firms sample is split by median salary payments, turnover and interest payements
respectively. Salary payments and interest payments are scaled by turnover. The red
(light) density is for firms below the median, and the blue (dark) is for firms above the
median. Panel D splits the sample by sector, into retailers (red density) and non-retailers
(blue density). The kink point is marked by a vertical solid line. The zero profit point is
marked by a dotted line. The bin size in all panels is 0.214, chosen so that the kink point
is a bin centre.
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of the counterfactual.29 To better evaluate the estimated counterfactuals, each panel
also shows the empirical distribution for a comparison sample in light grey (low-rate
firms in panel A, high-rate firms in panel B, 2006/07/09 in panels C and D). The ob-
servation that in all cases the empirical distribution for our comparison sample lines
up well with the estimated counterfactual, particularly around the kink, provides a
further validation of our estimates.
The figure also displays estimates of excess bunching scaled by the average
counterfactual density around the kink, i.e. b = Bˆ/E(dˆj | j ∈ [pL, pU ]). In general,
these bunching estimates are large and strongly statistically significant, except in
the placebo analysis of panel C where bunching is close to zero and insignificant.
Excess bunching is larger for high-rate firms in 2006/07/09 (b = 4.44 (0.1)) than for
low-rate firms in the same period (b = 2.00 (0.2)), consistent with the fact that a
lower profit tax rate implies a smaller change in the evasion incentive at the kink.
Futhermore, excess bunching by high-rate firms is larger during the years 2006/07/09
than in year 2010 (b = 2.05 (0.2)), possibly because optimization frictions prevent
some firms from responding to the change in the location of the kink in the short
run.
Table 2.II converts our bunching estimates into evasion responses using the
methodology developed in section 2.3. As shown earlier, the amount of bunching
translates to a reported profit rate response via the relationship ∆pˆ = B/f0
(
τy
τpi
)
'
b× binwidth,30 and this profit rate response is in turn linked to the combination of
real output and evasion responses via equation (2.15),
∆pˆ ' τ
2
y
τpi
εy − d (cˆ− c)
y
.
The table shows estimates of excess bunching b in column (1), the profit rate response
∆pˆ in column (2), the real output elasticity εy assuming zero evasion in column (3),
and the evasion response assuming different real output elasticities εy ∈ {0, 0.5, 1, 5}
in columns (4)-(7). Evasion responses are reported as percentages of taxable profits
(evasion rate responses) instead of percentages of output in eq. (2.15). Evasion rates
in terms of output are easily converted to evasion rates in terms of profits, using the
fact that y−cˆ
y
= τy
τpi
at the kink. The different rows of the table show results for the
main subsamples considered in the bunching figures.
29The excluded range [pL, pU ] is set to match the area around the kink in which the empirical
density diverges from its smooth trend; four bins on either side of the kink in panels A and C,
two bins on either side in panels B and D. The order of the polynomial q is five (seven for 2008),
chosen such as to optimize the fit. Table A.I shows that the estimates are fairly sensitive to
the choice of excluded range and polynomial degree in panel A, but less so in the other panels.
30Since b equals bunching divided by the counterfactual density in discrete bins, we have to multiply
b by binwidth to obtain the profit rate response. The binwidth underlying b is 0.214 percentage
points for most estimates and so binwidth = 0.00214.
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Figure 2.IV: Bunching Estimation
A: High-rate Firms, 2006/07/09 B: Low-rate Firms, 2006/07/09
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Notes: The figure shows the empirical density distribution of the profit rate (reported
profit as percentage of turnover, dotted dark graph), an empirical counterfactual density
(dotted light graph), and the estimated counterfactual density (solid graph), for the differ-
ent groups of firms and time periods considered in figure 2.II. The tax rate schedules and
kink locations are explained in the notes to figure 2.II. The empirical counterfactual is
the high-rate firms density in 2006/07/09 for panels B-D, and the low-rate firms density in
2006/07/09 for panel A. The counterfactual density is estimated from the empirical den-
sity, by fitting a fifth-order polynomial (seventh-order for 2008), excluding data around
the kink, as specified in equation (2.19). The excluded range is chosen as the area around
the kink that is visibly affected by bunching. Kink points are marked by vertical solid
lines; lower and upper bounds of excluded ranges are marked by vertical dashed lines. The
zero profit point is marked by a dotted line. The bin size for the empirical densities is
0.214 (0.204 for 2010), so that the kink points are bin centres. Bunching b is the excess
mass in the excluded range around the kink, in proportion to the average counterfactual
density in the excluded range. Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table 2.II: Estimating Evasion Responses
Observed Responses Without Evasion With Evasion
Bunching (b) Profit Rate (∆pˆ) Output Elasticity (εy) Evasion Rate Response
εy = 0 εy = 0.5 εy = 1 εy = 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High-rate Firms, 2006/07/09 4.44 1.0 133.3 66.7 66.4 66.2 64.2
(0.1) (0.03) (3.8) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0)
Low-rate Firms, 2006/07/09 2.00 0.4 34.3 17.1 16.9 16.6 14.6
(0.2) (0.04) (3.0) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5)
High-rate Firms, 2010 2.05 0.4 14.7 14.7 14.2 13.7 9.7
(0.2) (0.03) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2)
Notes: This table presents bunching, elasticity and evasion estimates for the subsamples considered in panels A, B and D of figure 2.IV. Column
(1) reproduces the bunching estimate b, based on estimating equation (2.19). Bunching b is the excess mass in the excluded range around the kink,
in proportion to the average counterfactual density in the excluded range. Column (2) presents an estimate of the profit rate response associated
with b, based on the relationship ∆pˆ = B/f0 (τy/τpi) ' b × binwidth. Column (3) presents estimates of the real output elasticity εy for the model
without evasion. This model is based on the assumption that bunching is purely due to a real output response. εy is estimated using the relationship
∆p = [c/y − c′ (y)] dy/y '
(
τ2y /τpi
)
εy. Columns (4)-(7) present estimates of the evasion response as percentage of taxable profits (evasion rate responses),
for the model with evasion. This model allows for bunching to be driven by both evasion and real output response. The evasion response estimates are
based on ∆pˆ = [cˆ/y − c′ (y)] dy/y − [d (cˆ− c) /y] '
(
τ2y /τpi
)
εy − (τy/τpi) [d (cˆ− c) /(y − cˆ)], assuming different real output elasticities εy ∈ {0, 0.5, 1, 5}.
Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses.
74
The following main findings emerge from the table. First, in a model with-
out evasion, the bunching we observe implies phenomenally large real output elas-
ticities, ranging from 15 to 133 across the different samples. These elasticities are
all far above the upper bound of the range of values that can be considered realistic
and so we can comfortably reject that model.31 The reason for the large elasticities
in this model is the combination of large observed bunching and the tiny variation
in real incentives at the kink. Second, when we allow for tax evasion in the model,
it becomes possible to reconcile observed bunching with reasonable values of the
real output elasticity combined with large (but not implausible) evasion responses.
Column (3) provides an upper bound on the evasion response, assuming a zero real
output response. In this case, the evasion response ranges from 14.7% to 66.7% of
profits across the different populations, with high-rate firms in 2006/07/09 featur-
ing the largest response. Third, the evasion estimates are very robust to the real
output elasticity even though we allow for elasticities up to 5, much higher than
the empirical literature suggests is justified. The reason for this robustness is again
that real incentives at the kink are extremely small. Hence, while we cannot sep-
arately identify both real and evasion responses using the minimum tax kink, we
can provide very tight bounds on the evasion response due to the particular set of
incentives provided by the minimum tax kink.32
Finally, it should be noted that the evasion responses which we estimate
using bunching at minimum tax kinks are responses to the differential evasion op-
portunities offered by profit and output taxation. The fact that we see such large
bunching is prima facie evidence that it is much harder to evade output taxes than
profit taxes, consistent with the motivation of the policy and our stylized conceptual
framework. In the extreme case where output taxes offer zero evasion opportunity
(as in our stylized model), our estimates would capture total tax evasion by firms in
Pakistan. More realistically, if output taxes offer some scope for evasion as well, our
estimates of evasion responses are lower bounds on the total evasion level by firms
in Pakistan.33
31For example, Gruber & Rauh (2007) estimate that the elasticity of corporate taxable income
with respect to the effective marginal tax rate in the United States is 0.2. Taking that estimate
at face value in the Pakistani context, with all the caveats that entails, would imply that
0.2 = dCTIdω
ω
dCTI =
∂CTI/∂y
CTI/y εy and so even a real output elasticity of 15 would require marginal
taxable profits to be 1.33% of average taxable profits to be reconcilable with their estimate.
32We find that the estimates of the evasion rate response are very similar when assuming that only
output can be evaded, using equation (2.17). The results are reported in table A.II.
33This is consistent with the fact that our evasion estimates are lower than the existing tax gap
estimates for Pakistan discussed in section 2.4. Those tax gaps were measured as a fraction of
true tax liability, but can easily be converted into tax gaps as a fraction of actual taxes paid
(corresponding to our estimates in Table 2.II), in which case they would close to 100%.
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2.6 Numerical Analysis of Optimal Tax Policy
This section links our empirical results to the stylized model introduced in section
2.2. The model characterizes the trade-off between production and revenue effi-
ciency when setting a uniform tax rate and tax base, while our empirical analysis of
Pakistan’s minimum tax scheme identifies sufficient statistics allowing us to evaluate
this trade-off. As discussed earlier, the conceptual framework ignores general equi-
librium cascading effects that will make turnover taxes less desirable, other things
equal. Hence, this section should not be seen as a complete analysis of the optimal-
ity of turnover taxes, but as an analysis of how far the partial equilibrium evasion
argument by itself can move the optimal policy away from production efficiency. If
the evasion mechanism cannot justify a large move away from profit taxes towards
turnover tax in the context of our model, then turnover taxes are unlikely to be an
attractive policy even in countries with limited tax capacity.
At the optimum, as shown in Proposition 2, the tax policy is characterized
by
τ
1− τ ·
∂ω
∂τ
(µ) = G(µ) · εcˆ−c
εy
.
While this optimal tax rule needs to be considered jointly with a revenue requirement
to determine the optimal tax base and rate, our analysis can shed light on the
optimality of the tax base µ for a given tax rate τ . This crucially depends on
how both sides of the optimal tax rule change as the tax system moves from profit
taxation (µ = 1) towards turnover taxation (µ = 0), which we analyze below.
The left-hand side of the optimal tax rule reflects the effective marginal
tax rate. Our theoretical model fully determines how this depends on the tax base
parameter,
τ
1− τ ·
∂ω
∂τ
(µ) = τ1− τ ·
1− µ
(1− τµ)2 .
For tax rates below 50 percent, the effective marginal tax rate is decreasing in
µ, starting at a maximum of τ1−τ for µ = 0 and falling to 0 for µ = 1. This is
illustrated in panel A of Figure 2.V for τ = .35, which is the standard profit tax
rate in Pakistan.
The right-hand side of the optimal tax rule equals the inverse of the output
elasticity scaled by the evasion rate response,
G(µ) · εcˆ−c
εy
= cˆ− c
Πˆ
εcˆ−c
εy
' −d(cˆ− c)
Πˆ
/εy,
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Figure 2.V: Numerical Analysis of Optimal Tax Policy
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Notes: The figure presents a numerical analysis of optimal tax policy, integrating our
stylized theoretical framework and our empirical results. The solid black curve in panel
A plots the left-hand side of the optimal tax rule (equation 2.11) as a function of µ for
τpi = 0.35. The three red markers on the dashed gray curve show respectively the right-
hand side of the optimal tax rule for τpi = 0.35, evaluated at µ = 0, at µ = 0.2/0.35and
µ = 1. The value for µ = 0 is directly implied by our theoretical model, while the values
forµ = 0.2/0.35and µ = 1 are based on the estimates of evasion rate response for the low-rate
firms and for the high-rate firms respectively, assuming an output elasticity of εy = .5. By
extrapolating between these three estimates, we find that the optimal tax base implied by
the tax rule equals µ = 0.578. In panel B we replicate this exercise to find the optimal
tax base as a function of the tax rate for three different levels of the output elasticity.
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using d(τµ)/(τµ) = −1 at the minimum tax kink. This evasion rate response is
exactly what we have estimated in our empirical analysis. For the firms facing a
profit tax rate of τ = .35, our empirical analysis suggests an estimate of the right-
hand side of 1.22 for εy = .5. This exceeds the left-hand side, which is bounded
from above by τ1−τ =
.35
.65 = .54. The evasion rate by high-rate firms in response to
the current profit tax is thus too high relative to the effective tax wedge, indicating
that welfare could be increased by broadening the tax base. This would reduce the
evasion rate, but increase the effective tax wedge.
To reveal how quickly the right-hand side of the optimal tax rule decreases
when moving towards a turnover tax (i.e., reducing µ), we can use our estimate of the
evasion rate response at the kink for firms facing a low profit tax rate of τ = .20.34
Due to the lower tax rate, the evasion incentive τµ for the low-rate firms is equal to
.20
.35 = 57% of the evasion incentive for the high-rate firms. This reduction in the tax
evasion incentive corresponds to a decrease in the tax base parameter from µ = 1
to µ = .57 (for a fixed tax rate) using that the evasion incentive τµ is symmetric
in the rate and the base. Our estimate of the evasion rate response for the low-rate
firms would imply an estimate for the right-hand side of the optimal tax rule, when
evaluated at µ = .57, equal to .34. The substantially smaller evasion rate response
for the low-rate firms implies that the right-hand side is marginally below the left-
hand side for µ = .57. This is illustrated in panel A of Figure 2.V. Extrapolating
linearly between these two points, we find that the two sides of the optimal tax
rule are equal for µ = .578, which suggests that only about half of the costs should
be deductible from the corporate tax base at a tax rate of 35 percent. While this
exact number relies on the specific assumptions of our model and calibration, the
result indicates that the full cost deductibility granted by profit taxation are far
from optimal when accounting for evasion.
Our conclusion is robust to different tax rates and output elasticities. Panel
B of figure 2.V shows all combinations of the tax rate and tax base for which the
trade-off between production and revenue efficiency is optimized as captured by the
optimal tax rule.35 The optimal tax base moves further towards the turnover tax
base when decreasing the tax rate, with an optimal µ close to zero for a tax rate of
.005, which is the minimum tax rate in Pakistan. The figure also illustrates that a
higher output elasticity would move the optimal tax system closer to profit taxation
for any tax rate, but still far from a pure profit tax base with full cost deductibility,
34Here we make the (strong) assumption that the variation in the profit tax rate across firms can
be viewed as exogenous.
35Here we use that the right-hand side decreases to 0 when moving all the way to turnover taxation,
as implied by our model. We thus have three points for the right-hand side as a function of µ
(i.e., for µ ∈ {0, .57, 1} and use a linear extrapolation in between.
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while a lower output elasticity would move the system closer to turnover taxation.36
The caveat mentioned at the beginning notwithstanding, the numerical analysis
clearly illustrates how production-inefficient tax instruments could become desirable
when tax capacity is limited.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the trade-off between preserving production efficiency
and preventing the corrosion of revenues by evasion faced by governments with lim-
ited tax enforcement capacity. In contrast to models without evasion in which the
optimal tax base is as close as possible to pure profits (preserving production ef-
ficiency), we have shown theoretically that in the presence of evasion, the optimal
tax base sacrifices some production efficiency in order to curtail evasion levels. Our
optimality conditions relate the optimal marginal tax wedge on real production to
the elasticities of real production and tax evasion with respect to the tax wedge,
sufficient statistics that we study empirically. We have also developed a novel em-
pirical approach showing that minimum taxation schemes of a type that is common
throughout the developing world can be used to estimate tight bounds on the evasion
response to switching from profits to a broader turnover base. Exploiting the small
change in real incentives and the large change in evasion incentives presented by the
minimum tax scheme on corporations in Pakistan, we estimate that the switch from
a profit tax to a turnover tax reduces evasion levels by up to 60-70% of corporate
income. Linking these estimates back to our conceptual framework, our tax rule
implies that the optimal tax system has a base that is far broader than profits—in
Pakistan, as little as 50% of costs should be deductible when taxed at 35%.
It should be noted that our policy conclusions are based on a setting in
which tax enforcement capacity is exogenously given, which is a reasonable ap-
proximation of the short-medium term environment of a developing country. In the
longer run where tax capacity is endogenous to economic development (Kleven et al.
2009) and investments in state capacity (Besley & Persson 2011, 2013), the policy
recommendations would obviously change. In fact, the large compliance gains to
production-inefficient policies that we estimate shows the potentially large social
returns to greater tax capacity.
36The numerical analysis assumes that the profit tax in Pakistan is non-distortionary (i.e.,µ = 1).
Figure xx in the web appendix shows the same graphs assuming that the the effective marginal
tax rate under profit taxation in Pakistan equals ω = .2, implied by µ = .53. The estimates
of the evasion rate response for the high-rate and low-rate firms now provide an estimate of
the right-hand side evaluated atµ = .53 and µ = .20.35 × .53 respectively. The optimal tax
base parameter is lower in absolute terms, but somewhat closer to the (current) profit base
parameter in relative terms.
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Finally, since the kind of minimum tax scheme required for our methodology
is ubiquitous throughout the world, the approach could be replicated in many dif-
ferent countries. Applying the approach to countries with different tax enforcement
capacities could shed further light on how tax policy is shaped by tax enforcement
capacity and on the returns to greater tax capacity.
Chapter 3
Does IMF Conditionality Work? Evidence from VAT
Adoption
3.1 Introduction
Adoption of the VAT is an important issue for developing countries’ fiscal policy
agendas. Developing countries are under pressure to increase public spending on
health, education and social services, but their tax systems rely on distortive tax
instruments and raise little revenue. Estimates for the period 1996-2001 show that
industrialized countries raised on average 25.0% of GDP in tax revenue, whereas de-
veloping countries raised only 17.6% of GDP. Developing countries relied on tariffs,
corporate income taxes and seignorage for 62.7% of their tax revenue, whereas these
taxes represented only 20.2% of tax revenue in industrialized countries (Gordon &
Li 2009). The VAT, a broad-based tax levied at all stages of production, is often
considered a cure for developing countries’ fiscal problems, as it promises to allevi-
ate the distortions of the tax system and increase tax revenue. First introduced in
France in 1948, the VAT has spread rapidly and is now used in more than 140 coun-
tries, two-thirds of which are low-and middle-income countries (Bird & Gendron
2007). However, its broad tax base and the fact that it often replaces more selective
sales and excise taxes also make the VAT an object of political opposition. Besides,
adopting the VAT, with its complex recrediting mechanism, is logistically challeng-
ing, especially for developing countries that have low administrative capacities. It
is therefore important for policymakers to understand what factors determine VAT
adoption and how VAT adoption can be facilitated in practice. An institution inti-
mately linked to the spread of the VAT is the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The IMF considers the VAT “a key instrument for securing macroeconomic stability
and growth by placing domestic revenue mobilization on a sounder basis.” It has
80
81
promoted the VAT by making lending conditional on VAT adoption and by provid-
ing technical assistance for adoption (Ebrill et al. 2001; Tanzi 1990). However, IMF
lending and technical assistance projects have been highly controversial in the past,
and countries have repeatedly failed to implement IMF advocated reforms (Easterly
2005).
This paper therefore analyzes whether IMF interventions in favor of VAT
adoption have increased countries’ likelihood of adopting the VAT. I discuss how
the IMF has promoted VAT adoption by making lending conditional on adoption,
providing administrative and technical assistance, and reducing the political costs of
adoption. Since only a handful of countries have ever repealed the VAT1, I consider
VAT adoption an absorbing state and estimate the determinants of adoption in a
hazard model. The empirical analysis is based on panel data for 26 years (1975-2000)
and 125 countries, 60 of which adopted the VAT during the sample period. To proxy
IMF interventions, I use a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a country
is under a lending agreement with the IMF in a given year.2 I find that countries
under a lending agreement are approximately three times as likely to adopt the
VAT as countries not under a lending agreement, and that this effect is not driven
by omitted variables such as debt crises. I also show that IMF lending attenuates
the negative effect of autocracy on VAT adoption.
My paper contributes to the literature on the VAT as summarized most
recently by Keen & Lockwood (2010). This literature has generally estimated the
determinants of VAT adoption in probit models which are not fit to accommodate
absorbing state events. I improve upon this by modeling VAT adoption in a haz-
ard framework, thus taking into account its absorbing state nature, and by paying
particular attention to political factors conditioning VAT adoption. My paper also
contributes to the literature on the impact of IMF lending, as represented by Barro
& Lee (2005) and Easterly (2005). This literature has focused on distant macroeco-
nomic outcomes and found weak and inconsistent effects of IMF lending. I instead
focus on a specific policy reform requested by the IMF and estimate the immediate
impact of IMF lending on this reform. The paper also draws inspiration from Besley
& Persson (2009) and other contributions to the fiscal capacity literature.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the benefits and
costs of VAT adoption, the role of the IMF in this process, and summarizes the
related literature. Section 3.3 presents the estimation strategy. Sections 3.4 and 3.5
1These exceptional cases will be discussed below. In general, countries are unlikely to repeal the
VAT because of the high fixed costs of adoption (investments in administrative capacity etc.).
2The data do not allow me to distinguish between lending agreements that contain an explicit
condition on VAT adoption and/or are accompanied by a technical assistance package, and
those that are not.
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discuss the data and empirical results. Section 3.6 offers concluding remarks.
3.2 Motivation
This section describes the efficiency and revenue gains from VAT adoption, its ad-
ministrative and political costs, and the role the IMF has played in the process of
VAT adoption. It also discusses related literature.
3.2.1 Benefits of VAT Adoption
According to Bird & Gendron (2007), the VAT is a “broad-based tax, levied at mul-
tiple stages of production and distribution, with, crucially, taxes on inputs credited
against taxes on output.” In fact, the VAT is simply a tax on final consumption that
is collected throughout the chain of production. It is usually charged on imports
as well as domestic goods, but not on exports. This, together with the recredit-
ing mechanism, ensures that the VAT fulfills the conditions of production efficiency
according to Diamond & Mirrlees (1971). The VAT does not create incentives for
vertical integration, as do turnover taxes, which are also levied at all stages of pro-
duction, but which do not allow for the crediting of input taxes against output
taxes. The VAT also avoids the excessive rate differentiation that characterizes final
sales and excise taxes. These tax instruments impose high tax rates on a narrow
range of goods and a zero rate on all other goods, which distorts the relative price
between those two types of goods.3 Finally, the VAT does not distort the relative
price of imports and domestically produced goods, as tariffs do (Bird & Gendron
2007), Burgess & Stern 1993). Since the VAT tends to replace tax revenue from
turnover, sales and excise taxes, and from tariffs, its adoption is likely to increase
the efficiency of the tax system.
The second key reason that the VAT may provide efficiency gains is the
difficulty of evading it. In fact, VAT evasion requires the cooperation of a buyer and
a seller who have opposing interests. A firm can evade the VAT either by overstating
its input purchases or understating its sales. However, the input purchases are
another firm’s sales, and this second firm is interested in obtaining a correct invoice
for its sales. This is why VAT compliance has often been described as self-enforcing
3Final sales taxes are intended to be levied on all goods at the stage of final sales. However, these
taxes are vulnerable to evasion since it is difficult in practice to distinguish final consumption
goods from intermediate goods. This means that final sales taxes also end up being levied on
a narrow tax base.
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(Bird & Gendron (2007); Ebrill et al. 2001).4
In summary, theory predicts that the VAT, if correctly implemented, can
generate important efficiency gains and reduce the marginal cost of public funds.
It is thus an attractive means of taxation, especially for developing countries that
have in the past relied on highly distortive tax instruments. Evidence shows that
the VAT has indeed become an important source of tax revenue. It now raises 20%
of tax revenue worldwide and is the “single most important tax” in many developing
countries. In El Salvador, the Republic of Congo, and Tajikistan, for instance, it
raised more than 45% of the total tax revenue in 1998-2000 (Bird & Gendron 2007).
However, it remains unclear whether VAT adoption has allowed countries to increase
total tax revenue, i.e. the tax revenue to GDP ratio. Keen & Lockwood (2006) and
(2010) report that the VAT has significantly increased tax revenue to GDP ratios in
OECD countries, but has not always done so in developing countries. In particular,
their predicted revenue gains from VAT adoption are negative for some African
countries. In these countries, the increase in tax revenue from VAT adoption has
often been more than offset by decreasing revenue from other sources such as trade
taxes, and by the high administrative costs of VAT adoption. These costs of VAT
adoption are therefore discussed in the next subsection.
3.2.2 Costs of VAT Adoption
The costs of VAT adoption can be divided broadly into administrative and political
costs, although these two are closely linked. The administrative costs of VAT adop-
tion relate to the investments in fiscal capacity a country must make in order to
successfully implement the VAT. Since the VAT is levied at all stages of production,
it covers a large number of taxpayers and thus requires a large and well-equipped
national tax administration. In addition, the VAT recrediting mechanism is based
on an extensive system of record-keeping, invoicing and self-assessment by firms.
Preparing the business community for this task requires public awareness and edu-
cation programs (Bird & Gendron 2007). The administrative costs of VAT adoption
are thought to differ widely across countries, according to their state of development,
their existing fiscal capacity and the design of the VAT (Ebrill et al. 2001). Esti-
4Since the VAT can only be applied to firms that keep records, there is a concern that it may
introduce distortions between formal and informal sector production, especially in developing
countries where informal sectors are large. For instance, Piggott & Whalley (2001) and Emran
& Stiglitz (2005b) present models in which the VAT can reduce welfare, because it leads to
differential taxation of informal and formal sector inputs and thus causes a shift towards inef-
ficient informal production. However, Keen (2008) shows that the VAT can be optimal even in
the presence of a large informal sector, if it is combined with a withholding tax. A withholding
tax allows for taxes paid on imports to be credited against income tax payments, and thus
functions as a tariff for informal sector businesses. A VAT-cum-withholding-tax is therefore
preferable to tariffs.
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mates by Cnossen (1994) suggest that the annual costs of administering the VAT rise
to approximately US$ 100 per registered firm in OECD countries. However, there
are, to the best of my knowledge, no similar estimates for developing countries, and
no estimates of the fixed costs of VAT adoption.
In addition to its administrative costs, VAT adoption also has political
costs. Political costs here are understood as the loss of votes in a democracy and
the emergence of violent protest in an autocracy. The VAT is a politically sensitive
issue for two reasons. First, the VAT is a broad-based tax and often replaces more
selective excise or sales taxes. It is therefore perceived by citizens as a regressive
tax that disproportionately hits low income groups.5 Second, the VAT is unpopular
in the business community due to the high administrative costs it imposes on firms.
In particular, small-scale businesses in developing countries, which have low ad-
ministrative and managerial capacity, struggle with the self-assessment mechanism
(Bird & Gendron 2007). The administrative and political costs of VAT adoption
are closely linked. If the government makes little effort to raise awareness about
the VAT and to prepare the business community for it, the political cost of VAT
adoption is likely to be higher. The history of VAT adoption in Ghana, discussed
in the appendix, illustrates this point.
3.2.3 VAT Adoption and the IMF
A large amount of anecdotal evidence demonstrates how the IMF has promoted
VAT adoption. First, the IMF has promoted VAT adoption through conditionality:
that is, including VAT adoption in the set of reforms that a country commits itself
to implement under IMF lending.6 For example, the Medium-Term Economic and
Fiscal Policy Framework Paper for an loan to Cameroon for the period 1998-2001
states: “Envisaged tax policy changes include (a) the replacement of the sales tax
by a value-added tax (VAT), as from January 1, 1999; [...].” VAT adoption was
also part of the lending agreement between the IMF and Chad in 1999. In its
Letter of Intent7, the Chadian government promised “the introduction on January
1, 2000 of the value-added tax (VAT) at the single rate of 18 percent, replacing the
turnover tax (TCA).” Cameroon and Chad indeed adopted the VAT in 1999 and
5In reality, many countries choose to reduce the regressivity of the tax by applying it only to
businesses of a certain size and exempting necessity goods. The degree of regressivity thus
depends on the context and widely differs across countries (Jenkins et al. 2006).
6The IMF uses different types of conditionality concepts, all of which broadly relate to a set of
policies that the country agrees to implement under IMF guidance. The way compliance with
conditionality is evaluated differs across policy prescriptions and lending programs. For more
information, see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm (accessed April 18th
2010).
7The Letter of Intent is the official request for funding from the IMF.
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2000 respectively.
Second, the IMF has promoted VAT adoption through technical assistance.8
The aforementioned agreement between the IMF and Cameroon, for instance, states:
“In the area of domestic resource mobilization, Cameroon expects to continue re-
ceiving technical assistance from the IMF [...]. The government will receive further
IMF assistance in introducing the VAT [...].” The 2001 Article IV consultation re-
port for Chad explains that “In the area of revenues, the valued-added tax (VAT)
administration has improved, with technical assistance from the Fund.” Finally,
Vreeland (2003) and Vreeland (1999) suggest that the IMF has also helped to re-
duce the political costs of VAT adoption by figuring as a scapegoat. They argue
that governments deflect popular anger about VAT adoption by claiming that the
IMF forced them to adopt the VAT.
Descriptive data show that the VAT has indeed spread rapidly over the
past decades. The VAT was first adopted in France in 1948 and spread to other
countries in Europe and Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. A second wave of
adoption brought it to Africa, Asia and the transition economies in the 1980s and
1990s. Figure 3.I traces the number of countries having a VAT and the number of
countries adopting a VAT each year for my sample of 125 countries. While only 22
countries had a VAT in 1975, this number increased to 82 by 2000. Today, more
than 140 countries have a VAT.
An event study analysis, presented in Figure 3.II, shows that VAT adoption
is often accompanied by an IMF intervention. For countries that adopted the VAT
during my sample period, the blue bars show the percentage of countries that were
under an IMF lending agreement in the years before, during, or after VAT adoption.
In each of these three years, approximately 50% of the VAT adopters experienced
an IMF intervention. The fourth bar shows that in all other years (i.e. those
more than one year before or after VAT adoption), on average only 40.54% of the
VAT adopters experienced an IMF intervention. This hints at a bunching of IMF
interventions around the VAT adoption date. Further evidence for this is provided
by the fifth bar, which displays the average percentage of countries under an IMF
lending agreement in any given year for the countries that did not adopt the VAT
during the sample period. On average, only 22.13% of these countries experienced
an IMF intervention in any given year. IMF interventions were thus more frequent
in countries that adopted the VAT during the sample period, and in years preceding
the VAT adoption date. The fact that VAT adopters also experienced a higher
number of IMF interventions in the year following VAT adoption suggests that the
8This can include the training of tax collectors, advising the government on the appropriate tax
rate and supporting the design of tax legislation (Ebrill et al. 2001).
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Figure 3.I: VAT Adoption Over Time
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Figure 3.II: VAT Adoption and IMF Intervention
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line of causality may not only run from IMF lending to VAT adoption, but also the
other way around, an issue which will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3.
3.2.4 Related Literature
This paper is related to three different strands of literature, the first of which is
the literature on the VAT. Key papers are Keen & Lockwood (2010) and (2006),
who estimate the revenue impact of VAT adoption. Other contributions are Desai
& Hines (2005), who show that VAT tax revenue is negatively related to trade
openness and export performance, and Agha & Haughton (1996), who analyze the
determinants of VAT compliance, showing that compliance is higher when rates are
lower and less numerous. The only paper that analyzes the determinants of VAT
adoption is Keen & Lockwood (2010). However, this paper uses a probit model
to explain whether or not a country has a VAT in a given year. This disregards
the fact that VAT adoption is in practice an absorbing state, so that the dependent
variable, a VAT dummy, is determined to take value one in all periods after the VAT
adoption date. After adoption, there is no variation in the dependent variable left
to be explained by the independent variables. I improve upon this by modeling VAT
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adoption in a survival framework, which takes account of the absorbing state nature
of this event, as will be discussed in more detail below. My paper also pays particular
attention to the political economy of IMF intervention and VAT adoption.
While research on the VAT is scarce, there is a large empirical literature
on the impact of IMF lending on various macroeconomic outcomes. Barro & Lee
(2005) use an instrumental variable strategy to take into account the endogeneity of
IMF lending and find that IMF lending reduces a country’s growth rate. Easterly
(2005) uses a similar estimation strategy and finds that IMF lending has no im-
pact on a macroeconomic imbalance indicator. Przeworski & Vreeland (2000) rely
on a dynamic Heckman selection model to demonstrate that IMF lending leads to
increased growth once a country graduates from the lending program. Other con-
tributions are Wei & Zhang (2010), Marchesi (2003), Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000)
and Conway (1994). Overall, the effect of IMF lending that these papers identify is
at best ambiguous. This might be due to the literature’s focus on macroeconomic
outcomes rather than on specific policy changes. Understanding whether IMF inter-
ventions have actually led to the desired policy reforms may help to better predict
the impact of these reforms on macroeconomic outcomes. This paper therefore an-
alyzes the IMF’s impact on the adoption of the VAT, which is one specific reform
the IMF has promoted.
Finally, this paper also draws inspiration from a nascent literature on fiscal
investments and state capacity. For instance, Besley & Persson (2009) model the
determinants of investments in fiscal and legal capacity, and show that the occur-
rence of wars, political stability and the existence of inclusive political institutions
are among the factors that promote investments in state capacity. Besley & Persson
(2010) further develop this framework and relate investments in state capacity to
development and growth dynamics. Another contribution is Acemoglu et al. (2006),
who pay particular attention to the political economy of inequality and show that
states with low tax capacity are more likely to emerge when inequality is greater.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
The foundation of my empirical strategy is considering VAT adoption an absorbing
state. In theory, countries should be unlikely to repeal the VAT once they have
adopted it, because of the large fixed costs of adoption. This is also true in prac-
tice. Even though we observe five countries repealing and later reintroducing the
VAT,9 the first VAT adoption in these cases was only an unsuccessful attempt. The
9Belize introduced the VAT in 1996, repealed it in 1999, and reintroduced it in 2006. Ghana
introduced the VAT in 1995, repealed it three months later, and reintroduced it in 1998.
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VAT had to be withdrawn because of lack of administrative capacity and political
support, as illustrated by the history of VAT adoption in Ghana, discussed in the
appendix. The VAT thus becomes an absorbing state if successfully adopted.10 The
next subsection explains why an absorptive dependent variable requires the use of a
hazard model, and specifically presents the advantages of the Cox proportional haz-
ard model.11 I then discuss how the coefficients in this type of model are estimated
and identified.
3.3.1 The Cox Proportional Hazard Model
As discussed in Cleves et al. (2004), the distribution of the time t until the occurrence
of an event Z is most often asymmetric and possibly bimodal. Estimating the model
ti = β0 +β1xi+i via an ordinary least squares or probit method, which assumes the
normality of the error term, may therefore lead to biased and inconsistent estimates.
If the event Z is an absorbing state, the errors in this model would also be strongly
auto-correlated. These problems are overcome in a hazard model, which does not
require any assumption on the error term. Let T be the time of VAT adoption. A
hazard model then estimates the probability of adoption, also called “hazard rate”,
at time t as a function of time and a vector of independent variables x(t), which can
themselves be time-varying:
h(t;x(t)) = lim
∆t→0
P (t ≤ T ≤ t+ ∆t|T ≥ t,x(t))
∆t . (3.1)
The independent variables x(t) in my model are a dummy for IMF lend-
ing, and proxies for the efficiency and revenue gains, and for the administrative and
political costs of VAT adoption. In order to model the relationship between the
probability of VAT adoption and the matrix x(t), one needs to impose a functional
form on the hazard rate h(t;x(t)). This paper relies on the semi-parametric propor-
tional hazard specification due to Cox (1972), which is most frequently used in the
aforementioned literature. The Cox model describes the hazard rate as the product
of an exponential function of the independent variables and a baseline hazard h0,
Grenada introduced the VAT in 1986, faced it out gradually, and reintroduced it in 2010.
Malta introduced the VAT in 1995, repealed it in 1997, and reintroduced it in 1999. Vietnam
introduced and repealed the VAT in several steps in the 1970s and reintroduced it in 1999.
10For the countries that adopted, repealed and readopted the VAT, I code the VAT dummy as
switching to one with the second VAT adoption. In my sample, this concerns only Ghana,
since Malta and Vietnam are not in my sample, and Belize and Grenada re-adopted the VAT
after 2000. The results are robust to dropping Ghana, Belize and Grenada from the sample, or
coding the first introduction as the VAT adoption date.
11The class of hazard models is also known as survival or duration models.
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which only depends on time:
h(t;x(t)) = exp(x(t)′β)h0(t). (3.2)
This specification has two main advantages. First, it ensures that the log-
arithm of the hazard rate is a linear function of the independent variables x(t),
which is convenient for interpretation.12 Second, the model does not require any
assumptions on the structure of the error term because it is semi-parametric. It is
parameterized with respect to x(t), but the baseline hazard h0(t) is left unspecified.
The cost of not making a distributional assumption is reduced precision of the esti-
mates. In fact, the coefficient vector β has to be estimated via partial rather than
ordinary maximum likelihood, as explained in the next subsection.13
3.3.2 Estimation Via Partial Maximum Likelihood
The partial maximum likelihood method removes the distributional assumption by
only taking into account the ordering of VAT adoption times, but not the time
intervals between two adoption events. In a dataset consisting of n countries, k ≤ n
of which adopt the VAT during the period under observation, and n − k of which
are right-censored (i.e. adopted the VAT after the period under observation), let
the countries be ordered according to their adoption time. The probability that the
ith country adopts the VAT at time ti is then
Pr(ti = Ti|R(ti)) = exp(xi(t)
′β)h0(t)∑
j∈R(ti) exp(xj(t)′β)h0(t)
, (3.3)
where R(ti) is the risk set at time ti, i.e. the set of countries that have not adopted
the VAT until ti. Notice that the baseline hazard, which is assumed to be the same
for all countries, nicely cancels out in this formulation. Now let di be an indicator
that takes value zero for right-censored observations. The product of the adoption
probabilities for each country then yields the partial likelihood function
Lp =
n∏
i=1
[
exp(xi(t)′β)∑
j∈R(ti) exp(xj(t)′β)
]di
. (3.4)
12Using the exponential function also ensures that the hazard rate cannot be negative because
h0(t) is a probability and thus greater than or equal to 0.
13Wooldridge (2002), Chapter 20, and Lancaster (1990) discuss these and other advantages of the
Cox model in more detail.
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The corresponding partial log-likelihood function is
logLp =
n∑
i=1
di
xi(t)′β − log ∑
j∈R(ti)
exp(xj(t)′β)
 , (3.5)
which can be easily maximized. Cox (1972) and Cox (1975) show that the partial
maximum likelihood estimates have the same properties as ordinary maximum likeli-
hood estimates. They are asymptotically normal, asymptotically efficient, consistent
and invariant.
Left-censored observations (that is countries that adopted the VAT before
the period under observation) do not contribute any information to the estimation
of the coefficients. Right-censored observations (that is countries that adopted the
VAT after the period under observation) contribute information only to the risk
set.14 We only know that these countries adopted the VAT after the year 2000, the
end of the period of observation, but do not know in which year they adopted it.
Right-censoring does not bias the coefficients as long as, conditional on the covari-
ates, the time until VAT adoption is independent of the censoring time ci, which
means D(Ti|xi, ci) = D(Ti|xi), where D(·|·) denotes the conditional distribution
(Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 20). This assumption clearly holds here, because ci is
a constant, 2000. All countries are censored in the year 2000, because the dataset
does not extend further.
An important challenge for the Cox model is dealing with “tied failures”,
or years in which several countries adopt the VAT and the order of adoption is
not known. In these cases, the exact composition of the risk set is unknown and
the partial likelihood function thus needs to be approximated. Here, I use the
computationally simple Breslow method, which declares the risk set to be the same
for all countries that adopt the VAT in a given year. It contains all countries that
adopt the VAT that year, and all countries that adopt it at a later point in time.
The loss of precision from this approximation is small, since the number of tied
failures in my sample does not exceed six countries in a given year. The results are
also robust to using more sophisticated methods of approximation such as the Efron
and exact discrete method (see Efron (1977) for more details on these methods).
Another challenge is that the Cox model cannot accommodate country fixed
effects, since its estimation relies on a single observation per country (the time until
VAT adoption). This is problematic if one expects the baseline propensity to adopt
the VAT to vary across countries. I therefore stratify the sample according to four
groups of countries that can be expected to have different baseline propensities of
14Right-censoring is equivalent to right-truncation in this model.
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VAT adoption. I let the baseline hazard h0(t) vary across these subsamples but
restrict the coefficient vector β to be the same for all subsamples. This means that
I compare countries only to other countries in the same subsample. The four sub-
samples are oil-producing countries (which have high oil revenue and thus little need
for the VAT), small island states (where most domestic consumption is imported,
which makes the VAT similar to a tariff), rich countries (those in the upper quartile
of the income distribution in 1975), and poor countries. Finally, since the errors are
most likely correlated across time for each country, I cluster the standard errors at
the country level.
3.3.3 Identification Assumption and Challenges
Having discussed how the coefficient vector β can be estimated, I will now address the
question of whether it can also be correctly identified. The identification assumption
I have to make is that the time path of the independent variables x(t) does not
depend on the time until VAT adoption (Lancaster 1990). This means that
P (x(t, t+ ∆t)|T ≥ t+ ∆t,x(t)) = P (x(t, t+ ∆t)|x(t)), (3.6)
where x(t, t + ∆t) is the path of the independent variables between time t and
t+ ∆t.
This assumption faces two important challenges. The first is omitted vari-
ables. Indeed, one can easily imagine that a shock, such as a debt crisis, might
push a country to adopt the VAT and simultaneously trigger an IMF intervention.
This would cause a spurious correlation between the IMF intervention and VAT
adoption. The above exogeneity condition would then hold only when the probabil-
ities are conditioned on the omitted variables. Without accounting for the omitted
variables, the partial likelihood maximization would yield upward biased and incon-
sistent estimates. Therefore, after presenting the baseline results in section 3.5.1, I
explore the impact of various omitted variables in section 3.5.2. I show that con-
trolling for the shocks that one most commonly expects to lead to IMF intervention
and possibly VAT adoption does not alter the sign and significance of the coefficient
on the IMF dummy.
The second challenge to the identification assumption is reverse causality.
For instance, countries that want to adopt the VAT might call for an IMF interven-
tion to assist them in carrying out the necessary administrative reforms.15 Alterna-
15Countries address a Letter of Intent to the IMF to request funding or technical assistance.
However, these letters are drafted in cooperation with the local IMF representation. It is
therefore difficult to distinguish in practice between supply-driven and demand-driven IMF
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tively, the IMF might be more willing to lend to countries that have adopted the
VAT, because those countries have a stronger fiscal balance and are more likely to
pay back the loan. In these cases, the above exogeneity condition does not hold and
the estimated coefficient on the IMF variable would be biased. I therefore conduct
a falsification test for reverse causality in section 3.5.3. The test shows that there is
no significant correlation between VAT adoption and future IMF interventions, once
autocorrelation in IMF interventions is controlled for.
3.4 Data
The data I use to test the impact of IMF interventions on VAT adoption contains
information on 125 countries over a period of 26 years (1975-2000). The set of
countries covers all continents, but excludes the transition economies due to their
specific development history.16 Data on the VAT adoption year was obtained from
Ebrill et al. (2001). 60 countries, most of them in Africa and Asia, adopted the
VAT during the sample period.
The key independent variable in my analysis is an IMF dummy indicating
whether or not the country is under a lending agreement for at least five months
of a given year. It is derived from Dreher (2006). I use different leads and lags
of the IMF dummy, as well as the combined dummy IMF−3 (IMF+3) which takes
value one if the country was under a lending agreement in one of the last three years
(will be under a lending agreement in one of the forthcoming three years). I lose
only few observations in this process, because the IMF data covers a slightly longer
period than the baseline data (1970-2004). 25.8% of the country-year points in my
sample experienced an IMF intervention. Individual lending agreements normally
last between one and four years. Many countries experienced only sporadic one-year
interventions, while others were under lending for a continuous period of more than
a decade (e.g. Panama from 1970 to 1986).
In addition to IMF interventions, the theory of taxation and the discussion
in section 3.2 suggest that VAT adoption depends positively on the revenue and
efficiency gains and negatively on the administrative and political costs of VAT
adoption. As proxies for the revenue gains of VAT adoption, I use the level of GDP
per capita, the share of the agricultural sector in GDP and the share of imports
in GDP. The larger a country’s GDP and the smaller its agricultural sector, the
interventions.
16The transition economies all adopted the VAT in the early 1990s, during the IMF-led process
of liberalization. Including these countries in the sample might therefore upward bias the
estimated IMF effect.
94
larger the monetary value of taxable transactions that take place and the higher the
revenue gains from VAT adoption.17 The share of imports in GDP does not directly
proxy revenue gains but rather the need for additional tax revenue. Countries with
a lower share of imports in GDP have lower trade tax revenues and should thus be
more in need of the VAT as an additional source of revenue. GDP, the size of the
agricultural sector and the share of imports in GDP are also standard variables in
tax effort models (Tanzi 1992; Burgess & Stern 1993) that attempt to predict the
ratio of tax revenue to GDP in a cross-section of countries.
As proxies for the efficiency gains of VAT adoption, I use the share of trade
taxes in total tax revenue and the inflation rate. Heavy reliance on trade and
inflation taxes suggests that the current tax system is highly distortive. Assuming
that VAT adoption raises the tax system’s efficiency to a certain level, VAT adoption
would yield higher efficiency gains in countries with more distortive tax systems.
Data on GDP per capita, the size of the agricultural sector, imports, tax revenue
and trade tax revenue as a share of GDP, and the inflation rate are obtained from
Baunsgaard & Keen (2010). The administrative costs of VAT adoption are proxied
by the adult illiteracy rate18 obtained from the World Development Indicators.19
Finally, in the absence of clear predictions about the political determinants
of VAT adoption, I focus on two political factors that have repeatedly been suggested
as determinants of fiscal capacity investments - democracy and political stability.
Besley & Persson (2009) show that greater political inclusiveness (democracy) lowers
the value of redistribution and increases the value of common interest goods. A more
representative regime thus has a higher value for fiscal capacity and is more likely
to invest in it. Political stability fosters investments in fiscal capacity, because the
ruling group’s expected value of public funds increases with its ability to stay in
power. The higher the group’s likelihood of staying in power, the lower the chances
that taxes will be used as a redistributive tool against its interests, and the higher
the group’s incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. To measure democracy, I use
the polity score from the Polity IV dataset20. This indicator ranges from -10 to
10, with the highest score characterizing perfectly democratic countries. As proxy
for regime stability, I use data on the number of executive changes in a given year
from the Cross-National Time Series Archive.21 When specifically analyzing the
17Eventually, I would also like to control for the degree of formality of the economy as a measure
of VAT coverage, using data such as those collected by Schneider (2005).
18This is of course a very crude proxy, and disregards the fact that the administrative costs of
VAT adoption depend at least partially on the level of sophistication of the existing tax system.
Data on collection costs for other taxes could be a good proxy for the administrative costs of
VAT adoption. At the moment, however, such data are, to the best of my knowledge, not
available for a large sample of countries.
19http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.
20http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/.
21http://www.databanksinternational.com/32.html.
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political economy of VAT adoption, I also use the number of riots, anti-governmental
demonstrations, coups d’Etat and cabinet changes, from the same dataset.
In my tests for robustness and omitted variable bias, I use data on the share
of aid in GNI and the GDP growth rate from the World Development Indicators, as
well as the debt over GNI ratio from the Global Development Finance Indicators22.
The use of these data will be explained below.
All independent variables I use are potentially endogenous. In the absence
of a theoretical model, the direction of causality between these variables and VAT
adoption is unclear. I minimize endogeneity concerns by lagging the independent
variables.23 I estimate all models by separately using the first, second and third lag
of the independent variables, and their average over the years t − 1 to t − 3. All
results are robust across these specifications.
Means of all variables in 1975 and 2000 and other summary statistics are
displayed in Tables 3.I (economic variables) and 3.II (political variables). The figures
indicate that the countries which had adopted a VAT by 2000 had a higher level of
GDP per capita at both the beginning and the end of the sample period, although
the difference is not significant at the 10% level in 1975. VAT adopters also had
a lower share of imports in GDP and a lower share of trade tax revenue in total
tax revenue in 1975 and 2000, and these differences are significant at the 1% level.
Finally, VAT adopters were significantly more democratic as measured by the polity
score in 2000, and slightly so in 1975.24 Together, these results suggest a strong
correlation between VAT adoption and GDP per capita, reliance on trade taxes,
and democracy. These effects will reappear in the next section, which presents the
results of my empirical analysis.25
22http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-development-finance.
23Using lags avoids endogeneity bias only under the assumption that that economic agents do not
anticipate VAT adoption and adjust their economic accordingly, which is unlikely to hold.
24It also seems as if VAT adopting countries had a significantly higher number of riots, anti-
governmental demonstrations and cabinet changes in 2000, but these results are driven by
outliers.
25An important aim for future research is the extension of the dataset, because some weaknesses
in the empirical results (referred to below) are due to the short sample period. I have already
compiled data on VAT adoption dates for the entire period 1948-2010. Data on the economic
and political variables used are readily available from the aforementioned datasets and the Penn
World Tables. The IMF dummy, however, still needs to be coded for the years before 1970
and after 2004, using information from IMF annual reports and article IV consultation reports.
When doing this, I would also like to collect information on whether lending agreements con-
tained an explicit VAT condition, and whether they were accompanied by a technical assistance
package. Being able to distinguish between countries that had an IMF agreement without VAT
conditionality, those that had an agreement with VAT conditionality, and those that had an
agreement with conditionality and a technical assistance package would allow me to test for
the different IMF impact channels.
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Table 3.I: Summary Statistics for Economic Variables
Variable Min Max N Mean N Mean N t-value Mean N Mean N t-value
if VAT=1 if VAT=0 if VAT=1 if VAT=0
All Years 1975* 2000*
GDP per Capita 85 56372 3059 6234.947 75 3557.23 27 -1.545 9703.316 82 3356.49 39 -2.744
(1530.248) (924.960) (943.256) (1209.67)
GDP Growth -50.2 71.188 2463 3.251 52 2.504 26 -0.443 3.085 59 3.638 41 0.688
(0.382) (0.790) (0.769) (1.829)
Imports/GDP 0 251 2889 33.458 71 48. 827 29 3.252 38.761 67 53.714 35 3.010
(2.54) (4.857) (1.853) (5.633)
Tax Revenue/GDP 0.1 55.6 2991 23.896 52 18.346 13 -1.754 21.760 75 18.916 42 -1.311
(2.450) (4.857) (1.432) (2.666)
Trade Tax Rev./GDP 0 33.3 2983 2.9990 52 6.580 12 3.022 2.077 72 4.417 42 3.782
(0.246) (0.692) (0.381) (1.881)
Inflation Rate -13 11750 2681 21.606 66 9.703 27 -1.040 5.974 79 5.709 31 -0.110
(1.304) (1.922) (7.277) (1.166)
Agriculture/GDP 0 74 2911 21.954 71 27.304 23 1.328 17.629 70 20.593 32 0.963
(1.610) (2.886) (1.939) (3.787)
Adult Illiteracy Rate 1.6 93.7 2288 46.221 60 47.207 28 0.164 27.351 60 24.750 28 -.544
(2.859) (3.359) (3.580) (4.269)
Debt/GNI 0 824.539 2023 28.850 46 19.372 18 -1.936 75.022 55 70.237 31 -0.444
(2.541) (4.376) (6.450) (8.665)
Aid/GNI 0 211 3045 0.636 22 6.6 80 3.216 4.085 82 8.275 40 2.255
(0.250) (0.966) (0.746) (2.184)
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses, all amounts are in millions of US$, * data on inflation rate is for 1976, ** data on adult illiteracy rate
is for 1999.
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Table 3.II: Summary Statistics for Political Variables
Variable Min Max N Mean N Mean N t-value Mean N Mean N t-value
if VAT=1 if VAT=0 if VAT=1 if VAT=0
All Years 1975 2000
Polity IV Score -10 10 2693 -0.773 75 -2.961 26 -1.244 5.012 77 -0.427 28 -4.341
(0.624) (1.173) (0.912) (1.409)
Num. of Riots 0 26 3140 0.506 77 0.093 32 -1.548 0.280 82 0.046 43 -1.834
(0.090) (0.032) (0.169) (0.068)
Num. of Demonstrations 0 26 3142 0.480 77 0.5 32 0.057 0.927 82 0.093 43 -2.994
(0.199) (0.044) (0.186) (0.283)
Num. of Coups d’Etat 0 2 3153 0.769 78 0.030 33 -0.804 0.024 82 0.023 43 -0.039
(0.017) (0.023) (0.035) (0.030)
Num. of Cabinet Changes 0 5 3150 0.500 78 0.406 32 -0.706 0.512 82 0.279 43 -2.544
(0.055) (0.069) (0.074) (0.098)
Numb. of Exec. Changes 0 4 3153 0.282 78 0.181 33 -0.790 0.182 82 0.116 43 -0.961
(0.182) (0.116) (0.070) (0.101)
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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3.5 Empirical Results
This section presents the results of my empirical analyses. It first discusses the
baseline results, then presents the tests for omitted variables and reverse causality,
and finally analyzes the impact of political factors on VAT adoption.
3.5.1 Baseline Results
Stylized facts indicate that the time span between the decision to adopt a VAT
and the implementation of the VAT law varies across countries and ranges from
a few months to several years. This is true even when considering only countries
that adopted the VAT under IMF supervision.26 I therefore conduct my baseline
analysis using the combined dummy IMF−3 for an IMF intervention in one of the
last three years as the key independent variable. The results are displayed in Table
3.III. In column (1), I control for the full set of economic and political determinants
of VAT adoption lagged by one period. In column (2), I use the averages over year
t− 1 to t− 3 of these variables, to ensure that their impact is not driven by short-
run fluctuations. In both specifications, the impact of an IMF intervention in one
of the last three years is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. To
understand the economic significance of the results, one needs to derive the relative
hazard ratio of country i, which is under an IMF lending agreement, to country j,
which is not under a lending agreement, all else equal:
hi(t)
hj(t)
= exp((1− 0)β) = exp(β). (3.7)
Using the more conservative estimate from column (2), I find that a country which
had an IMF intervention in one of the last three years is 2.962 = exp(1.086) times
more likely to adopt the VAT than a country that had no intervention. The effect is
thus not only statistically but also economically significant.27 Moreover, this effect is
much larger than the effect estimated in Keen & Lockwood (2010), which finds that
countries that participate in a non-crisis IMF program have a 25% higher chance of
26Chad, for instance, adopted the VAT within a year of announcing this reform in 1999 (Letter
of Intent 1999, Article IV consultation report 2010). Guyana, on the other hand, had planned
VAT adoption since 2004 or earlier and achieved adoption in 2007 only (Article IV consultation
reports 2004 and 2008). IMF fiscal experts suggest that a preparatory period of 18 to 24 months
is necessary to set up a VAT (Tait 1988).
27I also analyzed the individual impacts of different types of IMF lending agreements by decom-
posing the IMF dummy into separate dummies for the main lending programs (Extended Funds
Facility, Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Standby Arrangement and Structural Adjust-
ment Facility). The coefficients of these dummies are significant in some specifications, but
not in others. This is probably due to the small sample size and small number of VAT adop-
tions that identify each coefficient. Using the extended dataset may eventually provide a more
informative picture on the relative effects of different lending programs.
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adopting the VAT. The probit estimation, which allows the control variables to play
a role in predicting the VAT dummy even after the adoption date, thus downward
biases the true IMF effect.
Among the independent variables in this model, only the coefficients on
GDP per capita and the share of imports in GDP are statistically significant, and
they have the expected sign. Countries with a higher level of GDP per capita and
a lower share of imports in GDP are more likely to adopt the VAT. Note that,
since the baseline hazard is not identified in this model, there is no measure for the
goodness of fit.
As a robustness test, I estimate the baseline model of different subsamples
to examine whether the IMF effect is driven by a specific group of countries. In
particular, countries with a low level of GDP per capita, low tax revenue and high
aid inflows may be more dependent on IMF lending and thus more susceptible to
IMF influence. I therefore estimate the baseline model excluding countries placed
in the upper or bottom quartile of the distribution of these variables in 1975. In
these estimations, I control only for the independent variables which showed some
sign of significance in the baseline results, GDP per capita and imports as a share
of GDP in t − 1. This limits the loss of observations and reduces the standard
errors, but does not affect the size of the coefficient on IMF−3. Column (3) of
Table 3.III shows the results of this model for the full sample and columns (4)-(9)
show the results for the different subsamples.28 The figures demonstrate that the
impact of an IMF intervention in one of the last three years is robust to excluding
countries with particularly high or low GDP per capita, tax revenue, and aid as a
share of GNI. All coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level and the size
of the coefficients does not vary significantly across subsamples. This shows that
the size and significance of the coefficient on IMF lending is not limited to specific
subsamples.29 However, my identification strategy does not allow me to conclude
that this is evidence of a causal effect of the IMF intervention. To shed more light
on the direction of causality, I test for the presence of omitted variables and reverse
causality.
28Note that the number of observations differs across subsamples, due to missing values and
discontinuity in the variables I use to define the subsamples.
29I also find that the effect of IMF lending is not limited to particular points in time (results
available upon request). First, I show that the effect of an IMF intervention in the last three
years is robust to excluding the first five and last five years of the sample period. Second, I
estimate a model with two IMF dummies, one for the first three years of lending, and one for all
other years (IMF_oth−3) and this yields a coefficient on IMF_oth−3, which is significant at
the 5% level. The coefficients on the dummy for the first three years of lending is insignificant
due to high standard errors. Results are similar when singling out the first four or five years of
lending. This shows that the effect of IMF lending is not limited to the first three to five years
of lending.
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Table 3.III: Baseline Results
Variable Lagged Averaged Reduced High Low High Low High Low
Controls Controls Controls GDPpc GDPpc Taxrev Taxrev Aid/GNI Aid/GNI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IMF−3 1.321*** 1.086** 1.340*** 1.480*** 1.711*** 1.155** 1.018** 1.515*** 1.202**
(0.508) (0.475) (0.404) (0.458) (0.505) (0.494) (0.514) (0.502) (0.500)
GDPpct−1 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IMP/GDPt−1 -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.016** -0.014* -0.027*** -0.033*** -0.028** -0.025*** -0.009
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Tradetaxrevt−1 -1.086 0.862
(1.449) (1.721)
Inflationt−1 -0.004 0.003
(0.008) (0.010)
Agric/GDPt−1 -0.027 -0.025
(0.017) (0.019)
Illiteracyt−1 0.012 0.010
(0.010) (0.011)
Polityt−1 0.006 -0.001
(0.032) (0.033)
EX_CHAt−1 0.473 0.467
(0.316) (0.544)
Observations 850 728 1484 1186 1034 648 560 1066 868
Notes: The table shows the results of a Cox hazard model estimation of VAT adoption. The dependent variable is a dummy that switches on once a country has adopted the VAT. The key
independent variable is IMF−3, a dummy indicating whether a country had an IMF intervention in the past three years. The control variables are explained in section 3.4. Columns (1)-(3) present
the results for the full sample, with different specifications of the control variables (all controls as simple lags, all controls as averages over t− 1 to t− 3, and a reduced set of simple lagged controls).
Columns (4)-(9) present results for different subsamples, as explained in section 3.III. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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3.5.2 Testing for Omitted Variables
Omitted variables are a key challenge to my identification strategy. Indeed, any
shock that causes both VAT adoption and IMF intervention would result in a spuri-
ous correlation between these two events. An external debt crisis is most obviously
correlated with IMF intervention and possibly VAT adoption. A debt crisis often re-
quires an IMF intervention to provide short-term lending and re-establish investors’
confidence. It may also push a country to adopt a VAT to increase tax revenue
and service the debt. Shocks to tax revenue, imports or GDP growth may also
destabilize public finances in a way that necessitates both an IMF intervention and
VAT adoption. I therefore test whether including proxies for these shocks in my
regressions reduces the significance of the IMF impact on VAT adoption. If the IMF
effect in the baseline results was driven by omitted variables, it should disappear
once the omitted variables are included.
As debt crisis proxy, I use the dummy Debt_S to indicate whether the
difference in the external debt to GNI ratio between year t and t − 1 was in the
upper decile of the distribution of differences. The dummy is correlated with the
debt crisis dummy used in Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) at the 1% level of significance,
which suggests that it is a good proxy. I use this proxy instead of the dummy from
Reinhart & Rogoff (2009), because the latter is defined for only one-third of the
country-year points in my sample. I also use dummy variables for tax revenue and
imports shocks, Taxrev_S and IMP/GDP_S. These dummies indicate whether
the change in the tax to GDP ratio and in the imports to GDP ratio respectively
were in the lower decile of the distribution. The choice of the upper and lower
deciles as the cut-off levels for these dummies is of course an arbitrary one, but the
results are robust to using the upper and lower quantiles and quartiles as cut-off
levels. Finally, I also control for growth shocks by using the growth rate, a dummy
for negative growth, and a dummy for a growth rate less than -5%. For the debt,
tax revenue, imports and growth shocks, I use a three-year combined dummy that
indicates whether the respective shock took place in one of the last three years. This
ensures that I capture the impact of a shock on VAT adoption, even if it does not
materialize immediately. In all regressions, I control for the first lag of GDP per
capita and imports as a share of GDP.
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Table 3.IV: Testing for Omitted Variables
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IMF−3 1.340*** 1.097** 1.050*** 1.101*** 1.341*** 1.355*** 1.361***
(0.404) (0.483) (0.390) (0.389) (0.404) (0.399) (0.400)
Debt_S−3 0.501
(0.369)
Taxrev_S−3 0.148
(0.331)
IMP/GDP_S−3 0.088
(0.358)
GDP_growtht−1 0.005
(0.018)
Neg_growth−3 0.176
(0.271)
Growth_− 5−3 -0.483
(0.636)
Observations 1484 1146 1263 1336 1474 1450 1447
Notes: The table shows the results of a Cox hazard model estimation of VAT adoption. The dependent variable is a dummy that switches on once a country
has adopted the VAT. The key independent variable is IMF−3, a dummy indicating whether a country had an IMF intervention in the past three years.
The coefficients on the control variables GDPpct−1 and IMP/GDPt−1 are omitted. Columns (2)-(7) add indicators for various macroeconomic shocks
that could trigger an IMF intervention, as discussed in section 3.5.2. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The results are displayed in Table 3.IV. They show that none of the shock
variables predicts VAT adoption and that the inclusion of these shocks does not
alter the size and significance of the IMF dummies. An IMF intervention in the
past three years roughly triples the likelihood of VAT adoption even in the presence
of these shocks. This would suggest that my results are not driven by omitted
variables. There are two reasons, however, why including these shock dummies may
not reduce the significance of the IMF coefficients, even if the IMF effect is driven
by omitted variables. First, the effect may be driven by omitted variables other
than those that I control for. A second concern is that the dummies I use may not
be good proxies for the shocks for which I want to control.
In conclusion, although the tests I conduct do not allow me to completely
rule out the existence of omitted variable bias, they at least indicate that proxies for
the shocks most commonly related to IMF interventions do not alter the observed
IMF effect on VAT adoption. This still leaves the possibility that the results are
driven by reverse causality, the second challenge to my identification strategy.
3.5.3 Testing for Reverse Causality
In order to investigate the presence of reverse causality, I conduct a falsification
test by estimating the baseline model with a measure of future IMF interventions
on the right-hand side. If the line of causality runs from the IMF intervention to
VAT adoption, and if there are no anticipatory effects of future IMF interventions
on VAT adoption, the coefficient on the lead IMF interventions should not be signif-
icant.30 There are, however, two problems with such a test. First, there are reverse
causality scenarios in which the IMF intervention and VAT adoption take place
simultaneously: for example if a country requests an IMF intervention in order to
adopt the VAT. Therefore, insignificance of the coefficient on lead IMF interventions
is no clear sign for the absence of reverse causality. The test I conduct is thus a
very crude falsification test. Second, as the IMF program lasts from one to four
years, and contracts are often renewed, there is significant autocorrelation in IMF
interventions. This could result in a significant correlation between VAT adoption
and future IMF interventions, even in the absence of reverse causality. I therefore
30While possible in theory, anticipatory effects are highly unlikely in practice. There is
no evidence for ex ante conditionality in the sense that the IMF makes VAT adop-
tion a condition for future intervention (although some programs such as the Flexible
Credit Line are available only to countries that have shown good fiscal performance,
cf.http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fcl.htm). Article IV consultation reports that
precede a lending agreement occasionally mention the adoption of a VAT, but do not make
it an explicit condition for the conclusion of a lending agreement. Besides, since the process
of adopting the VAT can span several years, and countries that apply for an IMF loan need
financial support immediately, it is unlikely that they would agree to VAT adoption as an ex
ante condition.
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conduct the falsification test with two different measures of future IMF interven-
tions: the lead of the previously employed IMF dummy, and the lead of a proxy for
IMF program “onset,” which takes into account only the first or first two years of
each IMF program.
The results using the lead IMF dummy, IMF+3, are displayed in columns
(1) and (2) of Table 3.V. This dummy is constructed analogously to the dummy
IMF−3 used in the previous section, and indicates whether the country was under
an IMF lending agreement in one of the years t+ 1, t+ 2 and t+ 3. In column (1), I
control for the full set of economic and political determinants of VAT adoption, and
in column (2) only for GDP per capita and imports, lagged by one period. As the
figures show, the coefficient of an IMF intervention in one of the forthcoming three
years is highly significant, suggesting a strong correlation between VAT adoption
and future IMF interventions. In an attempt to further explore the time pattern of
this correlation, I also estimate the baseline model with simple rather than combined
leads and lags of the IMF dummy. Here I control only for the first lag of GDP per
capita and imports. The coefficients of the IMF dummy from the fifth lag to the
fifth lead are plotted in Figure 3.III. In this figure, the year of VAT adoption is
set to zero and the coefficient on an IMF intervention z years before (after) VAT
adoption is plotted at x-coordinate -z (z). The coefficients are significant from the
third lag to the third lead, except for the second lag.31 This confirms that both IMF
interventions before and after the VAT adoption date are significantly correlated
with VAT adoption.
One possible explanation for this could be the presence of omitted variables.
However, the results discussed in the previous section already showed that including
potentially omitted variables does not alter the effect of the lagged IMF dummy.
The same is true for the lead IMF dummy. The correlation of VAT adoption and
an IMF intervention in the following three years is of similar size to the correlation
of the lagged IMF dummy, and the size and significance of the correlation changes
little when proxies for various types of shocks are controlled for.
31The insignificance of the second lag is surprising but can safely be regarded as random due to
the small sample size. Indeed, since my sample includes only 60 VAT adopters, the coefficients
of the IMF dummies are sensitive to small changes in the number of observations that identify
them. For the first three years after VAT adoption, the year of adoption, and the first and
third year before adoption, the number of countries that experienced an IMF intervention in
that specific year lies between 24 and 26. However, only 19 countries had an IMF intervention
two years before VAT adoption. I expect the insignificance of the second lag to disappear once
I use data that covers a larger number of VAT adoptions.
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Figure 3.III: Coefficients on IMF Dummies
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Notes: The figure plots the coefficients on the IMF dummy (=1 if country is under an
IMF intervention) in a Cox hazard model of VAT adoption, for IMF interventions 5 years
before and after the year of VAT adoption. The estimations control for GDP and imports
in year t− 1.
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Table 3.V: Testing for Reverse Causality
Variable Full Reduced Full controls Reduced Controls
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
IMF+3 1.520*** 1.242***
(0.500) (0.352)
IMF_onset1−3 0.592 0.539*
(0.380) (0.311)
IMF_onset1+3 0.511 0.277
(0.367) (0.317)
IMF_onset2−3 0.965** 0.838**
(0.442) (0.339)
IMF_onset2+3 0.608 0.386
(0.414) (0.317)
Observations 837 1484 837 837 837 837 1484 1484 1484 1484
Notes: The table shows the results of a Cox hazard model estimation of VAT adoption. The dependent variable is a dummy that switches on once a
country has adopted the VAT. In columns (1) and (2), the independent variable is IMF+3, a dummy indicating whether a country had an IMF intervention
in years t+ 1 to t+ 3. Columns (3)-(10) test the effect of the IMF_onset dummy, which is discussed in Section 3.5.3 and indicates whether the country
experienced the onset (first year or first two years) of an IMF intervention in the last three or following three years (indicated by subscript −3 and +3
respectively). The coefficients on the control variables are omitted. For columns (1)-(6), the control variables are as in Table 3.III, column (1). For
columns (7)-(10), the control variables are as in Table 3.III, column (3). Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Another possible explanation is autocorrelation in IMF interventions. To
examine whether the correlation between VAT adoption and future IMF interven-
tions persist once autocorrelation in IMF interventions is controlled for, I code a
measure of IMF program onset. Unfortunately, my data do not allow me to cleanly
distinguish among different IMF lending agreements. I can distinguish among four
different types of lending programs32, but cannot distinguish between different lend-
ing agreements in the same program, unless they are separated by a year without
lending. I thus code program-specific dummies that take into account only the first
year (first two years) of a continuous period of lending, and then sum up these
program dummies to obtain the dummies IMF_onset1, for the first year of each
lending period, and IMF_onset2, for the first two years of each lending period.33
These dummies are an imperfect measure of program “onset” because they ignore
lending agreements that immediately follow the previous agreement. Approximately
11% of the country-year points experience the first year of an IMF lending agree-
ment during the sample period, and 14.5% experience the first or second year of an
agreement.
The results using the combined three-year lag and lead versions of these
IMF onset dummies are presented in columns (3)-(10) of Table 3.V. In columns
(3)-(6), I use the full set of controls and in columns (7)-(10), I use only GDP per
capita and imports, all lagged by one period. With the full set of controls, countries
that experienced the first year of an IMF lending agreement in years t− 1 to t− 3
(column (3)) are not more likely to introduce the VAT in year t (probably due to
the small number of observations that identify this coefficient), but countries that
experienced the first or second year of a lending agreement in the past three years
(column (5)) are more likely to introduce the VAT at the 5% level of significance.
More importantly, countries that will experience the onset of IMF lending in the
forthcoming three years (columns (4) and (6)) are not more likely to introduce the
VAT. The results are similar but stronger when using only the reduced set of controls.
Countries that experienced the first or first two years of a lending agreement in the
past three years (columns (7) and (9)) are more likely to adopt the VAT at least at
the 10% level, but countries that experience program onset in the forthcoming three
years (columns (8) and (10)) are not more likely to introduce the VAT. Thus, even
an imperfect measure of program onset, which does not take into account all lending
agreements, shows that lagged IMF interventions are significantly correlated to VAT
adoption, but that future IMF interventions are not. This provides credence to the
hypothesis that the line of causality runs from IMF interventions to VAT adoption
and not the reverse.
32Extended Fund Facility, Poverty Reduction and Growth Project, Standby Agreement and Struc-
tural Adjustment Facility
33No country was ever under two different programs at the same time, so the sum of the program
dummies is still a dummy variable.
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However, even if I can show that future IMF interventions are not correlated
to VAT adoption, this leaves the possibility that the IMF effect is driven by simul-
taneous reverse causality, in the sense that the IMF is more likely to intervene in
countries that plan to adopt the VAT. This is a challenge that cannot be addressed
in the Cox hazard framework. An instrumental variable strategy would be the nat-
ural way to correctly identify the impact of an IMF intervention on VAT adoption.
Barro & Lee (2005) and Easterly (2005), for example, use various geopolitical factors
as instruments for IMF lending. However, two-stage methods for hazard models are
only in a nascent stage of development, mainly due to the non-linear nature of these
models (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004).
3.5.4 The Political Economy of VAT Adoption
Given that VAT adoption is a politically sensitive topic, it is interesting to exam-
ine how the political context affects the interplay between VAT adoption and IMF
interventions. As mentioned before, I focus here on the effect of democracy and
regime stability, which have been identified by Besley & Persson (2009) as factors
promoting fiscal investments. However, instead of using proxies for democracy and
stability, I use proxies for autocracy and instability, and analyze the direct impact
of these factors on VAT adoption as well as their interaction with the IMF effect.
This allows me to investigate the idea brought forth by Vreeland (2003), according
to which an IMF intervention may help countries to implement unpopular reforms
even if the political context is not favorable to that implementation. A loose inter-
pretation of this idea would suggest that an IMF intervention might attenuate the
negative effect of autocracy and political instability on VAT adoption. One would
thus expect the coefficients on the autocracy and instability measures to have a
negative sign and the interaction term between each of these factors and the IMF
dummy to have a positive sign.34
I use three different measures of autocracy, all lagged by one period:35 the
negative of the polity IV score Neg_Polityt−1, an autocracy dummy indicating
whether the polity score was weakly negative, Autoc0t−1, and a autocracy dummy
indicating whether the polity score was below 5, Autoc5t−1. These are the cut-off
levels traditionally used in the economics and political science literature respectively
(Besley & Kudamatsu 2008; Persson & Tabellini 2008; Fearon 2008). Again, I
control for GDP per capita and imports as a share of GDP in period t−1. Columns
(1)-(3) of Table 3.VI display the effect of these autocracy measures on VAT adoption.
34This obviously remains a rather intuitive prediction, and a theoretical treatment of the political
determinants of VAT adoption is ultimately needed to shed more light on the lines of causality,
as I explain below.
35The results are similar when using the second or third lag of the autocracy measures.
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For each of the three measures, the coefficients of the autocracy indicator and of
its interaction with the IMF dummy are both highly significant, of approximately
the same size and of opposing signs. The autocracy measure thus cancels out when
the country is under an IMF lending agreement. This can be interpreted as follows:
in the presence of an IMF intervention, the degree of autocracy has no impact on
the likelihood of VAT adoption. Absent an IMF intervention, however, autocratic
countries are less likely to adopt the VAT. It thus seems that an IMF intervention
attenuates the negative effect of autocracy on VAT adoption.36
The effect of different measures of political instability on VAT adoption
is displayed in columns (4)-(9) of Table 3.VI. As instability measures, I use the
number of riots, anti-governmental demonstrations, coups d’Etat, cabinet changes
and changes in the executive in the last three years. The coefficients of all instability
measures and their interaction with the IMF dummy are insignificant, and these
results are robust to using the simple lag of the instability measures, their five-year
averages, or other instability measures such as the variance of the polity score, or
the number of changes in the polity score over the last five years (results available
upon request). This means that political instability does not affect VAT adoption,
and the IMF impact on VAT adoption does not differ across countries according to
their degree of political instability.
36Whether an IMF intervention has a beneficial effect on VAT adoption in non-autocratic countries
is unclear. The first specification, in which the IMF dummy is highly significant, suggests that
this is the case. In the second and third specifications, however, in which I use autocracy
dummies rather than the continuous autocracy measure, the coefficient of the IMF dummy
is insignificant. This would mean that democracies under IMF lending are no more likely
to introduce the VAT than democracies without IMF lending. Verification with cross-tabulate
revealed that the problem is not one of lack of variation (too few observations in the off-diagonal
cells). Still, using a larger sample might allow me to overcome these empirical irregularities.
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Table 3.VI: The Political Economy of VAT Adoption
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IMF−3 1.531*** 0.264 0.099 1.351*** 1.339*** 1.348*** 0.976** 1.459***
(0.511) (0.484) (0.643) (0.415) (0.445) (0.411) (0.444) (0.460)
Variable Neg_Polityt−1 Autoc0t−1 Autoc5t−1 RIOTS−3 ANTIGOV−3 CDETAT−3 CAB_CHA−3 EX_CHA−3
Coefficient -0.166*** -2.007** -1.656** 0.029 0.061 0.218 -0.164 0.227
(0.056) (0.8987) (0.739) (0.045) (0.065) (0.829) (0.246) (0.322)
Interaction Effect 0.177*** -2.396** 1.944** -0.035 -0.032 -0.562 0.250 -0.347
(0.062) (0.956) (0.924) (0.042) (0.065) (0.921) (0.267) (0.366)
Observations 1228 1228 1228 1412 1415 1419 1419 1419
Notes: The table shows the results of a Cox hazard model estimation of VAT adoption. The dependent variable is a dummy that switches on once a
country has adopted the VAT. The key independent variable is IMF−3, a dummy indicating whether a country had an IMF intervention in the past three
years. The coefficients of the control variables, as shown in Table 3.III column (1), are omitted. In each column, a different political dummy variable
(specified in row (3) and discussed in section 3.5.4) as well as its interaction with the IMF dummy is added to the estimation. Rows (4) and (5) show
the coefficient of the political dummy and of its interaction with the IMF dummy. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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In summary, the effects of autocracy and regime instability on VAT adop-
tion are weaker than those predicted by the fiscal investment literature. Autocracy
reduces the likelihood of VAT adoption, but this effect is attenuated by an IMF
intervention, and regime instability seems to have no impact on adoption. These
results are robust to using various different proxies for autocracy and instability. It
is thus unlikely that they are driven by measurement errors in the variables used. A
more plausible explanation is that VAT adoption is inherently different from other
types of fiscal investments and thus not driven by the same determinants. In partic-
ular, the IMF seems to play an overarching role in promoting the VAT and possibly
crowds out the effects of other political and economic determinants of VAT adop-
tion. Overall, these findings highlight the importance of developing a theoretical
framework to study how the political economy context affects VAT adoption and
the interplay between VAT adoption and IMF lending.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the impact of IMF lending on VAT adoption in a haz-
ard model framework. It finds that IMF lending approximately triples a country’s
likelihood of adopting the VAT. I show that this result is not driven by omitted
variables such as debt crises and shocks to growth, tax revenue and imports, and I
provide suggestive evidence against reverse causality. I also find that IMF interven-
tions reduce the negative effect of autocracy on VAT adoption. My methodological
approach faces two shortcomings, which open directions for future research.
First, I do not have clear theoretical predictions about the mechanisms
through which the IMF affects VAT adoption. A discussion of the context sug-
gests that the IMF can influence VAT adoption through lending conditionality, the
provision of technical assistance, and a reduction of the political costs of adoption.
Embedding these ideas into a political agency model would allow for a better under-
standing of these different impact mechanisms. The model could then yield testable
predictions of the relative importance of the different IMF impact channels, and
their interplay with the political economy context.
The second shortcoming is that the empirical strategy does not allow me
to cleanly identify a causal effect of IMF interventions on VAT adoption. I provide
evidence against omitted variable bias and show that future IMF interventions are
not correlated with VAT adoption, once autocorrelation in IMF interventions is con-
trolled for. However, this still leaves the possibility that the results are driven by
simultaneous reverse causality. Investigating the IMF’s influence on other types of
112
fiscal reforms in developing countires might provide better opportunities for identi-
fying a causal effect.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
Table A.I: Robustness of Bunching Estimates
Panel A: Varying the Order of Polynomial
Order of Polynomial 3 4 5 6 7
High-rate Firms, 2006/07/09 4.28 3.92 4.44 6.05 5.53
(.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1)
Low-rate Firms, 2006/07/09 1.93 2.04 2 2.47 2.5
(.2) (.2) (.2) (.2) (.2)
High-rate Firms, 2010 2.55 2.25 2.05 1.48 1.41
(.2) (.2) (.2) (.2) (.1)
Panel B: Varying the Number of Excluded Bins
Number of Excluded Bins 1 2 3 4 5
High-rate Firms, 2006/07/09 1.83 2.57 3.65 4.44 2.23
(.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1)
Low-rate Firms, 2006/07/09 1.7 2 2.01 1.48 1.45
(.1) (.2) (.2) (.3) (.3)
High-rate Firms, 2010 1.82 2.05 2.6 2.43 2.34
(.1) (.2) (.2) (.2) (.3)
Notes: The table presents estimates of the excess mass b, for different specifications of
the estimating equation (2.19), for the subsamples considered in table 2.II. Bunching b
is the excess mass in the excluded range around the kink, in proportion to the average
counterfactual density in the excluded range. Panel A presents estimates for different
choices of the order of polynomial q ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, for the excluded range chosen as
in table 2.II (4 bins on either side of the kink for high-rate firms in 2006/07/09, 2 bins
otherwise). Panel B presents estimates for different choices of the excluded range (1 − 5
bins on either side of the kink), for the order of polynomial chosen as in table 2.II (q = 5).
Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table A.II: Estimating Output Evasion Responses
Observed Responses Without Evasion With Evasion
Bunching (b) Profit Rate (∆pˆ) Output Elasticity (εy) Evasion Rate Response
εy = 0 εy = 0.5 εy = 1 εy = 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High-rate Firms, 2006/07/09 4.44 1.0 133.3 67.6 67.4 67.1 67.5
(0.1) (0.03) (3.8) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0)
Low-rate Firms, 2006/07/09 2.00 0.4 34.3 17.6 17.3 17.1 15
(0.2) (0.04) (3.0) (1.7) (1.7) (1.7) (1.7)
High-rate Firms, 2010 2.05 0.4 14.7 15.1 14.6 14.1 10.0
(0.2) (0.03) (1.2) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
Notes: This table analyzes the robustness of the estimates reported in table 2.II when allowing for output evasion rather than cost evasion. The table
presents bunching, elasticity and evasion estimates for the subsamples considered in panels A, B and D of figure 2.IV. Column (1)-(3) repeat the first
three columns of table 2.II. Column (1) reproduces the bunching estimate b, based on estimating equation (2.19). Bunching b is the excess mass in the
excluded range around the kink, in proportion to the average counterfactual density in the excluded range. Column (2) presents an estimate of the profit
rate response associated with b, based on the relationship ∆pˆ = B/f0 (τy/τpi) ' b× binwidth. Column (3) presents estimates of the real output elasticity
εy for the model without evasion. This model is based on the assumption that bunching is purely due to a real output response. εy is estimated using
the relationship ∆p = [c/y − c′ (y)] dy/y '
(
τ2y /τpi
)
εy. Columns (4)-(7) present estimates of the output evasion response as percentage of taxable profits
(evasion rate responses), for the model with output evasion but no cost evasion, as presented in section 2.3.3. This model allows for bunching to be driven by
both output evasion and real output response. The evasion response estimates are based on ∆pˆ = y (y/yˆ) (τy/τpi)− (1− τy/τpi) (τy/τpi) [d(y − yˆ)/(yˆ − cˆ)],
assuming different real output elasticities εy ∈ {0, 0.5, 1, 5}. Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table A.III: Data Cleaning Steps
Panel A: Sample Definition
Sample Definition
Firms Reporting Profits Firms reporting profits Π, turnover y and incorporation date D.
& Turnover Based on Π and y, derive implied tax liablities T˜ y, T˜ΠH and T˜ΠL
(high and low profit rate).
Consistency Check I Drop firm if reported and implied tax liability inconsistent
i.e. T y 6= T˜ y or TΠ 6= T˜ΠH and TΠ 6= T˜ΠL .
If TΠ = T˜ΠH or T˜ΠL , assign {H,L}.
If TΠ missing, assign {H,L} based on y, D and capital K.
Consistency Check II Drop firm if reported and implied taxpayer status inconsistent,
i.e. if T y > TΠ and T˜ y < T˜Π; T y < TΠ and T˜ y > T˜Π;
T˜ y > T˜Π and T y missing ; T˜ y < T˜Π and TΠ missing.
Panel B: Sample Size
Step Year High-rate Firms Low-rate Firms
Raw data 2006/07/09 45,284
2008 21,445
2010 21,584
Firms Reporting Profits 2006/07/09 10,228 2,899
& Turnover 2008 4,515 1,546
2010 4,862 1,867
After Consistency Check I 2006/07/09 10,265 2,198
2008 4,706 1,126
2010 5,212 1,418
After Consistency Check II 2006/07/09 9,472 1,966
2008 4,706 1,115
2010 4,678 1,239
Notes: Panel A of this table explains the consistency checks applied to the data. For
all consistency checks, a tolerance threshold of 5% is used. Panel B displays the sample
size for different steps in the cleaning process. Capital K is equity plus retained earnings.
Note that the implied turnover tax liability used for consistency check I is gross implied
turnover tax liability minus net deductions (which are deduced from the tax liablity before
the taxpayer status - turnover or profit taxpayer - is determined). For the same reason,
the profits to turnover ratio used for consistency check II and for the bunching graphs is
(profits-net reductions)/turnover, for firms that report positive net reductions.
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Table A.IV: Comparison of Missing and Non-missing Observa-
tions
Panel A: Firms Reporting Profits and Turnover
N Median Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Profits 17,358 0.1 -35.3 1624
Turnover 17,358 25.1 711.7 5579.6
Salary 7,865 8.8 63 265.6
Interest 9,726 0.9 84.8 901.2
Share of Low-rate Firms 17358 0.18
Panel B: Firms Reporting Profits Only
Profits 13,155 0 -69.8 2483.8
Salary 3,500 15 105.5 514
Interest 5,176 0.7 157.9 1472.3
Share of Low-rate Firms 11814 0.14
Panel C: Firms Reporting Turnover Only
Turnover 8,551 9.2 454.5 7399.1
Salary 3,078 5 37.8 271.8
Interest 3,767 0.7 40.2 259.9
Share of Low-rate Firms 8,551 0.27
Notes: The table compares different samples of firms depending on wether or not they re-
port profits and turnover. Panel A considers firms that report both profits and turnover.
Panel B considers firms that report profits only. Panel C considers firms that report
turnover only. Columns (1)-(4) report the number of observations, median, mean and
standard deviation for different observable characteristics (turnover, profits, salary pay-
ments, interest payments, share of small firms). All statistics are in million Pakistani
Rupees (PKR).
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Figure A.I: Bunching among High-rate Firms
A: Cleaned Data, 2006/07/09 B: Raw Data, 2006/07/09
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Notes: This figure shows bunching in the sample of high-rate firms in 2006/07/09, in the
cleaned data (panel A, same as panel A in figure 2.II), and the raw data (panel B). The
raw data contains all observations that report turnover and profits, before consistency
checks I and II are applied, and before firms reporting pi = 0 are dropped. The graphs
show the empirical density distribution of the profit rate (reported profit as percentage of
turnover). The tax rate schedule is explained in the notes to figure 2.II. For high-rates
firms in 2006/07/09, the minimum tax regime places the kink at a profit rate of 1.43%
(firms with a profit rate above this threshold fall under the profit tax scheme, while firms
with a profit rate below fall under the turnover tax scheme). The kink point is marked
by a vertical solid line. The zero profit point is marked by a vertical dotted line. The bin
size is 0.214, chosen so that the kink point is a bin centre.
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Figure A.II: Numerical Analysis of Optimal Tax Policy with
Distortionary Profit Tax
A: Optimal Tax Rule
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Notes: This figure analyzes the robustness of the numerical policy analysis shown in
Figure 2.V when using a distortionary profit tax as a benchmark. We rescale our tax base
parameter µ so that the implied tax wedge ω equals 17% – the mean effective tax rate on
profits reported in Gruber & Rauh (2007) – implying µ = 0.62 when τpi = 0.35. The solid
black curve in panel A again plots the left-hand side of the optimal tax rule (equation
2.11) as a function of the rescaled µ for τpi = 0.35. The three red markers on the dashed
gray curve show respectively the right-hand side of the optimal tax rule at µ = 0, at
µ = (0.2/0.35)× 0.62 based on the evasion rate response estimated for the low-rate firms,
and at µ = 0.62 based on the evasion rate response estimated for the high-rate firms. By
extrapolating between these three estimates, we find that the optimal tax base implied by
the tax rule equals µ = 0.383 as compared to µ = 0.578 for a completely nondistortionary
profit tax. In panel B we replicate the exercise to find the optimal tax base as a function
of the tax rate for three different levels of the output elasticity.
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 List of Countries and VAT Adopters
Countries in the sample: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central
African Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Rep., Costa Rica,
Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiri-
bati, Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mal-
dives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Gr.,
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
VAT adopters and adoption year: Algeria (1992), Australia (2000), Bangladesh
(1991), Barbados (1997), Benin (1991), Burkina Faso (1993), Cameroon (1999),
Canada (1991), Chad (2000), China (1994), Congo, Rep. (1997), Dominican Repub-
lic (1983), Egypt (1991), Fiji (1992), Finland (1994), Gabon (1995), Ghana (1998),
Greece (1987), Guatemala (1983), Guinea (1996), Haiti (1982), Honduras (1976),
Iceland (1990), Indonesia (1985), Japan (1989), Kenya (1990), Korea (1977), Mada-
gascar (1994), Malawi (1989), Mali (1991), Mauritania (1995), Mauritius (1998),
Morocco (1986), Mozambique (1999), Namibia (2000), Nepal (1997), New Zealand
(1986), Niger (1986), Nigeria (1994), Pakistan (1990), Panama (1977), Papua New
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Guinea (1999), Paraguay (1993), Philippines (1988), Portugal (1986), Samoa (1994),
Senegal (1980), Singapore (1994), South Africa (1991), Spain (1986), Sri Lanka
(1998), Switzerland (1995), Tanzania (1998), Thailand (1992), Togo (1995), Trinidad
and Tobago (1990), Tunisia (1988), Uganda (1996), Vanuatu (1998), Venezuela
(1993), Zambia (1995).
B.2 The History of VAT Adoption in Ghana
The Government of Ghana passed a VAT bill in December 1994. Stipulating VAT
adoption in March 1995, the bill left no time for awareness campaigns and the
necessary investments in administrative capacity. Citizens were left uninformed
about the functioning of the VAT, most businesses were unable to carry out the self-
assessment, and the state did not have the capacity to process the VAT recrediting
applications. In May 1995, popular anger against VAT adoption was taken to the
streets in violent protests that left four people dead. Although the government
withdrew the VAT shortly after these incidents, the political damage it had created
was substantial. In the 1996 parliamentary elections, the government lost 56 of its
189 seats. Ghanaian political scientists clearly relate this to the attempted VAT
adoption (Osei (2000), Assibey-Mensah (1999)). Ghana finally adopted the VAT
successfully in March 1998 - this time after intense preparations.
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B.3 Variable Definition
Variable Definition
IMFt Dummy = 1 if the country was under a lending agreement with the
IMF for at least five months in year t.
IMF+3 Dummy = 1 if the country was under a lending agreement with the
IMF for at least five months in at least one of the years t+ 1, t+ 2 and t+ 3.
IMF−3 Dummy = 1 if the country was under a lending agreement with the
IMF for at least five months in at least one of the years t− 1, t− 2 and t− 3.
GDPpct−1 GDP per capita in t− 1.
IMP/GDP−3 Imports as a share of GDP in t− 1.
Tradetaxrevt−1 Trade tax revenue as a share of tax revenue in t− 1.
Inflationt−1 Annual inflation rate in t− 1.
Agric/GDPt−1 Share of agricultural GDP in total GDP in t− 1.
Illiteracyt−1 Adult illiteracy rate in t− 1.
Polityt−1 PolityIV score in t− 1.
EX_CHAt−1 Number of changes in the executive in t− 1.
Debt_S−3 Debt shock dummy = 1 if the increase in debt from year t− 1 to year t
was in the upper decile of the distribution of differences, in at least one of
the years t+ 1, t+ 2 and t+ 3.
Taxrev_S−3 Tax revenue shock dummy = 1 if the decrease in tax revenue as a share
of GDP from year t− 1 to year t was in the upper decile of the distribution
of differences, in at least one of the years t− 1, t− 2 and t− 3.
IMP/GDP_S−3 Imports shock dummy = 1 if the decrease in imports as a share of
GDP from year t− 1 to year t was in the upper decile of the distribution
of differences, in at least one of the years t− 1, t− 2 or t− 3.
GDP_growtht−1 Annual GDP growth rate.
Neg_growth−3 Negative growth dummy = 1 if the GDP growth rate was negative
in at least one of the years t− 1, t− 2 or t− 3.
Growth_− 5−3 Dummy = 1 if the GDP growth rate was less than -5% in at least one
of the years t+ 1, t+ 2 or t+ 3.
IMF_onset1−3 Dummy = 1 if an IMF program (as defined in section 5.3)
started in one of the years t− 1, t− 2 or t− 3.
IMF_onset2−3 Dummy = 1 if the first or second year of an IMF program
took place in one of the years t− 1, t− 2 or t− 3.
Neg_Polityt−1 Negative of the polityIV score in t− 1.
Autoc0t−1 Autocracy dummy = 1 if the polityIV score was weakly negative in year t− 1.
Autoc5t−1 Autocracy dummy = 1 if the polityIV score was below 5 in year t− 1.
RIOTS−3 Total number of riots in years t− 1, t− 2 or t− 3.
ANTIGOV−3 Total number of antigovernment demonstrations in years t− 1,
t− 2 or t− 3.
CDETAT−3 Total number of coups d’Etat in years t− 1, t− 2 or t− 3.
CAB_CHA−3 Total number of major cabinet changes in years t− 1, t− 2 or t− 3.
EX_CHA−3 Total number of changes in the executive in years t− 1, t− 2 or t− 3.
